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This thesis, in the field of music composition and performance practice, presents the 
results of a practice-research project into performance validity and notational 
reliability in vigilant musical practice. 
 
From my initial inquiry into what constitutes a valid performance, three ground 
principles were observed: non-normative cognitive states (how the performer thinks); 
embodied multimodal imagery across a full effort scale (the images a performer 
draws with their presence); and inter-personal communication (the performer’s 
readiness to react to the audience’s presence) and the performance environment. 
These three interconnected skills form what I come to call vigilant performance 
practice. This thesis aims to define a conceptual framework for vigilant music 
practice, at the stages of composition, of rehearsal, and of performance. 
 
In support of vigilant practice, a set of developmental tools and activities were 
constructed that promote each of the three vigilance skills. These tools and activities 
are developed in practice in a sequence of sixty-four scores entitled Games for 
Musicians and Non-Musicians. This workbook promotes the development of vigilance 
skills in the context of improvised music performance in groups. Games for 
Musicians and Non-Musicians was rehearsed and performed publicly in several 
occasions. Reports of those events are presented here. 
Vigilant performance practice has the potential to be of use in music education and 
professional training, with different age groups (including children), as well as in other 
types of performance practice. It may be of use outside the performance environment 
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Developing a Vigilant 
Musical Practice 
Non-normative cognition, embodied multi-modal imagery, and inter-personal 
communication in the notation, rehearsal, and performance of improvised music 
Part 1 – Identifying the problem: 
performance validity and 
notational reliability 
 
1.1.  Introduction – Origins of the problem: my 
perspective  
The primary creative and compositional aim of this research project is to generate 
compositional, learning and performative tools that allow the performers to develop 
forms of embodied communication with their audiences and amongst themselves.  
 
At a very basic level, this research addresses a problem that I have identified very 
early on in my activities as composer, performer, music teacher, and as music 
consumer: what makes some music performances better than others? That is to say, 
why are some performances (music and other forms) magical, touching, educative, 
transformative, and others are not? This is a problem that has concerned me since I 
started composing music, and in its simplicity, raises a number of subsequent 
problems, which quickly grow exponentially in depth and complexity as one tries to 
understand the human transactions that agglomerate in the moment of a 
performance: first of all, what is a performance? What is a performer? What does a 
performer do? Why? How? How do they learn to do it? What is the audience? What 
is the audience’s role in facilitating, promoting and evaluating the goodness or 
badness of a performance? What makes a good performance good and a bad 
performance bad? How can we understand the factual differences between a good 
and a bad performance? Can such an understanding inform the writing of new music 
and new performance practices, and in crafting a pedagogic model for the teaching 
of music performance skills? 
  
Searching for answers to these questions led me to a profound aesthetic crisis, 
perhaps even a moral one: I could not clearly judge what constituted good music 
from what was not good music, and by extension I could not securely state what was 
good and what was bad. 
 
The issue at hand is not one of subjective assessment (‘I liked it, you didn’t…’), or 
one of adequate market direction and genre alignment – offering the right style of 
performance for the right audience tends to return positive responses – but one of 
understanding the mechanisms behind being able to reach out to the audience with 
work that is appropriate for this and that particular audience, on this and that 
particular performance, and which somehow offers each person involved 
(performers, audience, venue staff…), an opportunity for a transformative 
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experience. My work prior to this research project addressed some of these 
questions.  
 
This PhD appears as a continuation of those previous compositional and 
performative concerns. I will formalise the research questions and connect them to 
my previous work in part 1, before explaining how the present research project 
continues that work by absorbing practices and concepts from a variety of 
performance forms and theoretical disciplines. In part 2, I propose a possible 
theoretical framework for understanding of what I am referring to as a vigilant musical 
practice. In part 3, I propose a possible way to promote the pedagogic and training 
development of a vigilant musical practice, and report on the practical work which I 
have so far undertaken in that direction in the form of a portfolio compositions, and a 
catalogue of rehearsal periods and live performances. 
 
1.1.1. Performance validity 
When considering the phenomenon of musical activities and musicological studies, 
Cook gives prevalence to the musical event over the score and the composer’s text. 
For Cook, music happens in time, not on paper (Cook, 2001). My compositional 
thinking is sheltered in this idea. For me, writing scores is a process of creating 
triggers-for-action that a performer may undertake before an audience. Ultimately, it 
is the performer that has to generate meaning from the composer’s notated 
suggestions and deliver it to an audience. The moment of performance – not the 
moment of writing the score – is the moment when music is capable of gaining some 
sort of relevance, some sort of transformational agency through the acquisition of 
musical meaning. It was by watching and working with certain theatre and dance 
shows, in particular performances by Sue Morrison’s clowns, Jordí Cortes Molina, 
Forced Entertainment, Vânia Gala, Jonathan Kay, Robert Lepage, La Fura Dels 
Baus and others that I was brought closer to an awareness that there was an aspect 
of the human experience  - the body as both emotional and rational engine –that was 
largely absent in many of the music performances that I had seen or taken part in. In 
fact, that absence seemed to form part of my formal training as a musician. 
 
The action of making music that I was accustomed to through my classical music 
education did not do the kinds of things these theatre performances did. They did not 
move in the same way. They did not laugh, scream, cry with the same kind of 
undisputed honesty and truthfulness. They did not question the same things or even 
posed questions in the same way. They did not penetrate me in the same way. I did 
not always have from a music performance the same urge to laugh and to cry – 
sometimes simultaneously – to observe intently, or to participate, to be transformed. 
There was a level of physical and emotional involvement from both performer and 
audiences in some forms of theatre and performance art that I felt could add to live 
music making the same type of the excitement – and transformational power - that a 
clown performance, for instance, has. 
 
What did these other performers do that made their performances so profoundly 
touching and universally personal? This was what I wanted my music to do: to touch 
profoundly, to be universally personal. How can I harness their ‘secret’? It was been 
my aim to understand the underlying principles of what I had seen in the work of 
these and many other performers that had so influenced me and continue to do. 
 
But my musical training and that of the musicians around me did not promote, 
support or, in some instances did not allow music making to be combined with 
physicality (‘do not tap your foot, do not move the head to the beat’). The decision 
not to train the body and its presence in the curriculum of music-training institutions 
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where I later taught supported my view. Cook summarises my concerns precisely 
when he describes music as an enactment of social relationships.  
 
Instead of seeing musical works as texts within which social 
structures are encoded we see them as scripts in response to 
which social relationships are enacted: the object of analysis is now 
present and self-evident in the interactions between performers, 
and in the acoustic trace that they leave. To call music a 
performing art, then, is not just to say that we perform it; it is to say 
that music performs meaning. (Cook, 2001) 
 
From Cook’s statement one can infer an acknowledgment that music relies on our 
full presence to generate musical meaning, and not just on the parameters notated in 
a score and their accurate delivery. My work on vigilant music practice builds on that 
acknowledgment; exploring and exploiting ways in which our physical presence can 
further enlace itself in our music making. If the physical presence is important in the 
making and in the understanding of music, what can I as a composer do in order to 
consider the performer’s physical presence in my own musical imagination? My 
scores should then engage the performer at a physical level, not by offering my own 
choreographies to be repeated and re-enacted, but by facilitating and promoting in 
the performer the freedom to access and make use of their whole body, including 
their voice, facial expressions and the gaze, in whatever way they choose, using and 
expanding their own vocabularies of gesture, movement, speech, sound.  
 
Over the years, I made several mental lists of what I find important in performance. 
These are the aspects – or performance skills – that I appreciate in a performance, 
and that, in my view and experience, offer a high degree of performance validity, and 
that I want to promote through my scores: 
 
• A body that can access a complete range of actions, movements, directions, 
levels of effort, speeds, intentions, moods; 
• The possibility of eye contact with the audience; 
• Spoken word and, with it, a voice, with all its verbal and non-verbal meanings 
and moods; 
• Some aspect of improvisation, risk taking and a clear and visible possibility of 
failure, failure being part of the excitement of the performance situation; 
• Absence of acting: action is now and is here, the performance is the story 
being told, no artifice, and an honesty of presence: the performer is not 
pretending to be anyone else but the person that is doing something for the 
audience to see and hear. ‘I am me.’ 
• The audience is invited to explore and takes part in the game of the 
performance. The audience is made to feel their presence is felt and is 
appreciated, indispensable even. ‘You are you’. 
• Both solo and group plays were, to me, transformative: aspects of my own 
sense of self were changed through the performance. 
 
The next step was to try to learn more about these skills and about the mechanisms 
that other practitioners employ in developing them, in order to try to make use of 
them and promote them in my compositions and in my own performances. This 




1.1.2. Notational Reliability 
Together with identifying what constitutes for me performance validity, I tried to 
identify ways of ensuring notational reliability in my scores: how can I guarantee that 
my scores will produce valid performances? 
 
In the work that I developed during my MA (1998-2000) I had already detected some 
meaningful discrepancies between the way I was thinking about my music 
performances and the notational model I was using. I was increasingly finding that 
the truly important aspects of a performance were not encompassed in my scores. I 
was not writing scores that addressed what I considered important in a good 
performance; my scores were not exploring at depth the skills that I had identified as 
promoting performance validity.  
 
1.1.2.1.  Parametric Notation 
Music notation, be it prescriptive or descriptive notation, (Kanno, 2007) tends to 
focus on certain parameters of activity while neglecting others (Lely and Saunders, 
2012). Traditional western visual-symbolic notation offers a great deal of precision on 
pitch, rhythm, and synchronicity. Secondary and less precise are, for instance, timbre 
and sound pressure. Completely ignored are physical and gestural parameters. 
Modern gamelan notation provides relational pitch instructions (the precise pitches 
are dependent on the tuning of a particular set of instruments that make up a 
gamelan orchestra), and synchronicity between players. In both traditions the 
physical involvement of performers, beyond the physical activity necessary to 
produce sound is usually ignored all together. The parameters that are absent in the 
score are still present in a performance, but the score does not offer instructions that 
cover all the possible parameters of action. Some parameters are irrelevant in one 
performance tradition but important in another – light design, for instance, is not 
consistently relevant in the tradition of British brass bands, but is a fundamental 
constant in rock and pop music performances. It is my view that certain important 
parameters that are absent in a score or aurally transmitted musical texts are 
completed by the performer with the help of acquired traditions, of stylistic 
vocabularies and of prior learning. One is trained to fill in the gaps in the text 
according to a particular tradition, a particular genre, a particular taste. The level of 
knowledge required to competently fill in those gaps is transmitted either orally, or 
intuitively, by cultural assimilation, often from birth, and often unconsciously (Dewey, 
1938; Gordon, 2007; Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Merleau-Ponty and Lefort, 1991, 1968; 
Spatz, 2015). In order to perform according to a certain style, the performer has to 
internally assimilate – or formally learn – the subtleties of that style. Often pertaining 
to the bodily, behavioural, ritualistic and formal aspects of a performance style, those 
subtleties can easily escape the blunt parametric precision of symbolic or textual 
notations. 
 
Clayton (2007a, 2007b) found that in classical Indian music gestural signs, such as 
appreciative head shaking and rising head gestures from the audience, were used to 
direct and encourage the performers. Gestures are evidently crucial parts of human 
communication systems, and research shows that they are in part common across all 
humans, but heavily socially and culturally determined (Davidson, in McPherson and 
Welch, 2012). Yet I observe in the notation of music (composition) that gestures are 
rarely present. The gestural learning seems to take place in aural transmissions 
between players, and not by score-driven transmissions. Some exceptions (Kagel, 




1.1.2.2.   Notational Deficiency 
The deficient aspect of notation, and the reliance on the performers prior training 
(formal or informal), poses a problem of notation reliability: if we accept, like I will be 
proposing, that the validity of a performance lies, to a degree, on the full embodied 
presence of the performers, and if such an embodied presence is not explained, 
understood, formed or taught by the score; and if, in addition, the performers’ formal 
or informal training fails to develop the awareness of their own embodied presence, 
there is the clear risk that otherwise perfectly competent musicians may fail to 
explore and offer successful embodied performances, because the notation that 
leads to a particular performance lacks reliability: it does not offer the performer 
routes into its own stylistic competency. There is a need to offer, together with a 
score, the means of training performers in a particular embodied tradition, or perhaps 
away from engrained habits of other acquired traditions, in order to continuously 
expand the performers vocabulary of vigilant and embodied practice.  
 
This continual expansion of one’s own vocabulary is connected with a particular 
conception of pedagogy and training, and to the notion of transformation, two words I 
will return to throughout this text. 
 
1.1.3.   Performance pedagogic needs 
A powerful stage performance is so for some reason. Something must happen during 
a competent performance that is different from a mediocre one. What are those 
things that are happening, what variable parameters are involved? Answers to these 
questions are often discarded as ‘stage magic’, charisma, x-factor, a ‘je ne sais-quoi’, 
unattainable knowledge, which one either has or does not have. It is precisely ‘la 
chose qu’on ne sait pas’ that I want to know about. This ‘chose’ that makes great 
performances happen must be observable in some way. Swanwick, citing Popper 
states that “it is only products, things we say or make, that enable us to communicate 
with one another. We cannot see internal psychological processes at work unless 
there is some outwards manifestation, some visible, audible or tangible object, a 
perceptible event” (Swanwick, 1988, p.14). Something has to be present, some 
outward product needs to be observed in the performer for the audience to receive 
and begin to make meaning of the performer's presence and actions - which include 
the music being made but extends to their gestures, facial expressions and voice 
quality, the totality of their observable human presence. 
 
Nevertheless, music educators spend a great deal of time considering how to train 
and teach performers to be able to do such great performances, and convince 
audiences to endure and financially support such performances.  What exactly is 
being taught and (hopefully) learnt, when we do not yet seem to agree on what 
makes a good performance good, regardless of stylistic constraints?  
 
How can I, as a composer and as a performer, structure a learning sequence that will 
promote a vigilant and embodied awareness in music making, a transformative 
pedagogic action towards a vigilant musical practice? The word pedagogy is used 
here in a broader sense than is often used. I use the word pedagogy in the context of 
acquiring skills, concepts and insights that were not previously present or clear. The 
concept of transformational action is relevant: pedagogy can be considered any 
action that offers a transformational opportunity. Of course one never knows what 
lies at the other side of transformation, so in this sense my use of the word pedagogy 
is not a methodological one. It is not prescriptive in its sequential steps for individual 
personal development: transformative action is understood as any action or enquiry 
that favours growth, sustainable development and positive exploration of one’s field 
of action. From this understanding of pedagogic transformation, the production of 
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music texts can then be seen as the production of training tools, tools that help and 
show a performer how to do something they could not do or had not done before, be 
it to play a four-part fugue, improvise over a 12-bar blues pattern, or say play a board 
game while highly amplified, for instance (Cage, 1970, Solo for Voice 23). Matthews 
(Matthews, 2011) proposes the term askeology to describe the meta-disciplinary 
training one undergoes when preparing for performance. I will use the term 
pedagogic and askeologic alternately with similar meanings. I will further explore the 
pedagogic, or askeologic nature of producing and performing scores in Chapter 3: 
Solving the Problem. 
 
1.1.4. Justifications for the need for a creative framework for vigilant and 
embodied practice 
“For the drama theorist Baz Kershaw, it is "a fundamental tenet of performance 
theory . . . that no item in the environment of performance can be discounted as 
irrelevant to its impact," (Kershaw, Baz, 1992, p.22) and Charles Bernstein provides 
an all too graphic illustration of what this might mean when he characterizes "gasps, 
stutters, hiccups, burps, coughs, slurs, micro-repetitions, oscillations in volume, 
'incorrect' pronunciations, and so on" as "semantic features of the performed poem 
[…] and not as extraneous interruption” (Bernstein, ed., Close Listening, p.14, in 
Cook, 2001). 
 
The growing body of research on embodied music cognition points to the importance 
of the body – gesture, facial expressions, tone of voice – in understanding and 
generating musical meaning (Clarke and Cook, 2004; Clayton et al., 2013; Davidson, 
2001, 2001; Godøy and Leman, 2010; Goldstein and Brockmole, 2017; Gritten and 
King, 2011; Leman and Maes, 2015; Levitin et al., 2002; McPherson and Welch, 
2012; McPherson, Gary and Parncutt, 2002). 
 
I am proposing that musical meaning comes not only from the sounds that are being 
produced or experienced, but also from a series of other factors: the bodily 
configuration of the performer, the gaze (Graham and Hoggett, 2009); language and 
gestural imagery (McNeill, 2005), space audiation (Gordon, 2007), effort-levels (Estill 
et al., 2017). I am supporting this idea with research into interpersonal 
communication (Hargie, 2017), and multisensory and multimodal cognition (Alais et 
al., 2010; Calvert et al., 2004; Deroy et al., 2014; Vigliocco et al., 2014). 
 
This research thus proposes practical ways of exploring those ‘other factors’ in 
notated music performance – the embodied factors – in a structured series of pieces, 
conceived to illuminate paths into the possibility of a multi-modal presence of the 
performer, offering broader possibilities of meanings to a witnessing subject. 
 
1.2.  My work prior to this research project  
The work I did up to the start of my PhD in 2012 had not yet addressed my initial 
question: what makes a good performance good, and how do I write that into a 
score? What seemed clear was that what was meaningful to me was not just what 
the performers were doing on stage, but how they were doing it. My concern with the 
human presence, with gesture and with communication needed to be explored 
further. I formed a notion of vigilance (from my reading of Blanchot), which went 
beyond the engagement of the body: the need to engage the body was a means to 
promote and expand the creation of meanings, and to develop channels of direct 
human communication. 
 
Vigilant music practice is about trying to discover other places where music may 
inhabit, beyond the sounds, in the complete complexity of human presence. It is 
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about considering the possibility that the meanings generated in the experience of 
music may be derived from the sound but also from the presence of the musicians 
and of the audience. In my definition of presence I will  exclude forms of secondary 
meaning creation: fourth wall, suspension of disbelief, artifice, ‘acting out’, pretence, 
illusions, choreographies were no longer my preferred way into an exploration of 
vigilant musical practice.  
 
Ruth Zaporah’s ‘Action Theatre and the improvisation of Presence’ is a sequential 
training course that touches similar concerns by offering a model to explore “who we 
are, how we perceive our world, and how we respond to those perceptions” 
(Zaporah, 1995, p. xxi). In defining presence, all aspects of the human (the pure 
experience of the other, of the self, and of the dynamic relationship between self and 
other (James, 1912; Nishida and Abe, 1992)) must be allowed into the music-making 
equation: the body, the face, the voice, the skin, the gestural, the smell, the 
memories, the erotic, whether we understand the mechanisms of their 
communicative action or not. The fact that we may not be able to make quantitative 
deductions of the importance to 'presence' of some of these aspects makes those 
aspects no less negligible in the creative process. Vigilant practice considers and 
observes all of the above, and more, all other residues of human contact, whether or 
not we understand them, or even acknowledge them - for instance the role of smell, 
the illusive pheromones, and the presence in olfactory cognition of biologic quantum 
processes which we don't yet understand (Marais et al., 2018). We should not ignore 
the role of olfactory cognition in human communication simply because we cannot 
discuss it with words or quantify it with numbers, because we all know, experientially, 
that smell plays an important role in human relationships, because we know the 
power of smell in attracting and repelling others, in feeling safe and under threat, in 
determining healthy and unhealthy environments, in establishing spatial domains 
where we feel welcomed or not. Equally, the absence of a formal understanding of 
the complete phenomenology of human interactions should not restrict my 
exploration of vigilant and embodied presence in music making to modalities of 
interaction that we do understand. An open-ended approach to vigilant practice is in 
my view necessary in order to preserve all modalities of phenomenological 
engagement in the moment of performance. 
 
The explorations I undertook before this PhD led me to consider the following points 
as some of the skills necessary for my experience of valid performance practice, 
which became starting points for this research project. Special attention would have 
to be given to: 
 
Table 1 - Observed skills in valid performances 
The meaningful body, 
Vigotsky’s material 
carrier (Vigotsky, in 
McNeill, 2005) 
The importance of the body (gesture), facial expressions, 
and the voice (mood) 
Remove the score from the performance situation in 
order to release the performers’ gaze, accepting with this 
both the advantages and the constraints that also arise 
from this decision: abandon precision pitch and rhythm 
complexity, complex physical choreographies in favour of 
improvised structures easier to memorise. 
Focus on effort levels (as defined by the Estill voice 
model, and taught by Sue Morrison’s Clown Through 
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Mask) 
Appropriation of the space of performance (by the 
performer and their audience) 
Mental processes and 
an intense inner focus 
Promote in the performer an awareness of the self as 
object-in-the-world, objectified by the audience, and 
consequently, the Body as the prime meaning-creation 
object, and the body’s sound producing agency as a 
secondary object 
A dynamic 
engagement with the 
environment (venue, 
audience and other 
performers) 
Focus on empathy, in the form of interpersonal 
interaction 
Favour group improvisation forms and scoreless aural 
transmissions  
Group-learning and group decision making 
Focus on relationships between objects of perception, 
rather than on the objects of the world 
Training The need for prior training and development of the 
performers’ skills, and to view a score as a pedagogic 
tool. 
 
That gave me enough questions to start the research: how (and what) do we 
communicate when we communicate music? What role does the body play in that 
communication? And the voice and gaze? How can I, as a performer and as a 
composer bring these skills into my performances and scores? What is the role of the 
score (which is after all the composer’s only palpable and material tool) in achieving 
all of the above, yet maintaining a level of simplicity in the score which allows it to be 
memorable, therefore absent from the performance event? How can groups of 
players work together to promote such a level of communication? How can I exploit, 
in an inert score, the inherent role of oral transmission in a group rehearsal? 
 
These are the questions that this research is ultimately trying to address. It was clear 
to me from the onset that precise answers could be found for some but not all of 
these questions, although it was also clear that personal approximations and the 
presence of an uncertainty principle would be unavoidable, perhaps even welcome. 
Nevertheless, without the pressure to find conclusive answers, these questions 
opened a line of artistic enquiry in my work as composer and performer that has 
proved very fruitful. 
 
1.3. Notational Reliability 
1.3.1. Notational Reliability in Mental-Process scores 
Stockhausen’s concept of Intuitive Music, which he developed throughout the late 
1960s, led to the production of a series of pieces and recordings, the most relevant 
of them being the two collections of text scores entitled Aus Den Sieben Tagen 
(1968) and Für Kommende Zeiten (1968-70). Stockhausen “defines ‘intuitive music’ 
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as music that ‘results from the musicians’ spiritual attunement’ ” (Lely and Saunders, 
2012). 
 
These text scores propose a deep mental engagement with the process of music 
making but, in my view, they do not offer easy ways into valid performances. I 
personally would not know if and when I have reached an appropriate state of 
‘spiritual attunement’ in order to perform intuitive music. In fact, Stockhausen’s text 
scores raise important issues of notation reliability, as well as well the problem of 
styles and traditions in vigilant music practice that I would like to explore further. In 
the interviews and lectures collected by Maconie, rather than describing what 
Intuitive Music is, Stockhausen talks about what intuitive music is not:  
 
When I hear the Globokar group, for example, even though they 
claim to play without any written understanding or agreement, it is 
very obvious that the percussion player every once in a while starts 
playing tabla rhythms from Indian music. He studied tabla once 
with an Indian percussion player and these stylistic elements come 
out automatically. So while there may be no pre-established style 
for the whole music, certain stylistic elements come into it, and I 
would try to avoid them, and draw completely on intuition. The 
same is true of Portal, the clarinet player. Whenever the group 
comes into rage, as I call it, when their playing becomes very 
heated, he starts playing typical free jazz melodies and 
configurations that he has played for years, being a free jazz 
player; certain idioms that come from the group he plays free jazz 
with, others that belong to the free jazz tradition in general. 
(Stockhausen and Maconie, 1989, p.121) 
 
Stockhausen is cautious to disallow learnt musical behaviours – in Gordon’s Music 
Learning Theory (Gordon, 2007), this is equivalent to the acquired vocabulary of 
patterns that build up the syntax of a musical style – from invading improvised music, 
yet he does not offer a path to learn how to 'draw completely on intuition'. In my view 
what Globokar and Portal are doing when they revert to their learnt 'styles' is in fact 
to draw on intuition, to intuitively re-order learnt patterns from their own vocabulary of 
patterns, and construct new pattern sequences. Music Learning Theory would 
suggest that what would be necessary to escape the restriction of ‘learn styles’ is to 
increase the amount of patterns in the performers learnt vocabulary, and to develop 
the practice of articulating them into larger gestures in many different ways.  
Playing intuitive music it soon becomes very obvious which 
musician has most self-control; in fact, it's alarming how quickly the 
musicians reveal their physical and spiritual state, whether they are 
in crisis or have reached a certain kind of equilibrium. [...] 
Understand, I am not talking about ugly or beautiful sounds, but 
about very debased, physical, bodily aggression expressed in a 
determination to destroy one another. Then they play all at once. 
When that threatens it, it is most important that I always remind 
them, and myself as well, "Don't play all the time, and don't get 
carried away.1 After several hundred years of being forced to play 
only what has been prescribed for them by others, musicians today 
                                                
 
1 [a lot of self-control demanded: how will intuition arise?] 
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are particularly apt, once they start playing intuitively in a group, to 
play all the time, and it becomes loud very soon, and they don't 
know how to get soft again because everybody wants to be heard. 
(Stockhausen and Maconie, 1989, p.121) 
 
What Stockhausen expects from musicians when he expects them to draw on 
intuition, is, I believe, for them to sound like Stockhausen himself ("whenever the 
group come into rage, as I call it…"). Read this way, Stockhausen’s personal intuition 
seems to be better than his musicians’ own! I believe what is absent in 
Stockhausen's work with intuitive scores is a structured, sequential pedagogic 
framework, where his version of possible improvisatory events can be taught and 
achieved by any musician. He never wrote such a structured pedagogy, but no doubt 
he offered it to his close group of musicians – his troupe – as a director, hors texte, 
that is, relying not only on the written score but also on his own oral tradition to 
construct his performative style. Stockhausen again:  
You can think about a lot of things while performing: training your 
fingers, controlling what you are doing, reacting – aha! now he is 
playing, now I should do this – all of which is thinking about what 
you are doing. But you can also act! Now! Now! Now! Now! Now! 
Stop the thinking and as soon as you stop, all right. As soon as 
reflection or thinking starts also noticing that you are thinking, stop. 
That is all that is asked. And it needs some time for preparation, 
some special training of the musicians. (Stockhausen and Maconie, 
1989, p.124) 
 
But how do you train the musicians to play the music like Stockhausen imagines? 
How do I stop thinking? Stockhausen's intuitive scores have an unwritten expectation 
that musicians will know how to perform them how the composer imagined them. 
Yet, Stockhausen is merely stating how he makes music. He expects other 
musicians to make music the same way, to make the same discoveries in 
improvisation, without giving them the basic tools, the preparation or the training to 
enable them to do it like he does. Here, the composer is absolutely relying on a 
performance tradition to fill in the blanks in the score, but dangerously, such a 
tradition did not exist at the time (perhaps it does not exist yet).  
 
...it says here 'Play a vibration in the rhythm of the universe'. We 
have a pianist in our group, Mr. Kontarsky, who is an extreme 
intellectual and everything must be intellectually and mentally 
clear,, otherwise, he says, he at least can't do anything. So he said, 
what do you mean by the rhythm of the universe? What is all that 
mystic stuff here? And I said, I mane, have you never had dreams 
where you fly from star to star? He said no, I don't have them. What 
are you talking about? The I said, well, have you any inner view or 
inner vision of how the planets are rotating round the sun? –What 
do you mean? I said, at least you have an intellectual knowledge of 
how long it takes for the moon to go around the earth, or the earth 
around the sun; how many days it takes, in earth days, and how 
many  earth days Mercury takes? And he said, I am not well 
informed about the planets and, well, I could have thought about it 
but it's all so slow. I said, no, when it is in your mind it has your own 
time, hasn't it? Imagine it, just the rhythm of the universe. I mean, 
I'm not asking you tonight to go beyond the solar system, but just 
try. And he was saying, I don't know, let's stop and you can get 
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somebody else. I said, well, Aloys, you see, perhaps the 
constellations, think Cassiopeia or the other constellations of stars. 
He said, Oh, you mean Webern? I said yes! he said, well okay, let's 
start. (Stockhausen and Maconie, 1989, p. p.118) 
 
Stockhausen's anecdote on how he directed the rehearsal and performance of his 
own intuitive score reveals how incomplete and unreliable his text score is. Though 
profoundly committed to performing the score as competently as he could, Aloys did 
not extract from the score enough information to elicit a competent, valid 
performance. It's not that the score leaves aspects open to improvisation or to free 
interpretation. Its more a matter of the musician not being able to recall or imagine a 
mode of being that precedes the understanding of the score, as if the language of the 
score itself is unknown to Aloys. 
Aloys seems to be searching the score for clues that would allow him to embody the 
demands of the score: not the specific and appropriate actions and timings, not what 
to do, but how to be. That missing clue does not come from the score, but from the 
composer himself, fortunately present, who is here taking the role of the troupe 
leader, the director, the Joker. Stockhausen's physical presence in the rehearsal 
space allows the process of decoding the score into performative action to proceed. 
Without the composer's physical presence, the score does not offer Aloys all the 
tools he needs to act. This score is, in this sense, unreliable. 
Stockhausen's presence has two distorting effects: Stockhausen holds in his mind a 
model of what a valid performance should be like, which no one else knows. His 
authority as the composer and also the band leader allows him to easily impose his 
vision of validity and remove any discrepant presences. (John Potter (conversation 
with the author) proudly refused to work with Stockhausen for that same reason). 
What is missing in Stockhausen's unreliable score is completed, authoritatively, by 
the director. The troupe model of performance practice is in action here. But the 
authority of composer removes from the rehearsal space any possibility that the role 
of the troupe leader/director could, even if momentarily, taken over by another 
member of the troupe. The double authority of troupe leader and composer is 
absolute. Absolutely absolute! Cardew's epithet of Stockhausen as servant of 
imperialism is thus expanded to enabler and enforcer of authoritarianism. The model 
of human interaction, of social engagement that is inherent in Stockhausen's intuitive 
scores seems to be all but intuitive: it is directed, dictated even, from an external 
force – Stockhausen himself–, and not from an internal intuition (mindlessness, 
System 1). This needn't be the case were the score reliable, or had Stockhausen 
offered in his life time some form of training in how to achieve his own unique vision 
of what constitutes a valid performance. So the composer takes on the role of 
director, in flesh and blood, to supplement the unreliable narrator speaking from the 
score (subsequently, through his work with his troupe, through recordings and 
performances, a Stockhausen sound is accessible, a tradition has now been 
founded, which other performers may learn aurally, and validly apply to the reading 
of Stockhausen's ‘unreliable’ scores).  
 
Pauline Oliveros’ work on the practice of Deep Listening follows on from John Cage’s 
work into the non-intentionality of sounds, but places a stronger emphasis on 
agency, in particular meta-cognition of sound. Many of Oliveros’ published text 
scores pose, in my view, the same problem of notational reliability as Stockhausen’s 
Intuitive Music, but Oliveros circumvents the problem of notational reliability by 
offering courses and qualifications in Deep Listening at the Deep Listening 
Institute™: oral transmission again comes to the rescue and fills in any gaps left in 
the unreliable score. 
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The problem of notational reliability sits at the very heart of my research: as a 
performer I am searching for a particular way of being on stage, of improvising, and 
of communicating with other people. As a composer of scores I write must, first of all, 
generate tools that explain what that way is, and then teach it to other performers. 
Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians is the first of such tools. 
 
1.3.2.  Non-notated, improvised, and genre-bound mental 
processes 
As I suggested above, I believe that often, when faced with an imprecise instruction, 
or the absence of instructions, performers take a heuristic route and make 
improvised decisions according to what is already familiar and therefore predictable 
and easier. The strategies of heuristic decision-making can be seen to be the 
foundation stones for the development of the notion and practice of genres, styles, 
and traditions. Taking a considerable risk of generalising complex performative 
practices and reducing them to over-simplified heuristic algorithms, I will make 
reference where appropriate to performers where an observable engagement with 
the processes I presented in Table 1 is enacted without the recourse to scores or 
scripts, but rather through a variety of vehicles: 1) by an established tradition, 
delivered to the performer through cultural media; 2) by direct oral transmission, 
through one-to-one teaching and ‘troupe’ work, often in studio centred rehearsals 
and closed-door workshops.  
 
Some brief examples of non-notated mental process could include meditation and 
mindfulness training, Clown through Mask training, with its emphasis on quick 
reaction and intuitive responses, or so many orally-transmitted singing traditions, 
learnt without a score or a formal training structure. 
 
1.3.3.  Notated and non-notated gestural engagement in style-
bound music performance  
Though the agency of the body and the perception of the musicians’ body seems to 
be inescapable in live performance, (and perhaps even in recorded music and 
acousmatic music), through space and movement audiation and the multi-modal 
nature of human cognition (Godøy and Leman, 2010; Gritten and King, 2011), few 
composers work with the physical presence of the performer in a focused and 
deliberate notated way. Some musical practices – for instance, in Okinawan classical 
music (Gillan, 2013) – that exist outside the notated realm tend to grant the presence 
and perception of the body more attention, but a correlation between the presence or 
absence notational practices and embodied awareness is not definite.  
 
Some oral folk traditions show little style-bound physical involvement (for instance in 
my experience, Irish folk musicians tend to make a limited amount of non-functional 
gestures), while other styles may be defined by a higher degree of physical 
engagement, or non-normative physical effort levels. Andalucian flamenco and 
Lisbon fado singers’ pained facial expressions define the gestural style of the 
performance while at the same time also defining the voice quality required. In the 
second half of the 20th century attempts have been made in the field of western 
experimental and contemporary music to explore the role of the body in a more 
deliberate way and to acknowledge the role of the body as material carrier 
(Vigotsky). I will present examples of relevant work in this area that uses both a 




1.3.4.  Notated gesture 
Sara Carvalho’s score Imaginary Bars notates in text clear movements (“moving 
away and towards the listener”; “moving in a circular motion”) side by side with 
traditional music notation. Carvalho describes these gestures as “metaphorical 
process”, in which “the performer’s body gestures express an intended and pre-
conceived compositional musical idea. Therefore, the composer’s musical events are 
also enriched with specific planned gestural intention” (Carvalho, 2017, p.6). We see 
here an attempt at transferring to the performer’s body and presence the intentions of 
the composer. Again, like for Beethoven or Schoenberg, the performer’s presence is 
seen as a conduit to reveal the composer’s absence, through a process that I 
personally find mysterious, unreliable, fallible, and, ultimately, unnecessary. What I 
see in a performance is the performer’s body. I cannot see the composer’s absence. 
In addition, Carvalho’s gestural choreographies are seen as enrichments of musical 
events. As I will try to expand in the second section of this text (Chapter 2.2), I 
believe that gestures are not an addition but sit at the very core of musical meaning, 
even when physical gestures are not observable, as is the case of recordings, or 
even absent, as is the case of electro acoustic music, where the human body is not 
the agent in the production of sound, yet physical gestures can still be multi-modally 
perceived. 
 
1.3.5.   Non-notated, improvised/genre-bound corporeality 
Kagel’s Match (1964) is a piece for two cellos and percussion that enacts a match 
between the two cellos, refereed by the percussion. It is scored using traditional 
western music notation. There are no gestural notations, but the sounds are 
precisely notated. The gestures present are the gestures required to perform the 
music in the classical tradition, “the theatre element is only evident in a very 
roundabout way – indeed the music is so complete in itself that some people may 
never notice the subtlety of Kagel's joke" (Brindle, 1987, p.148). The corporeal 
aspect of this piece, being absent in the score, is brought into the performance by the 
conventions of the classical music concert, which are culturally, stylistically 
constructed and not strictly composed but genre-bound and stylistically improvised. 
 
1.3.5.1    Acquisition of embodied vocabularies 
Stelarc’s Amplified Body (1994) invites the audience to control the performer’s body 
through a remote web interface. The performer’s deliberate relinquishing of his own 
physical control draws parallels to the called dances traditions, like one sees in the 
British Ceilidh tradition, or the Portuguese baile mandado. Here the responsibility for 
the participants physicality is transferred to the caller. This tradition sits comfortably 
within a pedagogic model of vocabulary acquisition by rote, prior to inferences 
(improvisations) being attempted. The pedagogic process that involves relinquishing 
personal responsibility over one’s own physicality by copying (mimesis) or obeying 
another performer in order to assimilate new physical habits is central to the work I 
am proposing in this research. 
  
1.3.6.   Voice/body synthesis 
I would like to highlight the special case of the voice in performance, as a tool for 
immediate communication. The variety of vocal uses in performers like Roy Hart and 
the Roy Hart Theatre – exploring the extremes of vocal usage and vocal effort; 
Laurie Anderson – where story telling and music are inseparable; Meredith Monk and 
choreographed music performance, with an embodied vocality that expands from 
Dalcroze Eurhythmics, (which was part of Monk’s music education), Trevor Wishart, 
Phil Minton, Michael Edward Edgerton, and other contributors to the extended vocal 
technique repertoire, bring to the discussion on embodiment another angle in the 
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forging of a fully human communicative presence. What I find important in the work 
of these artists is the expanse of vocal use in order to differentiate between various 
emotional drives, pointing to an embodied generation of meaning through a rich use 
of voice and voice qualities: voice qualities and gesture are bound tightly with the 
making of musical meaning – an embodied musical meaning that is constructed on 
more than just notated musical parameters. 
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1.3.7.   Communication with the audience 
Interaction with the audience is more central to some performance practice traditions 
than others. Pop music performances tend to make much of physical and facial 
communication, including the gaze. Richard Pochinko/Sue Morrison’s ‘Clown 
Through Mask’ training puts interaction with the audience at the very core of the 
clown’s craft: in this type of clowning, a merging of European new clown traditions 
with native American fooling and shamanistic practices, the performer reacts and 
engages with their audience, the environment and other clowns with an immediacy 
and dynamism that defies planning, intellectualisation and social normative 
behaviour. The clown is operating on maximum outwards awareness and immediate 
response to external stimuli, and on minimum internal self-reflection. This dichotomy 
– degrees of internal focus and of external reactions – is central to the findings of my 
research project. In Chapter 2 I will expand on how both poles of this dichotomy are 
relevant to vigilant improvisation. 
 
In a similar vein, many of Augusto Boal’s theatre games included in the two books 
The Rainbow of Desire and Games for actors and non-actors (which I paraphrase in 
my workbook Games for musicians and non-musicians), focus on developing an 
awareness of the other and of the performers’ response to the other (see GMNM.1, 
GMNM.2, GMNM.3, GMNM.5, GMNM.13, GMNM.15, GMNM.55, A Chair to Sit On). 
 
1.3.8.  Group decision making  
An aspect I identified in my reading of performances that fitted my conception of 
validity was the importance of group communication. Communication between 
performers is equally important in establishing a safe and protective environment 
where each performer is allowed to explore ways of searching this elusive quality of 
presence. A working situation where each individual is free to explore safely and 
develop personal embodied strategies seems important in facilitating valid 
performances.  
 
Creating a safe rehearsal space 
In the introduction to Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians I suggests strategies 
for creating a physical and emotional safe rehearsal space. 
 
‘It is important to make all efforts in order to create a safe rehearsal space, not only 
physically but also emotionally. An environment where players can safely explore, 
express, and understand their own physical and emotional limits needs to be 
nurtured throughout the rehearsal process. Besides the group discussions and 
debriefing mentioned above, other strategies and policies to implement a safe space 
may include the presence of a qualified counsellor accompanying players throughout 
the rehearsal process, and the creation of a rehearsal agreement, to be agreed by all 
players in advance, setting out what behaviours they can expect and what 
behaviours are expected from them. I suggest the group discuss and write a 
rehearsal agreement to be agreed on in advance by all members, setting out actions 
and behaviours they expect to be part of. An example of a rehearsal agreement – by 
Intimacy Directors International – is presented, purely as an example, in appendix 4. 
Revisit and revise the group agreement as the work through the Games progresses.’ 
(GMNM, Introduction) 
 
Some composers have brought into their scores ways of organizing groups so that 
different degrees of individual freedom are allowed, facilitated or outright imposed: 
James Saunders group behaviour pieces, where individual behaviour is tightly bound 
to collective behaviour; Alexis Porfiriadis’s collaborative pieces (Porfiriadis, 2016), 
where the authoritative connection between the composer and the performers is 
 26 
deliberately severed in benefit of the consensual ethos of a working group of decision 
making performers; Christian Wolff’s vision of equality between musicians 
(Saunders, 2009). The political consequences of this attitude in the act of scoring are 
clear: absence of clearly defined authority; sense of individual responsibility towards 
the whole group; open-door attitude to the participation of non-specialists (un-trained 
musicians); group decisions are made by consensus rather than majority pressure. 
 
1.4. Methodology: Action Research - Research-Led 
Practice / Practice-Led Research 
The purpose of this research is to impact change in my own performative and 
compositional practice and to share those changes with other players in my research 
community. For that reason this is an action-research project. The methodology used 
in this research project was one of studying established texts and practices as well 
as new trends in performing arts, philosophy, linguistics, pedagogy and 
neuroscience, and constructing a compositional practice that could accommodate the 
findings of those studies.  
 
This was an iterative process, where studies in one discipline led to the composition, 
rehearsal and performance of new pieces, which in turn raised new questions. These 
then triggered further study in a new or related area of knowledge, often in a circular 
and recursive way. Music Psychology authors for instance were revisited several 
times, under the light of new knowledge acquired by the study of neuroscience, 
linguistics and gesture, and of certain composers whose work bears relevance to my 
research questions. New pieces were then written or old pieces re-written and 
performed in response to newly acquired knowledge and the cycle continued.  
Gray defines practice led research as research in which “The questions and 
challenges originate in practice and the needs of practice, and the research is carried 
out through practice" (Gray 1996, p.3, in Barrett and Bolt, 2010). This definition 
describes accurately the work undertaken at certain points during the research 
period: a practice-led recursive processes – where the work prompts enquiry– is 
followed by conceptual reflection.  
 
But at other moments during the research the work was much more led by theoretical 
research then by practice. At these moments it was the conceptual process that lead 
the way, the practice changing as a result: research-led practice. 
 
My research project was conducted under what Davidson refers to as the New 
Paradigm Approach, a variant of qualitative research “in which the researcher plays 
an active role in the generation and interpretation of the data" (Davidson, in Clarke 
and Cook, 2004, p. 58) 
 
The portfolio of compositions and the documentation of performances I am 
presenting is the result of this rather unpredictable and somehow self-evolving 
process. The thesis forms the conceptual distillation of this process and proposes 
new ways of understanding vigilance with regards to music performance, and how 
compositional processes can facilitate such an understanding in the practical 
contexts of rehearsals and performances. 
 
1.5. Conclusion to Part 1 
To summarize, my research questions are looking at ways of exploring in the 
process of scoring and rehearsing, what I observed in other performers as a sense of 
full engagement from the performer; of full physical agency and access to a wide 
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range of effort levels; of a delicate communication with the audience through the 
gesture, voice and the gaze. 
 
1.5.1. Vigilant Music Practice as relational awareness 
My use of the term vigilance is anchored in Blanchot’s definition:  
"Vigilance - the authority of the body when the body is not 
separated but fully in agreement with the truth of place" (Blanchot, 
1982, p. 266).  
 
The place in question for my purposes is any place which one treats as a 
performance space, what Peter Brook calls the empty space (Mitter, 2006; James 
Roose-Evans, 1989). Blanchot’s vigilance, perhaps akin to what Brooks calls the 
detached attachment (Mitter, 2006; J. Roose-Evans, 1989), exists in a cognitive 
place which is also to be understood as any place one inhabits, any event one 
endures.  
 
Blanchot’s definition of vigilance points to how one engages with such a place, how 
one’s awareness is engaged with aspects of the truth of place. Blanchot’s use of the 
word vigilance raises several immediate questions: what it is like to have authority of 
the body; how do I know when my body is or is not separated from the truth of place; 
what is the truth of place? What do we understand by the body? Do we mean our 
awareness of our body’s presence in a space? Do we mean our awareness of how 
our physical presence in a space is perceived by others?Some of these ideas 
resonated strongly with my own experience of performing other people’s music, and 
mine, and with performances that I had watched that impacted on me. Vigilance 
seemed to me to describe perfectly what I had so strongly experienced when I 
watched the work of, for instance, Sue Morrison's clowns, or of Lisbon Fado singers: 
the intense authority of the performer’s body over the performance situation, the 
sharp immediate responses to any sound or movement in the performance space, or 
outside of it – the performer in close syntony with the environment and people 
around them. Blanchot's definition of vigilance points to a way of being which is 
relevant to my problem. 
 
A proposal for a definition of vigilant musical practice needs to dismantle each of the 
terms of the problem, and attempt to understand them and how they can be used in 
developing a practice.  
 
William James, in ‘Essays in Radical Empiricism’ (James, 1912) places the 
relationships between objects as the root of all ontological insights. In this light, I 
focus not on the work as a product or object, not on the space of the performance, 
not on the performer, not on the audience, but on the relationships that take place in 
a performance: the relationship between the performer and the self, between the 
performer and the venue, between several performers, between performers and 
audience, between performer and the work performed. Relationships, or using 
another word, communication between entities become the keyword in beginning to 
address my problem. I could begin to explore my actions as a composer and 
performer if I took as a starting point that what makes a valid show is the degree with 
which communicative relationships are formed between all constituting agents in a 
performance, rather than the isolated acquisition of discrete sonic events by a 
passive audience. A sequential list of such relationships could be attempted, which 




1. Relationship between performer and the self; (part 2.1) 
2. Relationship between performer and its body; (part 2.2) 
3. Relationship between performer and sound (pitch, timbre…), time 
(rhythms), and the passing of time (form); (part 2.2.2) 
4. Relationship between performer and space; (part 2.1, 2.2) 
5. Relationship between performer and other performers (body, word, 
presence) (part 2.3) 
6. Relationship between performer and the audience; (part 2.3) 
 
7. Relationship between audience and the space; (part 2.1) 
8. Relationship between audience and sound; (part 2.2) 
9. Relationship between audience and others in the audience; (part 2.3) 
10. Relationship between audience and time (explored in my previous work, 
mainly through the production of installations). 
 
This shift of focus from objects to relationships is a reason why the present research 
is moving my compositional approach away from ‘what do performers do in a good 
performance?’ to ‘how do they do it?’; away from the prescribing of meaningful 
actions, towards proposing forms of communication and interaction between 
performers and audiences, which may be meaningful – such proposals are but my 
cheap excuses to trigger situations when we can be in each other’s presence in a 
positively communicative and transformative manner; to see, feel, hear and touch 
each other with more and more reality each time, with vigilance and empathy, and, 
ultimately, with love. [I believe I have never read the word love in an academic text, 
book or article, but my use of the word love in this paper is not a provocation or a 
misuse. Love in this context stands for the simplicity of individuals supporting and 
helping each other, unconditionally and reciprocally, with openness, honesty and 
generosity, in whatever ways are necessary and safe for each individual’s personal 
fulfilment.] 
 
I have structured the sequence of pieces in my Games for Musicians and Non-
Musicians along this sequence (points 1 to 6). I felt I had already addressed point 7 
and 10 in my previous installation work. Points 8 and 10 were tangentially touched in 
The Listening Club, a series of public talks and listening events of new music I 
curated at Index Gallery in Stroud between 2012 and 2014. Relationship between 
members of audience (Point 9) is visible in clubbing, where the audience can also be 
understood to be the performers. Point 7 to 10 are largely out of the control of a 
performative process, but may be addressed through a separate compositional and 
pedagogic programme. For that reason they did not form the focus of this research 
project. 
 
It is important first of all to define what is meant by embodiment and by presence 
under the light of Blanchot’s definition of vigilance. Notions of self and other, 
environment and agency, and more importantly how the self and the other engage 
with each other in a dynamic communicative process become fundamental starting 
points in this exploration. Defining the fields surrounding these concepts will be 
subject of the next section. 
 
In ‘Chapter 2: Understanding the Problem’ I will explain the three skills that underpin 
my concept of vigilant performance practice: cognitive states (internal processes) 
(Ch. 2.1), embodied imagery (external states) (Ch. 2.2), and inter-personal 
communication (Ch. 2.3). I will conclude the chapter with an overview of the three 
skills, their intrinsic relationship with each other, and propose a dynamic definition of 
vigilant performance practice. 
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In ‘Chapter 3: Solving the Problem’ I will present my proposal for developing tools, 
activities and scores that promote the three skills of vigilant practice. This has taken 
the form of a workbook, populated with sixty-four text scores.  
 
Chapter 4 brings together all the threads in this discussion. I discuss the possible 
personal and social consequences of this work and offer possible routes for 
developing other applications of this research. Future research avenues are 
explored. 
 
I will make reference, as appropriate, to scores in my portfolio, and video evidence of 
rehearsals and performances that may testify to a particular argument. The 
appended catalogue of pieces, video recordings, photographs and performance 
reports makes connections between the theoretical points raised in the thesis, the 
scores in the portfolio of compositions, and the video documentation folder 
submitted. The video documentation folder contains records of events – rehearsals 
and public events – where aspects of this research project were explored and 
guiding conclusions were reached. 
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Before I embark on a thorough explanation of my research project I would like to 
offer an explanation for the wide range of sources used in framing my arguments, 
experiments and conclusions. 
 
The field I am moving on is inherently interdisciplinary: for instance, the relationship 
between music-making, physical gesture, linguistics, neuro-science and psychology 
is so close in the present literature and state of knowledge that it seemed 
unavoidable for me explore wider and wider in the literature in each of these fields. 
Equally, the question of self control in music performance quickly poses subsequent 
questions in the fields of psychology, cognition, philosophy, cultural studies, 
pedagogy. Questions regarding group improvisation seemed relevant to theatre 
studies, sociology, even thermodynamics and entropy (a research thread eventually 
abandoned in the present thesis but still a possible avenue for future research). This 
was an iterative research process: reading leads to writing and testing, experiment 
and reflection, which opens new questions that require further reading. The number 
of subjects relevant to this project quickly expanded, with a great deal of data 
gathered along the way. I created a data management system that fitted my personal 
needs and the nature of the research plan. As the thesis took shape I could navigate 
between data sets from each different subject with ease, and fruitful connections 
were drawn between different disciplines that helped guide the outcome of the 
research. 
 
Another reason for the wide range of sources visited lies perhaps in my own nature, 
and can reveal my initial motivation for embarking on a PhD. That is, to explore and 
learn new things (if not in depth of detail, clearly in breadth of scope). I like learning 
stuff. This was a perfect opportunity to explore and study areas of human knowledge 
that I would not have otherwise dived into: existential philosophy, linguistics, physics. 
I was open and curious and I followed all leads in the obvious musicology literature, 
eventually landing in unexpected areas. Many of these explorations led to creative 
dead ends, but even so of importance to the research, in that I learnt what not to do. 
One must not underestimate the power of negative knowledge – to know that a 
hypothesis is false is as important as knowing that it is true (the best example I am 
aware of the importance of negative knowledge is the Michelson-Morley experiment 
(1887) that failed to prove the existence of a cosmic ether, thus opening the way for 
Einstein’s Special and General Theories of Relativity.  
 
Towards a definition of vigilant music practice 
At a simple level, sound carries clues to its origins, be they the material origin (what 
vibrates to produce pressure waves and the material nature of those objects) or the 
embodied origin (how the sound was created by the relationship between at least two 
bodies), which in turn includes information about other parameters, like speed, 
space, breath, strength, and also physical effort, intention, mood.  
 
Sound gestures have also the capacity to be meaningfully received and akin to other 
types of gestures: physical gestures, bodily gestures, syntactic gestures, vocalic 
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gestures (which includes voice qualities and with it information about mood and 
intention). According to Gødoy and Leman, “we experience and understand the 
world, including music, through body movement–when we hear something, we are 
able to make sense of it by relating it to our body movements, or form an image in 
our minds of body movements” (Godøy and Leman, 2010, p.5).  
 
Recent and on-going research into multi-sensory cognition points to the possibility of 
sound being understood at a multi-sensory level (Alais et al., 2010; Calvert et al., 
2004; Clayton et al., 2013; Deroy et al., 2014; Galvan Debarba et al., 2017), and the 
creation of musical meaning being cognitively forged not only in auditory centres but 
in other brain areas, like those responsible for the processing of movement and 
tactile inputs (Leman and Maes, 2015). Damásio’s (2000) use of the term embodied 
cognition relates cognitive processes to body processes and the bodily interaction 
with the world, in what Damásio calls the ‘body-minded brain’. I will explore these 
threads in section 2.2. We also find strong relationships between the understanding 
of gestural imagery in language (McNeill, 2005, 1992) and music making gestures 
(Clayton et al., 2013; Davidson, 2012, 2001; Godøy, 2004; Godøy and Leman, 2010; 
Gritten and King, 2011; Hatten, 2017; Kurosawa and Davidson, 2005; Leman, 2008). 
I will explore this topic in section 2.2. 
 
At a more complex level, embodied sound production expands from the purely sonic 
to the phenomenologicaly embodied, with possible strands into the creation of 
meaning at a poietic and aesthesic levels (Nattiez, 1990), which intersect with all of 
the types of gestural co-relations described above. Embodied improvisation delves 
further into the meaning making potential of music and gesture, and incorporates into 
its tool box not only the body as functional maker of music but also the body and its 
presence in space as trigger for the generation of meanings– which encompasses 
how the body relates to its surroundings, and also the voice and its many qualities – 
voice here seen as both as a musical instrument and as carrier of verbal and non-
verbal meanings.  
 
At a linguistic level, “language is inseparable from imagery” (Damásio, 2000; McNeill, 
2005, p.4). The word, gesture and the embodied presence all participate in the 
creation of thought, of speech and of meaning (McNeill, 2005). I am constructing my 
compositional and performative work on the notion that, like language, live music 
(and possibly recorded music as well) is also inseparable from imagery (Damásio, 
2000; Gordon, 2007; McNeill, 2005). The concept of embodied music practice I am 
proposing stems directly from the creative appropriation of the concept of music as 
imagery, which is inseparable from our relationship with the materiality of the world 
and of our bodies. 
 
But my concept of vigilant musical practice goes beyond simply using the body: it is 
about engaging the complete presence of the body to present embodied images 
which promote and expand the creation of meanings, and use all channels of human 
communication to achieve that. This practice excludes any form of secondary 
meaning, fourth-wall, artifice, acting, pretense, illusion, and persona. 
 
I am proposing a definition of vigilant musical practice as a practice that is at once: 
cognitively non-normative, multi-modal/imagetic, and interpersonally communicative. 
I will explain what I understand by each one of these terms and how I believe they 
can be tied in to a model of musical practice that includes compositional practices, 
the pedagogy and rehearsal of musical performance, and the performance of live 
music. In fact I will use these three terms – cognition, multi-modal imagery, and 
interpersonal communication– as the titles for each of the main sections in part 2 of 
this paper, because they can be seen as three conceptually independent learning 
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sequences in the development of a vigilant musical practice, which I will explore on 
part 3. For each of the three aspects above, I will propose ways of promoting and 
developing the performative skills that I identified in section 1, thus structuring a 
training sequence, supported by pedagogic theories, and by the concept of 
askeology (Matthews, 2011). 
 
The separation of vigilant practice into three stages – cognition, multi-modal imagery, 
and fully communicative engagement- can be equally described as: 
 
a. An interior stage [IN],  
b. An external stage [OUT],  
c. And relational (the relationship between what is IN and what is OUT: 
IN↔OUT).  
 
I will use these simplified terms – IN, OUT, and IN↔OUT – throughout the text to 
refer to each of the stages of the model. The division into three stages, though 
difficult to compartmentalise in the moment of performance, is not merely conceptual. 
Several writers from distinct areas have used this separation to describe how 
humans conduct their existence, in and out of the performance stage. One such 
writer is Daniel Dennet, whose writings on consciousness can bring a focused light 
into this discussion. For Dennet (Dennet, 1992, p. 44), human existence is subject to 
a  
 
tripartite division into outer, inner, and affect. [...] Philosophers and 
psychologists often use the term phenomenology as an umbrella to 
cover all items – the fauna and flora, smells, itches, pains, 
imagined purple cows, hunches, and all the rest. [...] Our 
phenomenon is divided into three parts: (1) experiences of the 
"external" world, such as sights, sounds, smells, slippery and 
scratchy feelings, feelings of heat and cold, and of the positions of 
our limbs”, the body in the world, [OUT]; “(2) experiences of the 
purely "internal" world, such as fantasy images, the inner sights 
and sounds of daydreaming and talking to yourself, recollections, 
bright ideas, and sudden hunches” [IN]: and “(3) experiences of 
emotion or affect" (to use the awkward term favoured by 
psychologists), ranging from bodily pains, tickles, and "sensations" 
of hunger and thirst, through intermediate emotional storms of 
anger, joy, hatred, embarrassment, lust, astonishment, to the least 
corporeal visitations of pride, anxiety, regret, ironic detachment, 
rue, awe, icy calm. (Dennet, 1992, p. 44) 
 
But I should make a reservation regarding my concept of vigilance and a three-part 
separation: each part in this separation is not isolated from the other parts. As I lay 
out my thesis, it will hopefully become increasingly clear that my personal vision of a 
vigilant musical practice cannot separate a sense of self, from a multi-modal 
engagement with the body, and from a dynamic inter-personal communication with 
the audience and other performers.  In the heat of a performance, all three parts 
should co-exist and influence each other. But there is a practical benefit in separating 
vigilance into three part: my model of vigilant music performance uses these three 
aspects to construct a sequential training programme for musicians (and non-
musicians) that proposes to transform their performative practice. This training 
programme guides the content and sequence of the sixty-four pieces that constitute 
my Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, which is the main work to come out of 
this research project.  From a pedagogic point of view, there is an advantage in 
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dividing learning objectives and activities into smaller conceptual units, for which 
separate learning sequences can be designed. I will discuss how the three parts can 
be connected in learning sequences in more detail in Part 3 of this text. 
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2.1 Cognition [IN] 
 
An understanding of how the senses of self, of place and of other interlock in the 
performance event (and in any event, for that matter) is a recursive topic in performance 
studies, and it is a logical and solid starting point for explaining my research. In this 
section I will look at several authors strategies to define the sense of self, compare 
opposing views on the matter, differentiating between mind, consciousness, meta-
consciousness, and self; between emotion and feeling (Damásio, 2000). I will argue, 
based on Damásio’s work, that the self, and the sense of self is, at a basic level, a 
transformational tool, ready to inflict and take on change and transformation; and that 
performance, and performers, exploit that property to operate transformations within 
themselves and in the others. I will look into how the process of transformation can be 
carried on onto the stage by observing the work of relevant current practitioners. 
 
For my purposes, though only what is observable on a stage is of relevance to my study, 
the private mental phenomena that instigate and shape the public signs are equally 
relevant. In the Games, mental processes are one of the skills identified and a learning 
sequence is attempted for that skill.  
 
2.1.1   Thinking and behaving 
Logical behaviourism  
is the theory that being in a mental state is being in a behavioural state. Thinking, 
hoping, perceiving, remembering and so on are all to be understood as either 
behaving or else possessing a complex disposition or propensity to behave. The 
mind is nothing over and above behaviour. This reduction of the mental state to 
the behaviour is advocated by the logical behaviourist as a linguistic thesis: a 
thesis about how it is possible for psychological concepts like ‘image', 
'perception', thought' or 'memory' to have a use in our language. This is possible, 
according to the logical behaviourist, because any sentence or set of sentences 
about minds may be translated, without loss of meaning, into a sentence or set of 
sentences about publicly observable behaviour. Unless our psychological 
vocabulary refers to overt behaviour, it could not be meaningful (Priest, 1991, 
p.35). 
 
Logical behaviourism, in its insistence on what is observable, and on what is 
'languageable' does offer us performers a perspective that our presence on a stage, what 
we ‘be’ before the other, needs to be seen, read, heard, felt prior to it being transformed 
into meanings. It does not offer a solution about where that presence originates and 
terminates, or how to sensitize us to its subtleties, and how to modulate that presence on 
a stage. That problem is addressed in the next section about the body in the world (see 
Ch. 2.2), and about communication (see Ch. 2.3). 
 
2.1.1. Theories of the Self 
For Hume, the self is not a substance that predates or outlives experience, but the result 
of a bundle of experiences. This view is also present in Buddhist philosophy: in the 
concept of Anatman, or non-self, there are no fixed points upon which to anchor the Self, 
which is considered a mere illusion of the five illusive and constantly changing skandha, 
or aggregates: perception, emotion, body, consciousness and thoughts. In isolation, 
none of these ‘aggregates’ are exclusive to one person. “They are regarded as without 
essence, impermanent, empty, and suffering-ridden” (Fischer-Schreiber et al., 1991). 
Hume’s view of the self is described in his Treatise: 
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There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately 
conscious of what we call our self. For my part, when I enter most intimately into 
what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of 
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the 
perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, 
so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist . . . I may 
venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or 
collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. (Hume, 2015) 
 
The emptiness of the self – the idea that the sense of self is forged from experience and 
not from a substance – is very much present in the theory of the self constructed by 
neuroscientist Antonio Damásio, which has profound connections to the improvising mind 
and to my concept of vigilant improvisation. 
 
2.1.2. Damásio’s Sense of self 
Continuing and expanding from the legacy of William James with regards to the primacy 
of the body as the source of consciousness, Damásio’s view is that  
consciousness is an entirely private, first-person phenomenon which 
occurs as part of the private, first-person process we call mind. 
Consciousness and mind, however, are closely tied to external 
behaviours that can be observed by third persons. […] Both wisdom 
and the science of the human mind and behaviour are based on this 
incontrovertible correlation between the private and the public – first 
person mind, on the one hand, and third-person behaviour, on the 
other. (Damásio, 2000, p.12)  
 
According to Damásio, the construction of consciousness is profoundly connected with 
the construction of a sense of self. Damásio’s model of Self defines the homeostatic 
needs of an organism, required for the regulation and preservation of life, as the starting 
point for the development of the sense of self. Damásio makes some useful definitions 
that can help in homing in on the concept of vigilant performance. For Damásio the mind 
encompasses unconscious and conscious processes; the Self is divided into the Proto-
self – “an interconnected and temporarily coherent collection of neural patterns which 
represent the state of an organism, moment by moment, at multiple levels of the brain” 
(Damásio, 2000), the Core-self, dependent on the Proto-self, is where consciousness 
first appears, as the “second-order nonverbal account that occurs whenever an object 
modifies the proto-self. The core-self can be triggered by any object”; and, constructed 
upon the Core-self, the Autobiographic-self, “which is constituted by implicit memories of 
multiple instances of individual experience of the past and of anticipated future.” The 
Proto-self represents the state of the organism, moment by moment; the Core-self 
represents how an object (real or mental) operates changes in the organism itself; and 
the Autobiographical-self keep a life-long record of core-self experiences through “explicit 
images”. The “activation of its memories generates core-consciousness.” The 
autobiographical self requires a functioning core-self, and the core-self needs a 
functioning proto-self. For Damásio, consciousness is the part of the mind that tracks 
changes in the organism and the environment – both the Core-self and the 
Autobiographical-self. The neuro-physiological mechanisms that form the proto-self and 
the core-self change little across a lifetime, while the neuro-physiological mechanisms 




This sequential structure will play an important role in how I have attempted a preliminary 





2.1.3.  Self as transformational process  
Damásio (2003) makes a clear distinction between emotions and feelings. Emotions are 
the neuro-physiological states that accompany the proto-self and the core-self, and are 
not always conscious, while feelings are purely mental, internal maps of emotional 
states, and are connected with the Autobiographical self. Emotions have a deep root on 
the body and bodily states, as proposed by James and Merleau-Ponty. Emotions are the 
bodily reflection of feelings, some of which can be observed externally, which include, but 
are not limited to facial expressions, somatic states, skin conductivity, voice quality, heart 
beat, hormonal states, etc. I will return to emotions and ways in which they are visible in 
the performers body in section 2.2, when I address the meaningful body. 
 
 
Damásio states that  
"It is through feelings, which are inwardly directed and private, that 
emotions, which are outwardly directed and public, begin their impact 
on the mind; but the full and lasting impact requires consciousness, 
because only with the advent of a sense of self do feelings become 
known to the individual having them” (Damásio, 2000, p.36).  
 
Table 2 – Levels of life regulation (in Damásio, 1999) 
 
Basic life regulation
Relatively simple, sterotyped patterns of response, which include 
metabolic regulation, reflexes, the biological machinery behind what 
will become pain and pleasure, drives and motivations.
Emotions Complex, stereotyped patterns of response, which include secondary emotions, primary emotions and background emotions.
------------------consciousness-----------------
Feelings Sensory patterns signaling pain, pleasure, and emotions become images.
Levels of life Regulation (in Damasio, 1999)
High Reason Complex, flexible, and customized plans of response are formulated in conscious images amy be executed as behaviour.
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Knowledge of the subtle interaction between internal feelings and external, visible 
emotions is not always processed consciously, with full awareness of what the impact is 
of internal processes on our external behaviors and external revelation. “The fabric of our 
minds and of our behavior is woven around continuous cycles of emotions followed by 
feelings that become known and beget new emotions, a running polyphony that 
underscores and punctuates specific thoughts in our minds and actions in our behavior 
[my emphasis]” (Damásio, 2000). Revealing some of this running polyphony, the 
constant flux of emotional matter that continuously percolates through us, that is what 
vigilant practice is looking to establish. Pochinko/Morrison's Clown Through Mask 
(Coburn and Morrison, 2013) training talks about the clown 'facing all directions of our 
selves at the same time', ready to follow one or other of the running polyphony's 
exquisite melodies, plucked from its dense counterpoint. 
For my purposes, feelings relate to the IN aspect, while emotions bridge towards the 
physical and embodied, the multi-modal imagetic, the OUTwards aspect of the self, 
which I will address in more detail in section 2.2.  
 
The sense of self is, according to Damásio created in the process of mapping and 
keeping track of change. “The sense of self in the act of knowing an object is an infusion 
of new knowledge, continuously created within the brain as long as "objects", actually 
present or recalled, interact with the organism and cause it to change" (2000, p.25) 
According to Damásio’s model, the sense of self arises through an awareness of 
transformations in the organism; the self is thus considered a transformational process.  
 
2.1.4. The self in the world 
Separately from William James, and equally stemming from a phenomenological tradition 
but fusing it with Zen Buddhist ontology, Nishida Kitaro proposes a variation on the 
concept of pure experience. For Nishida, "reality is the activity of consciousness" 
(Nishida and Abe, 1992, p.59). Far from locking consciousness in a solipsistic trap, 
Nishida’s statement reduces the description of reality to the act of being in such a reality, 
closely resonating with Heidegger’s dasein, the simultaneously fundamental and terminal 
notion of ‘being-in-the-world’. In Nishida’s words “We believe that there are two types of 
experiential facts – phenomena of consciousness and phenomena of matter – but 
actually there is only one: phenomena of consciousness” (Nishida and Abe, 1992, p.43).  
 
For phenomenologist philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the 
awareness of the self are inseparable from awareness of the world around us and of 
other people. Merleau-Ponty insists on  
the body's essential ‘reversibility’ of being both sensing and sensed is 
crucial to our ability to grasp the world, he strongly cautions that this 
reversibility of being both observer and observed, although "always 
imminent," is "never realized in fact" through complete simultaneity or 
exact "coincidence. One cannot at the very same time fell one's hand 
as touching and touched, one's voice speaking and heard. In short, one 
cannot simultaneously experience one's body as both subject and 
object. So if the lived body is always the observing subject, then it can 
never be observed as an object. (Carman and Hansen, 2005, p.173) 
 
Merleau-Ponty calls this unbridgeable gap between self and other the chiasm. In the 
chiasm, Merleau-Ponty  
ensures that in some sense the other is always already intertwined 
within the subject, and he explicitly suggests that self and non-self are 
but the obverse and reverse of each other (VI 83, 160) […] attempts to 
reinforce that self and other are also relationally constituted via their 
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potential reversibility. One example of this might be the way in which 
looking at another person–or even a painter looking at trees, according 
to one of Merleau-Ponty's more enigmatic examples–always also 
involves the tacit recognition that we too can be looked at. However, 
rather than simply oscillating between these two modes of being–looker 
and looked upon, as Sartrean philosophy would have it–for Merleau-
Ponty each experience is betrothed to the other in such a way that we 
are never simply a disembodied looker, or a transcendental 
consciousness. (Reynolds, 2017a) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, there is an irreconcilable duality between the self in the world, as an 
object of the world, and the self as a subject, capable of observing and acting in the 
world.  
 
This irreconcilability, this schism may in fact be capable of offering us operational tools 
for understanding our sense of self. Merleau-Ponty writes about the incompatibility of 
understanding that your hand touching someone else’s comes with the inevitable 
possibility of your hand being touched as well, that the roles can be reversed. I expand 
on Merleau-Ponty’s example by proposing the following: imagine a cup in front if you. It 
has a shape and a colour. You can probably calculate its weight, imagine how it feels in 
your hand, its temperature, audiate the sounds it can make. When you move your hand 
and finally hold the cup, you receive further information regarding the cup, which may 
confirm or deny your previous expectations. By holding the cup you not only we receive 
guarantee of the cup’s existence, but, inevitably, you also receive confirmation that your 
own hand exists, as an object of the world. Holding the cup with your hand offers you the 
materiality of the cup and the reality of your hand. It is as if touching is not done 
outwardly – my hand towards the world, but equally in the opposite direction, the world 
imposing itself on my hand, touching it from without. Both are inseparable. Subject and 
object are inseparable. The knowledge of your own body is derived from its interaction 
with what is around it.  When I feel the object I touch, I really am feeling my hand, the 
contour of my body, the first portal of my consciousness. There is no opposition between 
the subject touching and the object touched. They rely on each other to gain their 
phenomenological identity. Zen ontology refers to the non-opposition of knowledge, in 
which there is no separation between object known and knowing subject, thus defying 
the concept of knowledge itself. However, “it has nothing to do with "knowledge" in the 
ordinary or philosophical sense, because in the experience of enlightenment there is no 
distinction between knower and known” (Fischer-Schreiber et al., 1991). What remains 
is, rather than knowledge – acquired, developed, transmitted, learnt, taught, defied, 
discredited, bought, etc.– what remains is experience, the pure experience of Nishida, of 
William James.  
 
Expanding this relationship between self and the special type of object which is the other, 
one could observe a similarity in our relationships with the other: when I see the other 
and the other sees me, I am in reality gaining awareness of myself as a seen entity: I am 
seeing myself.  It is by encountering the other than one can begin to envision the self.  
We gain self by encounters with the other. The self is thus modelled by the way it is 
mirrored in the world around us. In human terms, perceiving another human floods the 
observer with a sense of being human himself. We encounter ourselves through an 
encounter with the other. When we transport this encounter to the performance situation, 
the encounter between performer and audience, the self and the world is intertwined in a 
complex mirrored room reflection, where performer and audience fulfil their mutual roles 
of obverse and reverse of self and object in the world. "Merleau-Ponty explicitly asserts 
that […] though we are of the world, we are nevertheless not the world (VI 127), and in 
affirming the interdependence of humanity and the 'things' of the world in a way that 
permits neither fusion nor absolute distance, he advocates an embodied inherence of a 
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different type" (Reynolds, 2017b). This interdependence between humanity and the world 
is fundamental in my definition of vigilant performance practice.  
 
Roger Scruton talks about the ‘other being a ritualized sacred representation of the self’ 
(Scruton, 2017), which I think is another way of addressing the same issue. The word 
sacred points to Scruton’s view that we see ourselves in the other with more clarity that 
we see ourselves in ourselves. The other is the vehicle for self-reflection, for 
development, for change, growth and transformation. It is in the encounter with the other 
that vigilant improvisation can present a tool for transformation in the context of the ritual 
of music making.  The mutual influence triggered in this encounter is further explored in 
section 2.3 on Inter-personal Communication. 
 
Below is a text box entitled In Practice. This text box (and others that follow) connects the 
theories and concepts discussed in the thesis to scores and performances in the 
portfolio. Video documentation is presented in the portfolio for the pieces on bold. 
 
2.1.5  Sartre and Bad-Faith 
Inasmuch as encounters with the other reflect and modulate the sense and agency of the 
self, Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of Mauvaise-Foi, or Bad Faith, seems pertinent at this 
stage of my discourse, though it is a complex concept that pertains equally to a 
discussion of non-normative cognition [IN], as it does to the multimodal embodied 
imagery [OUT] and to interpersonal communication skills, [IN/OUT]. As I mentioned in 
the introduction to Part 2, the three-part divisions that I built to structure my exploration 
into vigilant practice are not airtight and aspects of one division quickly become relevant 
to another one.  
 
Sartre’s view of the self is particularly relevant to how a performer may observe itself in 
the moment of performing. Sartre’s ontology posits the existence of several modes of 
being: the being-in-itself, the being-for-itself, and the being-for-others, which make a 
clear separation between unconscious action, self-consciousness of self and awareness 
of the other (the objects of one’s consciousness). In the state of being-in-itself one simply 
is, immediate, responsive, intuitive, (though not necessarily unconscious) with little or no 
attention placed upon ourselves. Being-in-self offers a clear separation between subject 
that observes and object that is observed (the objects observed may be objects of our 
own cognition, thoughts, itches, aches); the observing subject is IN the world but clearly 
separated from it. You can consider all the things around you as objects of your 
perception, perceived by your consciousness and clearly separated from your own self. 
Your being, a subject observing the world and it’s objects, is clearly separated from the 
objects of its consciousness. You, the subject, can move objects, alter them, create 
meanings from those objects, cast judgments and generate values but your being is 
always separated by a thin membrane from the objects of the world around you. Yet that 
membrane can be easily torn by the sudden awareness that you are also an object of the 
world, brought about by the appearance of the being-for-itself. You own body, your own 
IN PRACTICE: 
The first piece in my Games For Musicians and Non-Musicians (GMNM), entitled 
‘Public Situations’ (GMNM.1) simply asks that the players, in a public situation, make 
them selves aware of the moment when a stranger sees them, and when the other is 
seen by the player, and observe the subtle internal and external mutations (what 
Damásio calls feelings and emotions) that happen in themselves in this process. 
 
Other pieces in GMNM that address this point are GMNM.2; GMNM.3; GMNM.55. 
Videos recordings and Catalogue entries exist for the pieces in bold. 
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consciousness can be seen by the for-itself as another one of the objects in the world. 
You are the object of your own consciousness, yet separate from it. For the being-for-
itself, being a subject is also being an object of the world, upon which the subject can act; 
being-for-itself is self-reflexive.  
 
While the being-in-itself is conscious of the objects of the world and how the subject 
engages with them, the being-for-itself is conscious of itself as another object of the 
world. But, following Hüsserl’s phenomenological line, consciousness is conscious of 
something. What is it that is conscious of this consciousness? Nothing – according to 
Sartre (and to Buddhist philosophy and the concept of emptiness). At the core of 
consciousness lies a black hole of nothingness. Metzinger, in Being No One: The Self-
Model Theory of Subjectivity (Metzinger, 2004), defines the Self as a creation of our 
consciousness, whose purpose is to make sense of the physical world. This is done 
through a process he calls the Ego Tunnel, where “our experiences of the outside world 
are organized for our understanding” (Duimstra, 2009). The evolution of a sense of self 
takes place to justify the knowledge that someone must be having these experiences, 
which are simply brain states. Metzinger’s justification for the evolution of the self does 
not entirely address the fact that, whether the self is real or fictitious, the sense of self 
each one of us experiences is a phenomenological reality. 
 
For Sartre a continuing struggle takes place as the for-itself tries to impose upon the In-
self it’s own wish to be factual. “Being-for-itself is being what it is not, and not being what 
it is” (Sartre, 2006, p.142). The self-reflexive nature of the being-for-itself imposes itself 
on the immediacy of the being-In-itself and becomes at once object and subject of its 
own awareness. The being-For itself wants to be what is not (promoting its self-asserting 
desire to be a facticity, to being real in the world – which incidentally it will never 
achieve), and be what it is not (that is, it wants to improve itself, striving to iron out faults, 
defects and wrongs). “It is this game of musical chairs at the heart of the for-itself which 
is Presence, to being” (Sartre, 2006, p. 142).  
 
In short, Sartre defines three Ekstases, three modes of total absorption of the being-for-
itself: “1) to not be what it is; 2) to be what it is not; 3) to be what it is not and not-be what 
is it” (Sartre, 2006, p. 137). Thody summarizes this labyrinthine argument: “We would all 
like to be absolutely what we are with the full awareness that we are it. But this, Sartre 
argues, is something which no human being can ever possess" (Thody et al., 1998). In 
Sartre’s view, as well in Merleau-Ponty’s, the self reveals its reality when confronted with 
the other. This new perception of the self in presence of the other Sartre calls being-for-
others, “There arises here a new dimension of being in which my Self exists outside as 
an object for others. The for-others involves a perpetual conflict as each for-Itself seeks 
to recover its own Being by directly or indirectly making an object out of the other” 
(Sartre, 2006, p.650). Changes in one’s awareness of the self in the presence of the 
other are explored by Jean-Paul Sartre in his concept of Bad Faith. Bad faith "refers to 
the cultivated illusion by which we seek to conceal from ourselves the uncomfortable 
ambiguity of our position - that we must and can choose, and yet that the only real 
choices we can make are those presented to us by the situation in which we happen to 
find ourselves […] The inevitable tension between our freedom and our facticity, the 
human response to this tension is to fall into what Sartre calls 'mauvaise foi’" (Matthews, 
1996, p. 68). In Being and Nothingness (2006, p. 59) Sartre offers several examples of 
the trap of Bad Faith. I will refer to the example of the overly mannered café waiter, 
locked in the precisely established role of what a waiter should talk like, move like, think 
like.  
In thus behaving, the waiter is identifying himself with his role as waiter 
in the mode of being in-itself. In other words, the waiter is discarding 
his real nature as for-itself, i.e. as free facticity, to adopt that of the in-
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itself. […]. In this way, the burden of his freedom, i.e. the requirement 
to decide for himself what to do, is lifted from his shoulders since his 
behaviour is as though set in stone by the definition of the role he has 
adopted. […] the very identification at the heart of bad faith is only 
possible because the waiter is a for-itself, and can indeed choose to 
adopt such a project. So the freedom of the for-itself is a pre-condition 
for the project of bad faith, which denies it. The agent's defining his 
being as an in-itself is the result of the way in which he represents 
himself to himself. This misrepresentation is however one the agent is 
responsible for. […] Insofar as bad faith is self-deceit, it raises the 
problem of accounting for contradictory beliefs. The examples of bad 
faith which Sartre gives, serve to underline how this conception of self-
deceit in fact involves a project based upon inadequate representations 
of what one is. (Onof, 2018)  
 
The same analysis of behaviour could apply, for instance, to the way a classically trained 
musician walks on stage to offer the audience a solo recital.  
 
Sartre’s ontology presents a constant struggle between who we are and who we want to 
be, between who we think we are and who we think we should be, between who wish we 
were and what we think other people think we are. From a performance perspective, 
standing on a stage before an audience, this struggle – and the redemptive possibility 
offered by Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm – becomes not only acutely real, but it is the very 
matter of a performers craft. Without an open and visible acceptance of the conundrum 
of Bad Faith and of its inevitable existential failure there is no performance, no ritual, no 
offering, no possibility of transformation. In this sense, vigilant performance publicly 
navigates the fine line between a pristine and a failing performance. In fact, it positively 
welcomes failure, errors, unexpected situations, and unplanned moments, since those 
are the moments when the person (in-itself), and not a persona (for-itself) of the 
performer is visible to the audience. In “being-for-others, the artist projects onto the 
audience the existential struggle itself, the struggle inherent in existing for others”. 
(Adams, 2007) The shared humanity that is thus communicated is further discussed in 
section 2.3, Interpersonal Communication.  
 
My artistic aim, as I attempt a definition of vigilant practice, is to reveal, on stage, each 
performer’s own projects of Bad Faith – and their inevitable failure. In this sense I am 
proposing that a vigilant performance reveals the presence of persons rather than of 
personas. That is not to say that the performer should not bring to the stage his or her 
own masks and lies (that is after all the impossibility of Bad Faith), but that the masks 
and lies are personal, unique, individual, honest. The paradox is inevitable: a vigilant 
practice asks for honest lies (rather than acted out ones). 
 
2.1.5.1   Sartre and Meta-cognition 
Sartre’s view of the self as a battlefield between being-in-itself and being-for-itself is 
further complicated if we consider that consciousness is seen by other authors as a 
complex, multi-layered concept. Winkielman and Schooler (2011)  distinguish “between 
unconscious, conscious and meta-conscious processes in social cognition” and “among 
IN PRACTICE: 
Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians contains several pieces that address the 
issue of bad-faith: GMNM.3; GMNM.6; GMNM.15; GMNM.25; GMNM.47. 
 
Video recordings and Catalogue entries exist for the pieces in bold. 
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mental states that are (1) genuinely unaware, (2) aware, but lack meta-awareness, and 
(3) meta-aware – internally articulated as states of the perceiver.” For Schooler, mental 
content can be “meta-conscious” (or “meta-aware”) and be explicitly represented as a 
content of one’s own consciousness. It is this type of consciousness that is typically 
assessed when an experimenter asks participants questions like, “How happy do you 
feel now?” (Winkielman and Schooler, 2011) Meta-consciousness is not a distinct state 
of mind: “the distinction between consciousness and meta-consciousness is simply one 
of content. Meta consciousness can be said to correspond to conscious states in which 
the content of those states includes an explicit characterisation of what is currently being 
experienced. In other words, meta-consciousness is simply a kind […] of conscious 
experience in which the focus of thought is turned onto itself.” An awareness of this 
difference is relevant in performance since it ”carries behavioural consequences.” Meta 
consciousness is not an abrupt process and can occur slowly or quicker, and at deeper 
levels of awareness, from the moment “when during a long drive a person suddenly 
realises that he mind-wandered right past the motorway exit”, to the slow realisation that, 
years after an event, we acted wrongly towards another person. Meta-consciousness 
operates along a spectrum, and not as a binary on/off switch, and is not continuous, 
allowing moments where meta-consciousness is more or less present. Winkielman and 
Schooler tested subjects while reading a text during meta-cognition and during mind 
wandering states, when they suddenly realise that they are no longer retaining the 
information in the text. Surprisingly, Winkielman and Schooler’s study presents an 
important find in that the neural activity of a mind-wandering subject, when not engaged 
in meta-cognition, is substantially more active than when engaged in a focused meta-
cognitive activity. Meta-conscious states can be beneficial when self-control is 
necessary, but it can be equally hindering in situations of pleasure.  
 
 It is difficult to equate Sartre’s being-for–itself to meta-cognition, since for Sartre much of 
the project of Bad Faith is active in the background of our mental content, often operating 
at an unconscious and even subconscious level. 
 
2.1.6  Kahneman’s mind operation systems 
Drinko (2013) proposes Kahneman’s model of immediacy of reaction in response to 
different levels of meta-awareness as particularly relevant to the improviser. According to 
Kahneman (2011), the mind operates in two distinct systems, labelled as System 1 and 
System 2. Keywords that define System 1 and system 2 are presented in the table 
below: 
 
Table 3 – Kahneman's mind operation systems (in Drinko, 2013) 
System 1 System 2 
Intuition Rationality 
Behaviour Action 
Immediate response Effort 
Quick reaction (disgust, humour, pain Ponder, plan, consider (take time to 
respond) 
Automatic Critical thinking 
Outwards focus: observe, react to the 
external 
Inward focus 
Instinctive Conscious problem solver 
Observing environment Deliberating 
Listen Talk 
 
I will refer back to Kahneman’s typology (System 1/System2) throughout this text. 
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2.1.7 A spectrum of consciousness  
The view that consciousness is a dichotomy, a binary state that one either has or does 
not have (as portrayed in the Sistine Chapel’s roof by the finger of the god imparting 
consciousness to humankind, fully assembled and ready to use) can be opposed by an 
alternative model of consciousness as gaining access to a series of procedural steps: a 
spectrum or continuum of consciousness that one can navigate, like Damásio’s running 
polyphony ‘I am aware of the page in front of me; of the temperature of the pen I am 
holding and by consequence of the skin of my hand, of the children playing outside, and 
by consequence of spaces that I am not presently inhabiting, of my breathing, of the 
discomfort of an old cut in my hand; of the memory of having cut myself, of all the times 
my skin was cut, grazed, healed, of remembering being. By writing this sentence I am 
becoming more and more aware of being aware, a meta-cognition, (a pata-cognition). All 
these descriptions can be placed along a continuum of awareness, each connecting my 
own cognition to a new aspect of my experience and memories. They don’t all arrive at 
me simultaneously, as if a consciousness switch has been turned on in me the moment I 
wake up, but I glide along the continuum of awareness, of my own volition or not. 
Learning can then be seen as a process of navigating the spectrum of consciousness, 
and discover new colours: what is learnt is the new consciousness – experience is 
transformation. The concept of both pedagogy and of performance as a transformational 
process is central to this research. Let me clarify that transformational does not 
(necessarily) equal a healing process, though there are clear parallels with therapeutic 
practices, in particular Psychodrama, which proposes to be a psychological healing 
process. The reason why I do not consider this process of transformation to be a healing 
process is that healing implies that there is something to be healed, to be cured, some ill 
to be eliminated. That is not the objective of this research. 
 
Table 4 – Models of consciousness: Damásio, Winkielman, Kahneman, mindfulness 
 
These are the mental states that my work aims for in a vigilant performance practice. 
Vigilance in this sense is not a state of meta-cognition or System 2 – unless the truth of 
place demands it to be. The truth of place in an fully improvised situation may require a 
state of Flow (Cziksentmihalyi, 1990), system 1 state of mind, while planned aspects of 
the same performance may require a degree of meta-awareness, system 2. How to 
choose which state to be in, and more importantly, how to allow oneself to navigate 
between states, is an individual process, a process that is dependent on the individual’s 
sense of truth of place. My Games are proposals for exploring these concepts but each 
player must always find their own solutions for each performative problem encountered.  
 





















2.1.8 Cognitive states in Performance: Applications 
How are these theories of the self-useful in understanding performance studies and 
specifically in exploring vigilant music improvisation? Many theatre practitioners and 
educators, such as Boal, Johnstone, and Zaporah have focused their work on how to 
articulate these mental processes in order to promote valid theatrical performances and 
improvisations. I believe many of those mental processes can be transferred to music 
improvisation practice.  
 
Drinko (2013) makes the point, based on Viola Spolin, Keith Johnstone and Del Stone’s 
work on theatrical and comedic improvisation, that an outwards focus on what is 
happening in the scene around can motivate an intuitive and un-repressed response, 
which is referred to as a state of Flow. This outwards awareness also plays an important 
role in Pochinko/Morrison Clown Through Mask training.  
 
The key to understanding improvisation's effects on the mind is that it 
orders consciousness. By focusing outward on one's scene partners, 
the game of the scene, or the space, skilled improvisers can order 
consciousness in such a way that system 1, or intuitive automatic 
thinking rises to the surface in the competition amongst different modes 
of thought. Whether it be Viola Spolin's focus (or point of 
concentration), long-form improvisation's perceptual shift towards 
patterns and themes, or Keith Johnstone's status, not thinking about 
one's behaviour leads to less self-conscious improvisations with better 
ensemble collaboration. (Drinko, 2013, p.93) 
 
See the text box on the following page for details of pieces relevant to this topic. 
 
Like Drinko, I believe that meta-consciousness (system 2) can have an important 
influence on the improvisation of presence. This influence is both positive and negative. 
Meta-consciousness can have the positive effect of focusing the performers’ awareness 
in their own presence and inner imagery. Equally, it can have the negative effect of 
interrupting quick decision-making, which can be necessary in improvisation. Drinko 
(2013), quoting Johnstone, Spolin, Close points towards the dismantling of meta-
consciousness to allow intuitive, quick responses to stimuli. Albeit working in the context 
of theatrical improvisation, and not of musical improvisation, Drinko refers to Damásio’s 
proto-self and core-self, when the mind-wandering state reveals enhanced neuro-activity 
(Winkielman and Schooler, 2011), as potentially facilitating a state of flow, when 
improvised solutions are generated quickly and without inhibitions. For Drinko, the 
autobiographical self, extended consciousness and meta-consciousness, and System 2 
can have a hindering effect in improvisation fluency.  
 
Damásio’s model for the sense of self in which awareness of self is dependent on an 
awareness of change in the organism in response to a stimuli has consequences in my 
definition of vigilant performance practice: being aware of how an object changes the 
organism (the performer) can become an obstacle to achieving Drinko's state of flow in 
improvisation. But, as Damásio proposes, core consciousness is a preliminary state that 
allows emotional states, and is fundamental in having a sense of self, and upon which 
extended-consciousness is constructed. It is possible to argue that having a sense of self 
at the level of core consciousness does not necessarily obstruct the possibly desired 
state of flow in performance or a state of Vigilance. Extended consciousness, on the 
other hand, can in fact create such an obstacle to the immediacy of Flow. The careful 
articulation between Kahneman’s System 1 and System 2, between mind-wandering and 
meta-cognition is described by Dina Facklis as a  
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“shift in focus in terms of listening [...] Facklis says, "if I say to myself, 
'Listen, listen, listen, [...] then I'm always in a better place." Facklis's 
outwardly focused listening prevents her from relying on her system 2, 
conscious problem solver, internal monologue. [...] In order to have 
successful shows where she feels as if she is experiencing the 
performance moment to moment, Facklis reminds herself and her 
students to shift their focus outward. […] By listening intently to her 
partner and the ensemble, she is able to shift her focus from a self-
conscious, critical mode of thinking to a heightened perception of what 
she hears on stage” (Drinko, 2013, p.93-94). 
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s parlance, the performer sees the other-as-subject, and the self-as-
object, “Allows them to 'get out of their heads, [...] and out of 'deliberating mode' 
(Claxton). It means no conscious monitoring of one's own behaviour” (Drinko, 2013, p.93-
95). When performing, focusing on intense outward listening, attending to the duality of 
the other – at once object in-the-world, beings-in-the-themselves, and subjects that 
attend to me, as being-for-themselves attending to me as being-in-myself – I allow the 
experience of being-in-myself to take over being-for-myself; I choose to give more weight 
to the other-as subject and to myself-as-object, than the more immediate and common 
self-as-subject (being-in-myself). These mental operations can be seen as Sartrean key 
concepts applied to the working and development of the improvising mind.  
 
Vigilance in performance, as I am defining it, is at once ‘mind-wandering’ (Self A, being-
in-itself) and meta-conscious (Self B, being-for-itself). Choosing to engage one mode or 
the other can be dependent on the situation, on the style or genre. But both modes can 
coexist, in a way that perhaps sits closer to the meditative state of observing one’s 
thoughts with detachment and non-interference. As Winkielman states, mind-wandering 
states display active neurological states that are not present in meta-cognitive states. 
Further research is needed to investigate the possibility that this halting of neurological 
activity is causally related with the hindering of improvisational activities – stopping the 
flow– which is reported by improvising performers. 
 
Many of the performance traditions and practitioners I discuss on this paper – from 
performance areas as diverse as music, dance, theatre, martial arts – have engaged, to 
a larger or smaller degree, in some of the concepts and practices that scaffold my 
concept of vigilance. Their work seems to me to nurture mental processes over or in 
parallel with the physical or musical. That is to say, a great deal of the ‘product’ of the 
performance (the material residue of the performance) is spent internally, in the 
performer’s mind.  I will refer to a selection of performance practitioners and how specific 
aspects of their practice can be used to exemplify and scaffold my own concepts and 
practices. 
 
Though a detailed analysis of each of the following practices falls outside the scope of 
this paper, it may be helpful to refer to some of them as examples of the type of mental 
engagement I am referring to in my concepts of Vigilance and embodiment. I have 
mentioned the practice of breathing meditation as an example of a practice where the 
inner, mental process is at the core the activity. Tai chi and yoga are other examples of a 
practice where the mental process is an inseparable part of the physical activity. 
Performance practitioners like Pina Bausch, Marina Abramović, or as I mentioned above, 
comedy improvisers and Pochinko’s Clown Through Mask also make use of specific 
mental states in their practice. In the field of music, notable performance practices, 
composers and performers where the mental engagement is important include the 
musical accompaniment to Nō theatre, Pakistani Sufi chanting, Pauline Oliveros’s Deep 
Listening practice, Stockhausen’s intuitive music, John Cage’s non-intentionality in 
performance, many of the composers of the Wandelweiser group, such as Mark So and 
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Manfred Werner’s book Bangs (which deals primarily with cognitive states and no 
action), Alexis Porfiriadis collection Blocked Piano (which contains pieces which deal with 
cognitive states with some action). 
 
Anthony Rowley’s view that "Music can be a way to contemplation […]. The player is also 
the listener - he becomes his own audience, but he may be joined by others who find this 
way attractive” (Rowley, 1984) is informative in this respect, in particular if we consider 
his view in the light of Merleau-Ponty’s definitions of Self and the awareness of Self. For 
the performer, the musical act is one of encounter with the self and with the self as other. 
At the same time his audience is invited to observe and partake on this experience. The 
audience may perceive the performer as the other, but also as a representation of the 
self: to see a performer making music is also to consider ourselves, the audience, as – at 
least in potential - the performer we are face with. We are also the body of the player 
playing, of the dancer dancing. The understanding, the creation of meaning (at the 
aesthesic level) by a performer can be argued to be in part related to the way in which 
we, with the help of the mirror neuron system, embody the very body of the performer – 
the gestures, the facial expression, the voice quality, the muscle tone and effort of our 
performer is in reality – not figuratively – being experienced (but in unique and individual 
ways) by the brain and body of each audience member. This is good news if the aim of 
the research is to emphasise communication at all possible modalities. An embodied 
presence can be an entry point for what Moreno call the encounter: "the ability to meet 
others, being as present and aware as is possible and each being capable of mentally 
reversing roles with each other” (Karp, M., et al., 1998, p. 32). I will return to this when I 
discuss inter-personal communication in section 2.3.  
 
2.1.8.1.  Audiation as internal music making 
Amnon Wolman’s collection of textual descriptions of music are an exemplary exercise in 
audiation. In February 26, 2000, Wolman describes sonic events that are never in fact 
present physically. The sounds are audiated by the reader, existing only in their audiated 
imagination, in a very private performance. It is interesting to note that Wolman describes 
not only the sounds, using non-technical language often drawn for other senses (I will 
return to the multi-sensory nature of perception in section 2.2 – multi-modal imagery), but 
also describing the feelings and emotions, thus impelling the reader to imagine how they 
react and respond to the musical imagery described. From purely mental, audiated, 
imagery, a physical, emotional response is elicited from the reader-performer. 
 
Stockhausen, in his own words, articulates his concept of an outwards driven performer 
in the following way:  
the most profound moments in musical interpretation and composition 
are those which are not the result of mental processes, are not derived 
from what we already know, nor are they simply deducible from what 
has happened in the past. Musicians must learn to become the 
IN PRACTICE: 
[IN] 
Many of the scores in my Games employ rules that demand that the players focus 
their attention on external events, precisely to take their awareness out of System 2 
and into System 1. Other pieces, on the other hand, focus on meta-awareness and 
the players perception of themselves. I will discuss them in more detail in Section 3. 
 
[COGNITION] 
GMNM.1; GMNM.2; GMNM.3; GMNM.4; GMNM.5; GMNM.10; GMNM.11; 
GMNM.13; GMNM.14; GMNM.16; GMNM.23; GMNM.30; GMNM.33; GMNM.38; 
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opposite of egocentric; otherwise you only play yourself, and the self is 
nothing but a big bag full of stored information. Such people are closed 
systems. But when you become like what I call a radio receiver, you 
are no longer satisfied with expressing yourself, you are not interested 
in yourself at all. Then you will be amazed at what happens to you, 
when this state is achieved; when you become aware of what happens 
through you, even for short moments, you will be quite astonished. You 
become a medium. (Stockhausen and Maconie, 1989, p.125)  
 
Though Stockhausen’s attempts at defining the optimum performance state for his music 
is done through a sequence of negative sentences, which tell us what the optimum state 
is not but do not necessarily clarify what that optimum state is, it is clear that at the centre 
of his performative concerns is the relationship between the emptiness of the self and the 
awareness of the objects of the world outside (the ‘radio receiver’). Here I observe a 
similarity with the IN and OUT dichotomy that I am proposing as a basis for my concept 
of vigilant practice.  
 
Pauline Oliveros’ Deep Listening exercises are, at the onset, exercises in sonic meta-
awareness: Listening to Listening, as Oliveros herself describes it. "Deep Listening 
comes from noticing my listening or listening to my listening and discerning the effects on 
my body mind continuum, from listening to others, to art and to life" (Oliveros, 2005, 
p.xxiv). But Khaldi, describing Oliveros’ notion of attention that underpins Deep Listening, 
states that "Attention is the act of using our senses, beginning with the ability to 
concentrate. Next is the ability to process our external environment through our senses 
by taking an interest. Third is giving care and tending to the information we have 
received, then fourth is responding to the information by an affectionate act. The 
summation of these properties creates respect. In our case it is respect for what our 
senses have heard, seen tasted, smelled or touched” (Oliveros, 2005, p.63). 
 
In Oliveros’ work, there is an emphasis on receiving stimuli, on the input aspect of being, 
on the inwards, and on states of meta-awareness, on System 2.  Oliveros’ concept of 
Deep Listening, as described by her, has the clear aim of “listening in every possible way 
to everything possible to hear no matter what one is doing.” […] Deep Listening explores 
the difference between the involuntary nature of hearing and the voluntary, selective 
nature – exclusive and inclusive - of listening” (Deep Listening Institute Website, n.d.). 
Though Khaldi's fourth ability is to do with responding to information, that response is 
conditioned to being an affectionate act. All other possible responses seem to be 
inappropriate and not compatible with Attention. If divergent from affection and 
compassion -for instance Joy, euphoria, sadness, anger– should the responsive acts be 
ignored and discarded? Should they be masked and replaced with an un-authentic 
demonstration of affection? The Outwards motion in response to the inwards impact of 
the world is dangerously restricted to a tight and unforgivable sense of morality that is not 
necessarily the performer's morality. Oliveros’s attempt at the OUT is thus obstructed. 
The last sentence confirms this by focusing all the definition on what is received internally 
through our senses. Left out, in my view, are the continuous emotional flux of the subject, 
Damásio’s polyphony of emotions, the continuously modulated adaptation to the other's 
response to the self as inter-personal Communication. For that reason, Oliveros’s score 
work, though full of interesting models with regards to mental processes that operate in 
the boundaries of System 2 and System 1, falls short of my aim to create an un-impeded, 
direct channel of communication between performers and between audience. 
 
I make this negative assessment through the study and performance of Oliveros’ scores 
alone.  Oliveros was aware of the limitations of the score as vehicle for transmitting 
musical actions. For that reason she founded the Deep Listening Institute in 1985 to 
develop and divulge Oliveros’s work, through a certified training programme. Oliveros’ 
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Training institute involves Deep Listening practitioners in a process that “includes 
bodywork, sonic meditations, interactive performance, listening to the sounds of daily life, 
nature, one’s own thoughts, imagination and dreams, and listening to listening itself.  It 
cultivates a heightened awareness of the sonic environment, both external and internal, 
and promotes experimentation, improvisation, collaboration, playfulness and other 
creative skills vital to personal and community growth” (Deep Listening Institute Website, 
n.d.) There is in the mission statement an unequivocal desire to include ‘external’ agency 
in the deep listening process, which seems to me, in the light of my own artistic practice, 
to be underdeveloped in Oliveros’ scores. (I have not taken any training at the Deep 
Listening Institute, which could be a route for further exploration and personal 
development). 
 
2.1.9 Summary of section to 2.1 
We have seen how some theatre and comedy practitioners (Drinko, Johnstone, 
Morrison) propose a mode of improvisation where the mental states and awareness of 
the improviser is driven towards the world around, the Exterior – the OUT–, rather than 
on the mental or psychic world, the Interior. Evidence from Neuroscience supports this 
preference for an outwards awareness in improvisation. Other composers, like Pauline 
Oliveros, Manfred Werther, Amnon Wolman work on processes that are predominantly 
interior. Oliveros’ Deep Listening proposes forms of engaging with the production of 
sound that are first of all internal. Wolman’s text scores describe in words music that has 
never been heard, to be recreated in audiation by the reader at each reading of the text. 
These pieces operate purely on audiation and do not require the physical existence of 
sound to be enjoyed. An inwards looking awareness, an appeal to meta-cognitive 
processes draws the work to an Interior field.  
 
By opposing Morrison’s [OUT] and Oliveros’ [IN] strategies of improvised performance, I 
observe two distinct pulls in regards to the fields of awareness of a performer: one draws 
the performer into itself, and the other does very much the opposite and draws the 
performer’s focus to the world around and how to react to it. I believe striking a delicate 
balance between inwards and outwards awareness is key to formulating a model of 
vigilant musical practice. 
 
I will return to cognition and cognitive states in Chapter 3, when I will discuss approaches 
to developing a pedagogy of cognitive states and applications to music improvisation.  
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The second element in my definition of vigilant performance practice is embodied multi-
modal imagery. Multi-modal imagery is the way in which we perceive the whole presence 
of the performer, their actions, and the music they may be performing, as a complex and 
interconnected set of images (Damásio, 2000) and that those images are constructed 
upon many cognitive modes, such as: sight, sound, time, effort, shapes, language, 
materiality, intentionality, movement, balance, olfaction. That is to say – the complete 
presence, the perceived body. According to Damásio, we use multi-modal imagery in 
order to construct meaning. The perceived body becomes a meaningful body. The way in 
which the multi-modality of presence affects each individual is unique and seems to be 
influenced by culture, environment and by each individual’s experience (Heyes, 2012;  
Calvert et al., 2004). Nevertheless, there are important aspects of multi-modal cognition 
that are genetically, rather than culturally or individually encoded (Kreifelts et al., 2007; 
Simpson et al., 2014). The human ability to read meaning in facial expressions and voice 
qualities, even across species, is a well-documented example of genetic, or Universal 
behaviours (Ekman, 1972; 2003).  
 
Considering that non-verbal communication is an important element of live music 
performance, I construct my work around the idea that the body of the performer has the 
power to influence, and in fact to construct, the musical meaning of a performance. The 
meaningful body is seen as the tabula rasa, the ground zero of musical meaning, upon 
which all other layers of action and meaning are later deposited. The duality of cultural 
and biological meaning formation surrounding the musical action is described by 
Thompson 
 
A musical gesture, read on a score, heard as sound, or seen as a 
bodily movement attains its significance through an acknowledgment 
bestowed upon it by the subject producing the object (agent) or the 
subject perceiving the object (interpreter). Robert Hatten, cited in 
Gritten & King (2006), argued musical gestures are biologically 
grounded, that they ‘inter-modally synthesize the energetic shaping of 
motion through time into significant events with expressive force’ 
(Gritten & King, 2006, xxi). From this point of view, musical gestures 
are gestalts in which otherwise unrelated elements are constructed 
‘into continuities of shape and force’ (xxi). […] The cognitive pairing of 
these dichotomies is what we come to interpret as music. (Thompson, 
2007, p.6) 
 
From these sonic gestalts, which can trigger complex internal images, I highlight the 
importance of bodily movement and physical gestures, and the external images they can 
trigger because, as I will discuss, it is only through the visible, audible, multi-modal and 
perceptible presence of the performer that imagery is created. 
 
In this section I will explore what philosophy, neuroscience, linguistics and gestural 
linguistics, and performance studies can tell us about how imagery is created from the 
performer’s multi-modal presence, and how imagery from the object of the perceived 
body is the vehicle for the creation of subjective meanings – the meaningful body – 
through non-verbal, verbal and musical images.  
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2.2.1 Multisensory cognition and multimodality 
 
The literature about the neurological and psychological underpinnings of multisensory 
cognition is rich in examples of multi-modal representations. Multisensory imitation in 
neonates (Simpson et al., 2014), offers evidence of the importance of multisensory mirror 
neurons in the acquisition of speech. Neuro-plasticity – the brain’s capacity to re-
structure itself and to appropriate neural structures for different processes– may also 
offer clues about multi-sensory and multi-modal cognitive processes . For instance, in 
blind people, vision centres in the brain can be diverted to other senses. The questions 
that this field of research presently poses are far beyond the scope of this project. 
Nevertheless, from an artist’s perspective it can be enticing and creatively productive to 
play with suppositions and scientific hypotheses: can the capacity to redirect and 
restructure pathways across sensory domains be a constant in the functioning of the 
brain, even without any visible damage or impairement? That is to say, can, for instance, 
auditory cognition be perceived by tactile pathways, or vice-versa? We know we can 
perceive space from the sounds we hear. Can we also smell with our ears, hear with our 
eyes? That would surely help us direct this creative research towards a complex web of 
cognition where the senses are no longer separate but in continuous, embodied 
interaction. From this perspective, music may be said to not be purely sonic – because it 
is also gestural and colourful; painting is not purely graphic – because it is also material 
and literary; literature is not purely verbal – because it is also rhythmic and pictorial.  
 
Multi-sensory cognition proposes that cognitive information arises from a complex 
interaction between the senses, and not from each sense individually. According to 
Massaro (Massaro, in Calvert et al., 2004, p. 154) “when regarding cross-modal influence 
across other domains, multisensory integration is the rule rather than the exception". 
Multi-sensory pairings of sound and vision, touch, movement, balance, proprioception, 
temperature have been identified (Calvert et al., 2004). In fact, present research by 
Roder and Rosler points to the possibility that multi-sensory, or multi-modal cognition 
may be present even in the absence of some of the modes of perception involved. When 
observing the audio-visual pairing in the perception of speech in the presence of only one 
of the sensory stimuli, Roder and Rosler find that the missing sensory mode is completed 
in cognition. Even in a mono-sensory episode, multi-sensory neural processes may be 
active. (Röder and Rösler, in Calvert et al., 2004, p. 724) 
 
Of particular importance to my work is the notion that multi-sensory cognition is relevant 
to the understanding of how we in fact perceive our own self. deGelder et al. states that 
“At the level of subjective experience, multisensory integration contributes to a sense of 
self and an intensified presence of the perceiver in his or her world. This aspect of 
multisensory integration is particularly relevant for multisensory perception of emotion" 
(deGelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, in Calvert et al., 2004, p. 581). Debarba et al., working on 
first and third person representation in computer games, proposes that the “experience of 
embodiment, or bodily self-consciousness—the pre-reflective sensation of being the 
subject of an experience—comes from the coherent multisensory integration taking place 
in the brain and relates to the notion of an egocentric first person perspective on the self. 
One feels embodied due “to the ensemble of sensations that arise in conjunction with 
being inside, having, and controlling a body” (Kilteni et al., in Galvan Debarba et al., 
2017, p.1) 
 
Damásio (2000) points to the role of attention in multisensory integration. Attention here 
can also be understood as vigilance, as discussed in the previous section. Vigilance can 
be seen as a multisensory and multi-modal experience: to pay attention to an object is to 
perceive it as a multi-modal event. This brings us back to Dewey and Merleau-Ponty’s 
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notion of learning through an embodied and shared environment, through the “non-
dualistic divergence” “between my body looked at and my body looking, my body 
touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or encroachment, so that we may 
say that the things pass into us, as well as we into the things" (Merleau-Ponty and Lefort, 
1968, p.123).  
 
Multi-sensory cognition plays a role in understanding and reading emotions, in particular 
the complex relationship between verbal and non-verbal vocal stimuli, facial expression 
and bodily effort (Calvert et al., 2004). Mirror neurons play an important role in reading 
emotions in a multi-modal context. I will return to mirror neurons in more detail when I 
discuss Interpersonal Communication in Section 2.3. 
 
From a performance practice perspective, I will discuss the work of a selection of 
performers, and of performance traditions where I identify performance skills that are 
relevant to my own compositional work. I will explain how the notion of imagery – the 
perceived body, and the meaningful body – has informed my compositional and 
performative practice, and how I use these concepts to construct a proposal for a 
learning and development sequence that embraces and promotes those skills within the 
Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians.  
 
I will make a separation between the generation of meaning – where one only requires 
an object and a subject (which, as we discussed in the previous chapter on vigilance, can 
coincide in the same person), – and communication proper, where, according to Hargie 
(2017), two or more active subjects are necessary – a sender and a receiver. I will 
reserve for section 2.3, a discussion on inter-personal communication, when the contact 
between two or more entities is subject to a constant modulation and interplay.  
 
2.2.2 The Perceived Body 
 
The study in vigilance that I initiated in Section 2.1 proposes that the sense of self only 
becomes fully present within an individual when that individual is observed by the other. 
The next stage in my investigation is to explore how the individual is seen by the other, 
and the nature of the performer’s physical presence before its audience (which includes 
other performers).  
 
Vigilance (‘the body in agreement with the truth of place’ (Blanchot, 1982)) requires an 
alert engagement of one’s own body, not only with mental but also with all physical 
mechanisms which can be used to assert the authority of the body, ready to be engaged, 
ready for action: muscle, bones, weight, voice (in its many qualities), mastery of skills, 
the whole body in full agreement with the needs of the situation. A vigilant performer is 
prepared to use its body in any way, in any direction, with any intention, at any level of 
effort, in order to assert its authority, or presence. Skill, experience, and control of 
physical effort levels are seen as requirements for playing many musical instruments but 
from a vigilant performance perspective a performer also needs to be ready to 
acknowledge the role their facial expression, their voice, their fear and excitement, their 
emotional presence, their whole body-perceived, play in the possible understandings of 
the performance of music.  
 
2.2.2.1.  Cognition and embodied imagery 
The notion of a vocabulary of physical actions – a vocabulary of bodily forms and 
gestures– is closely linked with the notion of imagery which recurs both in Damásio’s 
texts on the neurological basis for the self, in current models of multi-sensory cognition 
(Stein, 2012), in McNeill’s (2005) work on linguistic and gestural imagery, and also, 
reverting back to music, in Gordon’s late notion of Space Audiation as the foundation for 
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both the understanding of rhythm and of tonal audiation, which he was working on at the 
time of his death in 2015. I will come back to each of these authors to expand on their 
notion of imagery. 
 
The processes that underlie the perception of the objects of our world, be they external 
or internal objects are, according to Damásio (2000), defined as neurological patterns, 
formulated as neurological images of the objects themselves: 
 
On their own, without the guidance of images, actions would not take 
us far. […] Images allow us to choose among repertoires of previously 
available patterns of action and optimize the delivery of the chosen 
action – we can, more or less deliberately, more or less automatically, 
review mentally the images which represent different options of action, 
different scenarios, different outcomes of action. We can pick and 
choose the most appropriate and reject the bad ones. Images also 
allow us to invent new actions to be applied to novel situations and to 
construct plans for future actions – the ability to transform and combine 
images of actions and scenarios is the wellspring of creativity. 
(Damásio, 2000, p.24) 
 
This again is in full agreement with Gordon's Music Learning Theory and the emphasis it 
places on acquiring a vocabulary of short patterns (images) that can be combined in 
familiar or unfamiliar in improvisation. 
 
My proposal is that musical meaning, very much like linguistic meaning (McNeill, 2005) is 
deeply interconnected with physical, and therefore emotional imagery as perceived by 
both the audience, other performers, and, both subconsciously and in a meta-cognitive 
way, by the performer itself.  
 
2.2.2.2. Feelings and emotions 
Damásio makes the distinction between feelings and emotions, feelings being the 
internal states one undergoes privately, while emotions are the physical states that 
accompany feelings. Emotions are external and observable. They exist in the outside 
world, be it in facial expressions, muscular tension, level of skin conductivity, tone of 
voice, gestural patterns, in the “fine touch and musculoskeletal division” (Damásio, 2000, 
p.150).   
 
In practical terms this means that you cannot observe a feeling in 
someone else, although you can observe a feeling in yourself when, as 
a conscious being, you perceive your own emotional, physical states. 
Likewise no one can observe your own feelings, but some aspects of 
the emotions that give rise to your feelings will be patently observable 
to others. (Damásio, 2000, p.42) 
 
I am using the terms ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’ as Damásio defines it. Only emotions are 
public; mind, consciousness and feeling are private, mental experiences. IN/OUT: 
emotion is OUT, consciousness and feeling is IN. Emotions, in this sense, are the 
physical counterparts, the residues of internal states, and form the primary building 
blocks for the creation of meaning, from an embodied and holistic perspective. The 
perceived body becomes the primary meaning machine, or in Vigotsky’s terms, the 
material carrier, upon which we can erect other meaningful modes of communication – 
words, music, images, architectures. Kristeva’s concept of the pheno-text, in opposition 
to the geno-text, as well as Roland Barthes’s notion of the Grain in the Voice (Barthes 
 53 
and Heath, 2009), both emphasise the corporeality of the voice, and highlight the 
uniqueness of each performance and of each performer as the only route into the 
understanding of music performance. Thomaidis (in Reeve, 2013, p.86) summarises this 
point by stating that the  
 
grain is the manifestation of the aspects of physicality engaged in the production 
of spoken or sung utterances, the bodily trace that seals each voice emission in 
such an unrepeatable way that the voice becomes direct allusion to the unique 
body that made its genesis possible in the first place. The 'grain' is what allows 
the listener to distinguish between this or that singer. 
 
In fact, for some art forms, like popular music, and performance painting (or perhaps any 
painting), it is precisely the uniqueness of the grain in the voice (and, by extension, in the 
whole body) – the pheno-text – that is highly appreciated. This is often the focus of the 
learning and training process in those styles: to find individuality. But the perceived body 
is also the emotional body. The performer’s body reveals to the world the intricate and 
delicate ‘polyphony’ of its own emotional symphony, to use Damásio’s expression 
(Damásio, 2000). 
 
Sartre describes emotions as mechanisms to “mask, substitute for, and reject behaviour 
that one cannot or does not want to maintain” (Sartre, 1948, p. 32). It seems to me that 
Sartre’s focus is on understanding the structures behind extremes of emotions (joy, 
terror, anger, hysteria), and does not address the gentle flux, the “running polyphony that 
underscores and punctuates specific thoughts in our minds and actions in our behaviour” 
(Damásio, 2000, p.43). Nevertheless, Sartre’s view is that extreme emotions open a 
route to the issue of the authenticity of the body in the world. "Emotion is not an accident. 
It is a mode of existence of consciousness, one of the ways in which it understands its 
being-in-the-world" (Sartre, 1948, p.91). According to Sartre, extreme emotions are 
dependent on the situation from which they arise and cannot be considered as isolated 
elements, or as discreet ingredients in a biochemical soup that conditions our bodily 
behaviours. Extreme emotions arise from a need to defend the self from a change in the 
world. The emotional realm is at once inevitable and absolutely true: inevitable – in the 
sense that it cannot be stopped or avoided, (nor can it be internally provoked without 
recourse to some context) – and absolutely true – in the sense that it's reality is, at the 
moment of its existence, utterly convincing and undeniable. It cannot be faked. If either of 
these conditions fault, the emotion is, from the point of view of the individual, false. The 
perceived body lies. Sartre's phenomenological view of emotions – which lead to extreme 
behaviours and to less extreme ones– points, in my own work, to a need to appropriate 
the performance situation per se as the source for those emotional behaviours, and not 
by exterior, imagined or a-priori contexts. In this sense, a vigilant performance cannot 
rely on acting plans, theatrical scripts, mood scores or created choreographies. The 
multi-modality of presence is too complex for scoring, and the perceived body too subtle 
for acting out previously learnt gestures and images, the ‘polyphony’ of emotions too 
delicate and dynamic to be fixed in time. For this reason (and other reasons we have and 
will encounter later), my vision of vigilant practice tends to step away from 
choreographies, from precise scripts and instead embraces improvisation as the initially 
favoured way of making music. 
 
Improvisation has been a constant compositional tool in my work for the past twenty 
years. I have written text scores, graphic scores, gestural scores, video scores, all of 
them rely heavily on the performers’ willingness to improvise some parameters of the 
performance, while respecting others. Nevertheless I acknowledge the importance of 
traditional western music notation and what it can achieve by focusing its attention on 
pitch, timbre, and temporal parameters. One could argue that traditional scores are 
improvised with regards to all the other parameters that escape its grip, such as the 
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performers’ gestures and embodied imagery. In parallel with the text scores produced as 
a result of this research I continue to compose traditionally notated scores, focusing 
primarily in defining pitch, sound colour and rhythm. Those scores do not form part of this 
research project but the work I have undertaken in my exploration of vigilant performance 
practice feeds into those compositions and the sonic universes and events they describe. 
This poses the possibility that even strictly notated scores can produce vigilant 
performances, if other aspects of the performance (embodied multi-modal imagery, 
communication) could be said to be present and observed. Further research is needed to 
clarify this point, but in the meantime I will continue to compose using both traditional and 
non-tradition scoring systems. 
 
What is seen in a performance is the performance being performed. What is being 
revealed to a concert audience are musicians making music, players playing. I believe 
there is enough depth, enough profound learning to be made within the ritual of a 
performance itself. The performance ritual of music making has the potential to create 
meaning, to reveal beauty and depth, to electrify some of Damásio’s internal ‘running 
polyphony’ in all those involved, to transform whoever is involved in it. Revealing some of 
this running polyphony, the constant flux of emotional matter that continuously percolates 
through us, that is what my vigilant practice is looking to communicate: Sartre’s thirst for 
authenticity, within the complex polyphonic flow of our existence. Vigilant practice is 
looking for persons, not personas. 
 
Sue Morrison, when teaching Richard Pochiko’s ‘Clown Through Mask’ (Coburn and 
Morrison, 2013) talks about the clown facing all directions of our selves at the same time, 
ready to follow one or other of the running polyphony's exquisite melodies, plucked from 
its dense counterpoint. For this reason, vigilant practice in my work is not simply about 
using the body in non-stylistic ways, like perhaps Kagel or Stockhausen propose in their 
theatrical, choreographed scores, or others more recently, – Michel van der Aa theatrical 
scores, Sara Carvalho’s gestural compositions, Ben Jameson’s Guitar Hero, – but about 
engaging the performer in a physical way which reveals some sort of inevitable truth 
about themselves in relation to the situation they happen to find themselves in. Again, the 
aim is to reveal persons and not personas – persons, with their true complexity of masks, 
denials and falsehoods.  
 
In vigilant practice the aim is to ultimately communicate using all of the above: mind, 
consciousness, emotion (external) and feeling (internal). In my compositional and 
performative work, I am concerned about how we can use the extent of our multi-modal 
physical presence to promote the generation of imagery, and how imagery is used to 
generate meaning.  
 
The conception of Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians is to address these areas as 
separate skills, each with their own learning sequences. In my Games for Musicians and 
Non-Musicians there are situations where fixed scripts are used to highlight a particular 
aspect of performance practice, by momentarily liberating the performer's attention from 
the verbal or gestural in order to be able to focus on other aspects of performance. This 
is done for the purposes of a pedagogy, of a training sequence, and not a choreographic 
attempt. My aim is that the person is never concealed by a persona. 
 
In the previous section we established that the differentiation between subject and object 
– the observer and the observed– can be complicated when the subject realises that they 
are themselves the object of the other’s subjectivity; and that we can observe not only 
the objects of our perception as subjects that observe us, but that we can also observe 
our own cognition as an object of our perception, in a process referred to as Meta-
cognition, or meta-awareness. Cognitively, we are images of ourselves. This is a central 
aspect of vigilant performance training. See section 2.1. 
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2.2.2.3.  Space Audiation 
Edwin Gordon’s late work on space audiation brings the notion of multi-modal imagery 
directly back to the musical field. For Gordon the complex process of audiation, when 
one listens internally, with comprehension, sounds that are not yet or no longer present, 
is inseparable from the notion of space audiation, when one equally perceives internally 
spatial gestural movement that are not yet or no longer present in perception. Gordon’s 
early work on music pedagogy, following on from Laban and Dalcroze Eurhythmics, 
placed a strong emphasis on physical movement as a means to understand rhythm. 
Later, he expanded this concept to encompass the notion of internal gestures that take 
place in an auditory space rather than a physical one, in the same way that musical time 
is seen separately from chronological time (Korsakova-Kreyn, 2018). Space audiation is 
not limited to rhythmic and temporal structures. For Gordon, space audiation is equally 
present in the musical understanding of pitch and harmony, phrasing, form, as well as in 
improvisation, musical expression and intonation (Gordon, 2015). Observing an 
orchestral conductor at work, or a rock musician performing – say Jeff Beck – I see how 
non-functional, gestural actions can relate to musical structures and how we, individually 
or within the context of a music genre or style, may construct an embodied meaning from 
sound (Korsakova-Kreyn, 2018). 
 
2.2.2.4.   The materiality of sound and multi-sensory perception 
Multi-sensory perception may play a role in assigning material qualities to sound 
perception. One can perceive the nature of the sound producing objects by hearing them: 
soft, hard, wooden, metallic, blown column of air or scratched string. We can also 
perceive the physical nature of the space through its resonating patterns (Bregman, 
2006). For Gordon, sonic gestures can be perceived (both in audiation and as acoustic 
signals) as material objects, and also as physical gestures, as having speech properties, 
like agogic and prosody, as movement in space, as spatial events (the low rumble of an 
earthquake or of a horse running comes from below, the high pitch of birdsong comes 
from above) (Klasen et al., 2012; Ramachandran, 1998; Vera, 2001). 
 
The theory of multi-modal cognition poses the possibility that the separation of senses 
that we experience at the level of perception may not be so clearly separated at the level 
of cognition. It's an alluring prospect to consider the many senses as existing in a 
continuum, sharing between them the capacity to motivate the creation of meaning. 
Ramachandran's multi-modal justification allows us to consider that perceiving say, a 
colour may not mean just a colour, speed not just speed, time not just time, movement, 
space, pitch, chords, gestures, moods, etc., etc., may all join forces in creating a complex 
web of cognitive stimulation across many senses from one single perceptual stimulus. In 
addition, and to further complicate the matter, since most perceptual stimulus are already 
multi modal at a perceptual level (a bouncing ball is not just a sphere, not just red, not 
just rubbery, not just movement at a certain speed, sound, material, etc. the potential 
complexity of a multi-modal cognitive experience is enormous: a bouncing red ball has 
the potential to generate and trigger an infinite number of simultaneous meanings within 
an individual. It is not my aim to map or control such complex webs of meanings within 
my compositional actions: for me, what is important is the recognition that a multi-modal 
approach to cognition and the creation of meaning(s) can justify a multi-modal approach 
to performance practice, and consequently to the training of a vigilant performer. 
 
I believe that phenomenologically, acousmatic, electronic and electro acoustic music 
retain this strong cognitive link to materiality (even though the sonic materials are electric 
speakers), to movement (even though movement and space are perceived only through 
space audiation and not through sight) and gesture (even though the gestures have to be 
imagined and audiated from within each audience member’s own vocabulary of gesture-
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sound patterns) (Bullington, 2013; Kreifelts et al., 2007; Leman, 2012; Leman and Maes, 
2015; Lundqvist et al., 2009). 
 
2.2.2.5. Music and gesture and the Multi-modal cognition of sound and Imagery 
These proposals support the notion of sound as source of information regarding the 
actually materials involved, but also of the effort levels involved in its production, and 
subsequently information regarding the emotion and intention behind the production of 
such sound. Multi-modal cognition of sound thus proposes two types of imagery: one 
relating to the material nature of sound itself, the other relating to the embodied gestural 
imagery attached to possible ways of producing the sound itself. One is physical, 
belonging to the world of things, the other is human, relating to the world of human 
intentions, emotions, meanings (Korsakova-Kreyn, 2018). As an example of the second 
form of multi-modal imagery let us take for instance a singer: without seeing the singer’s 
face, one can perceive their facial expression in the sound of their voice, and with it their 
emotional states, as revealed by their unseen physicality. Equally, one can visualise the 
physical effort of a violinist or of a rock guitarist in the sound we perceive, without seeing 
them. "We do not perceive sound just for itself, but as a source of information about the 
various bodily gestures that create that sound" (Windsor, in Gritten and King, 2011, 
p.55).  
 
The multi-modal cognition of the act of making music offers us the possibility to 
understand not only sound as a material movement, but also of understanding musical 
movement as meaningful gesture, in accordance with Godøy and Leman’s definition of 
“gesture as meaningful movement” (Godøy and Leman, 2010, p.5) 
 
2.2.3 The Meaningful Body 
The notion that an embodied presence is seen to form images in a multi-sensory field 
can help us understand how those images form meanings that can be subjectively 
communicated – meaningful action being my objective both as performer and as 
composer. But there is a large procedural step between the formation of images and the 
formation of meaning. 
 
2.2.3.1.  Imagery and the formation of meaning 
McNeil (2005) presents a definition of ‘meaning’ as a significant contrast in a field of 
opposites.  
The meaning is two things taken jointly, including both the point 
differentiated and the field of oppositions from which it is differentiated. 
The concept of meaning is irreducibly a relationship of a point to a 
background [cf. James’s Radical Empiricism], both of which are 
constructed in order to make the relationship possible. (McNeil, 2005, 
p.107) 
 
This view “contrasts with the classic view of meaning as ‘association’ or ‘habit strength’ 
or ‘content’ at a mental address” (McNeill, 2005). For McNeil meaning is formed by 
comparing the changes in objects in relation to a context. Interestingly, learning by 
comparison and relationship (and also the relationship between the pattern and the 
context) is also an important concept in Gordon’s Music Learning Theory, whose 
pedagogic models offer a way of scaffolding and informing my research output, in 
particular ‘Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians’. 
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Yampolschi, quoting Michel Imberty, offers the gesture a structural role in musical form: 
“the physical gesture contains the essential psychological elements of all musical 
thinking”2 (Yampolschi, 2014), starting with newborns’ experience of tension and release 
surrounding feeding patterns, and the temporal frame that is then created, which form the 
base for intentionality and meaning formation. In this perspective, the mechanics of 
meaning generation are genetically encoded, running in our biochemical processes, 
largely independent from our consciousness, a skill that is always present, that perhaps 
one never truly learns because its is present from birth. Many of the ways humans assign 
meaning seem to be genetically driven: from pattern recognition, facial emotional 
recognition, dietary preferences, sexual practices, racial bias and stereotyping, much of 
the really important aspects of human life are in fact largely beyond our interference.  
 
Reading an emotion when presented with a specific facial expression or voice quality 
seems to be driven to some extent by our shared genetically encoded behaviour, as 
observed by universal behaviours and values (Ekman, 1972). Yet a great deal of our 
relationship with gestural vocabularies is a learnt one, absorbed and developed by each 
individual in response to their environment and culture. Inevitable cultural variations arise 
from migrations and periods of social isolation, in what we could call the creation of 
gestural tribes with distinct gestural vocabularies (Mithen, 2011; Spatz, 2015). 
 
Musical genres often come packaged with a specific way of dancing, a way of singing 
and talking, and even a way of walking (the band Madness comes to mind). A whole 
catalogue of embodied skills is acquired through our continuous cultural contact: trends, 
fashions, technological advances, religion, changes in legislation, all these can have an 
immediate and profound effect in the way we form meanings from each other’s physical 
presence. The cultural and stylistic variants present in musical practices are immense 
and observing their specificities in detail falls out of the scope of this paper. What I’d like 
to retain is the notion that gesture, regardless of its origin, is inseparable from both 
speech and music and it forms an inclusive part of how we construct musical meaning. 
My work as a composer and as a performer has tried to bring our attention to this 
inseparability. 
 
In order to support this notion, I am drawing connections between gesture, language and 
speech, and music, highlighting the strong bonds that exist between all three, at the level 
of language and music acquisition, music education, linguistics and gesture.  
 
I am constructing my argument for a compositional concern with music/gesture imagery 
around two premises: one is that speech and music share many of the same 
neurological, psychological and social structures including what McNeill calls the 
Speech-Gesture bond, which can be understood as imagetic and also present in music 
performance (Davidson, 2001; Godøy and Leman, 2010; Gritten and King, 2011; Truslitt, 
in McPherson, Gary and Parncutt, 2002, p. 241). Mithen (2011) proposes evolutionary 
links between the development of language, music and dance/gesture, which are still 
visible today. The other is the premise that those common aspects and similarities need 
to be welcomed into musical practice, and some consciousness of gesture (large or 
small, effortful or effortless) needs to be present during the conception, training, and 
performance of music. In Chapter 3 I will explain my pedagogic proposals to address the 
second point. 
 
                                                
 
2 “o gesto constitui o recurso psicológico essencial de todo o pensamento musical” (Yampolschi, 
2014) [trans. author]. 
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2.2.3.2.   Speech-gesture bond and music-gesture bond 
To support the first point I am referencing, in addition to Mithen, the work of Vigliocco, 
McNeill, observing the links between gesture and language, I am also referencing texts 
on music and gesture, in particular Truslitt, Davidson, Gritten, Godøy, Gordon which 
points to the possibility that the speech-gesture bond is also present in music making as 
music-gesture bond. 
 
2.2.3.2.1.   Evolutionary links between language and music 
Observing the archaeological and anthropological record of early humans, Mithen 
(Mithen, 2011) proposes a shared evolutionary origin between language, music and 
dance (gesture), and a shared evolution of symbolic mind, in parallel with the beginnings 
of a Theory of Mind and the development of a sense of self-awareness, or meta 
cognition. 
 
Mithen proposes a pre-linguistic, pre-musical and pre-gestural communication system.  
With evolutionary specialization those modalities gain some separation in the form of 
language, music and dance but are not yet in our present evolutionary stage, completely 
separate. 
 
Yet language, music and dance/gesture still invade each other at all moments: the 
meaning of a spoken word is inflected by the tune of the voice or the gesture of the hand; 
a dance inevitably brings to mind words to describe and remember it; the emotional 
intensity of a piece of music is clearly written in a singer’s facial expression. In Mithen’s 
words: 
Music and language are universal features of human society. […] Both 
communication systems involve gesture and body movement (Mithen, 
2011). 
 
Mithen’s hypothesis of a shared origin of language, music and gesture allows us to 
approximate McNeill and Kendon’s speech-gesture bond closer to the possibility of a 
music-gesture bond, as Godøy proposes. 
 
Peretz makes a connection at a neurological level between music, speech and emotional 
states, suggesting that each of these human activities is united through early responses 
to parental vocalisation in such a way that there is an “invasion of the brain circuits that 
have evolved for emotional responsiveness to vocal expressions” (Peretz, in Juslin and 
Sloboda, 2011, p.102). 
 
2.2.3.2.2.   Parallels between Music and language acquisition 
Gordon proposes many shared aspects between early language acquisition and music 
skills acquisition, in particular the aspect of pattern acquisition through imitation, the 
process of learning through comparison and differentiation, and the value of 
improvisation strategies in learning and perfecting musical skills.  
 
Berkowitz concurs with Gordon in this point when he states, "Continuing the analogy with 
foreign language learning [...], practicing recombination of musical materials is similar to 
the use of learned vocabulary and grammatical structures to begin to form sentences. [...] 
recombination begins to train the budding improviser in the art of musical rhetoric" 
(Berkowitz, 2010, p. 71). 
 
The evolutionary (as Mithen proposes) and developmental (as Gordon and Berkowitz 
propose) connection between music and language is not structural: it is not through the 
shared presence of a grammar, which music lacks, but through the shared exterior 
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physicality (as Kendon and McNeill propose), of both speech and music making, and 
through it, the presence of imagery. 
 
Both music and language demonstrate the presence of an intention, a drive, an agency 
in the creation of meaning. Both the agent and the receiver of the linguistic or musical 
object need to be engaged at some level in order for some sort of meaning to be 
possible. I will refer back to this point when I discuss inter-personal communication in the 
next chapter. 
 
Music and language also share a social role, important in defining tribal identities, at 
many different levels, from families and friendships to nations and inter-national cultural 
associations (Ben-Tal, 2012; Gordon, 2007; Howell and Cross, 1985; Leman, 2012; 
Leman and Maes, 2015; Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009; Matyja, 2016) 
 
2.2.3.3.  The language-gesture bond  
Linguists, from Saussure to Chomsky, have debated the formation of meaning from 
phoneme or graphemes but often the role of the body in spoken communication has 
been ignored. Adam Kendon and David McNeill’s work on gesture, thought and language 
addresses this issue.  
 
McNeill offers two complementary dimensions of analysing language, two models for 
linguistics: the dynamic model and the static model. The static model observes the 
written word, best practice, correct grammars, etc. while the dynamic model observes the 
spoken word in a holistic manner, where an embodied, gestural, contextualised analysis 
is possible. It is interesting to note the similar move in recent years in musicological 
studies away from the object of the written score towards the complete phenomenon of 
music making (Cook, 2001). 
 
For McNeill, the gestures that inevitably accompany oral communication are not simple 
add-ons to spoken language, or clarifying elements for the verbal discourse, but are in 
fact inseparable from the whole thinking process that underlies speech. “It is profoundly 
an error to think of gesture as a code or 'body language', separate from spoken language 
[…] [gestures] are part of language” (McNeil, 2005, p.4) 
 
2.2.3.3.1.   Language is multimodal 
Vigliocco states that “speech signals are invariably accompanied by visual information on 
the face and in manual gestures, and sign languages deploy multiple channels (hands, 
face and body) in utterance construction (Vigliocco et al., 2014). 
 
The language-gesture bond and its reliance on iconicity “(i.e. resemblance between 
aspects of communicative form and meaning)” (Vigliocco et al., 2014) forms the basis for 
an “imagery-language dialectic” (McNeill, 2005) 
 
McNeil (2005) proposes an inseparable bond between gesture and imagery of speech: 
"Language appears to be inseparable from imagery. The imagery in question is gesture” 
(2005, p.18). McNeill's static and dynamic dimensions of language, offers us another way 
of relating speech to music: One static dimension (the score, the recordings of music, the 
geno-text, Nattiez’s neutral state of the work), and a dynamic one (observing also 
gesture and relationship – the pheno-text, Nattiez’s aesthesic and poietic states, Barthes’ 
grain in the voice, the performer’s body, the music’s internal and material imagery). The 
static dimension, connected with grammatical and syntactic structures in language, is 
also present in the syntax of music, regardless of style (Gordon, 2007). 
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The distinction between static and dynamic dimensions is also observed in Donaldson’s 
observations of classical and Pop musicians stylistic gestures in live performance, and in 
Moran’s observation of gestures in Indian classical musicians (in Clayton et al., 2013). 
 
The dynamic dimension of music is connected to the subtleties of phrasing, of the 
specifics of the situation of music performance (venue, and acoustics) and, directly 
relevant to my research, of the embodied, physical domain of music making. Again in this 
sense one could propose that Sausurre’s view that language has a ‘double essence’ 
(‘langage et parole’), also applies to music: an essence of syntax (Gordon, 2007), and an 
essence of imagery.  
 
The existence of a speech-gesture bond as McNeill suggests, and of an imagery-
language dialectic as supported by Damásio and McNeill, echoes Donaldson, Gritten, 
Bayley, Godøy’s work on gesture and music performance. Once again, we find closely 
related sets of cognitive and behavioural structures that link language and gesture, and 
music and gesture. 
 
As in speech, thinking music and making music impact on each other. Similarly, the 
gesture-speech bond could be as important in music making as it is in speech, as 
proposed by Truslitt, Davidson, Sloboda (Juslin and Sloboda, 2011; McPherson, Gary 
and Parncutt, 2002; Sloboda, 2005). Identifying some of the mechanisms behind the 
language-gesture imagery bond has helped me understand ways in which my own 
interest in the physicality of the act of music performance can be developed in my scores 
and performances. 
 
Relevant to this project, is McNeil’s point that speech-gesture “presents an absence of 
combination of units. There is no pre-choreography of the possible units of speech-
gestures” (2005, p.29). Similarly I believe that the music-gesture bond is not combined in 
units and is not pre-choreographed. This impossibility of pre-choreographed gestural 
units is extremely important in my work, and informs my decision to opt for improvised, 
rather than strictly notated, or choreographed, gesture-music imagery. 
 
2.2.4.   Internal musical imagery and External music imagery 
The literature pertaining to the relationships between music and gesture in the creation of 
imagery presents two clearly distinct but nevertheless related ways of understanding 
music and gesture, which I will refer to as internal imagery and external imagery 
(Korsakova-Kreyn, 2018).  
 
2.2.4.1. Internal Musical Imagery 
Internal imagery, as studied by authors like Juslin, Gordon, Sloboda, Hatten, refers to the 
relationship between the cognition of purely sonic musical gestures and the mental 
perception of physical events, which may be connected or not to the physicality of the 
musician making music, but it is subjectively connected to a sense of materiality, 
movement and physicality. Truslitt in 1938 theorised about an internalised sense of 
corporeal movement as a way of understanding how music impacts upon us: 
IN PRACTICE: 
Piece 28 from Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians offers an example of how this 
topic can be addressed in the writing of score and in its performance. A video recording 
exists for this piece (GMNM.28), as well as a Catalogue entry and commentary. 
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Musical motion is internal and encompasses the whole human being. It 
is not only an emotion but also a true motion sensation. […] Musical 
motion can be likened to an invisible, imaginary dance. (Truslitt, 1938, 
in Repp, 1993, p.51, in McPherson, Gary and Parncutt, 2002, p.241) 
 
Similarly, Hatten (2004), cited in Gødoy and Leman propose that a musical gesture is  
 
a mental activity that can be evoked from musical sound. When we 
hear something, we are able to make sense of it by relating it to our 
body movements, or form an image in our minds of body movements. 
(Godøy and Leman, 2010, p.5) 
 
Davidson and Correia give the example where “expressive slowing in music (ritardando) 
corresponds to the deceleration of runners coming to a halt” (Davidson and Correia, in 
McPherson, Gary and Parncutt, 2002, p.249). 
 
As Gordon proposes, musical gestures can be perceived (in ‘space audiation’) as multi-
modal phenomenological events: as physical gestures, as material objects, as movement 
in space, as agogic and prosody in speech as natural events (the low rumble of an 
earthquake below, or the high pitch of birds above.) Clayton goes one step further into 
the realm of the individual’s body. He states that "Musical sounds can be conceptualised 
in terms of movements of our bodies and/or external objects within spaces that are 
roughly commensurate with the human body and its capacity for reach" (Clayton et al., 
2013, p.196). 
 
2.2.4.2.   External musical imagery 
External imagery is caused by events that are seen as well as heard, through the body of 
the performers. As an event with a public dimension, it can be shared, measured, 
documented, discussed, filmed, reproduced. It is present when the audience’s musical 
meanings are modulated by the act of watching the performer’s actions, and also how 
the performer’s physical actions are modulated by their own intentions (Davidson, 2012, 
2001; Kurosawa and Davidson, 2005; McPherson and Welch, 2012). 
 
2.2.4.3.   Unity of internal and external imagery 
On one side we can observe the influence of the external, physical gesture in the 
understanding of music gestures, and one the other we can observe the influence of 
musical gestures in creating an internal imagery (Leman and Maes, 2015). Both aspects 
are important in my compositional research: some pieces focus on the mental process of 
understanding musical gesture as a representation of physical events (GMNM.7, 
GMNM.8, GMNM.16, GMNM.17), while other pieces focus on the physical gestures that 
attract and modulate musical events (GMNM.9, GMNM.13, GMNM.16, GMNM.33). In the 
end, my aim is to create a performative bridge between both aspects: to combine the 
mental gesturing of music perception with the physical gestures of making music into one 
integrated form of musical practice from which meaningful and communicative situations 
can be extracted. The nature of the physical gesture itself can be so tightly bound to the 
sonic gesture that no imagetic separation between the two is possible: the concept of 
musical gesture applies both to sounds as well as to body movements (Godøy & Leman, 
2010). My artistic proposal is that, from a phenomenological perspective, both internal 
and external imagery are in fact inseparable.  
 
 
Clayton (Clayton et al., 2013, p. 197) refers to this parity between physicality and sonority 
as embodied music cognition. Windsor, cited in (Gritten and King, 2011), expresses the 
deep bonds between sound and gesture by writing that “sound has information about the 
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various bodily gestures that create sound”. The experience of sound, musically construed 
or environmental, is an experience of gesture, that is to say, or meaningful movement. 
 
Cumming offers an argument that I consider important in my search for performance 
validity: "What transforms a dead mechanical performance into a 'live' one is the creation 
of sound as a sign" (Cumming, 2000, p. 29). Cumming cites David Lidov, stating that for 
him, "music is significant only if we identify perceived sonorous motion with somatic 
experience" (1987, p.70) [...] Music bears significance, he suggests, if and only if, its 
capacity to convey somatic experience is understood" (2000, p. 134). For Lidov, it is a 
condition for the encoding of a musical sign that the somatic experience he mentions is 
one that accommodates a full embodied phenomenology: gesture, material, surface, 
temperature, speech patterns, voice qualities, shapes, temperature, colour, and whatever 
else if part of out complex embodied existence, all have the potential to partake in the job 
of generating musical signs and imagery, and with it, musical meaning. 
 
Windsor, in a departure from a sound-centred observation of music making, goes as far 
as suggesting that what one perceives when watching a performance of music are the 
physical actions, the gestures of the performers, and that the light that reaches our eyes 
and the sounds that we experience are mere sensory scaffoldings for the phenomena of 
embodied gesturing: 
If one is willing to take a radical ecological approach (i.e. Gibson 1979) 
what is perceived is movement of a person (in interaction with an 
instrument), not sounds and light. Auditory and visual perception are 
processes of picking up information that specifies events and objects. 
In case of music, the objects are people and instruments, the events 
are sets of movements that constitute musical performances (whether 
seen or heard, or both). (Windsor in Gritten and King, 2011, p.48) 
 
By proposing that one can conceive of the world as movement of our own body, Godøy 
and Leman open way for an interpretation of the experience of the musical as an 
experience of the gestures of our own body, whether we are moving or not, performing or 
not. By reducing all musical phenomenon to analogues of phenomena of our own 
individual bodies we encounter the ground rock, the absolute zero of musical meaning, 
the starting point for all shared musical experiences (Trevarthen, C., Delafied-Butt, J., 
Schögler, B., in Gritten and King, 2011). 
 
The immediacy of the unmediated physical meaning that music has the ability to propel is 
not limited to individual experiences, but because of its grounding on primal biologic 
encodings, it has the power to generate communicative channels between individuals, to 
create unhindered flows of shared meaning that, though non-verbal are by no means 
less real. Gestures “can be considered vehicles of human musical communication" 
(Godøy and Leman, 2010, p.30). 
 
This discussion is now traversing towards the communicative nature of the embodied 
musical gesture, and preluding the topic of the next section of this paper, and the third 
pillar of my definition of vigilant musical practice: interpersonal communication. For now, I 
will discuss how the physical gesture in music making is used to bridge towards the 
other, as a communicative tool. 
 
2.2.5.  The musical gesture as communicative tool – bridging 
towards the other 
Davidson (Davidson, 2001) adapts Ekman and Freisen’s conversation gestural 
categories to music to propose three types of music performance gestures: 
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- Adaptive gestures 
- Regulatory gestures 
- Illustrative and emblematic gestures 
 
Davidson adds a fourth gesture, which she calls ‘display’ or ‘showing off’. 
 
Bayley (Bayley and Clarke, 2011), observing chamber groups in rehearsal, highlights 
gestures that facilitate group music making. These gestures help musicians synchronize 
their musical intentions, provide tempo and timing information and offer cues for entries 
and exits. Though on the surface these types of gestures are merely functional, they 
nevertheless offer added information about the whole of the musical meaning, and how 
each individual understands it, thus helping the whole group find consensus about each 
individual contribution to the musical fabric. Group gestures also help the audience 
partake in the musical images of the musicians. 
 
Davidson reminds us the importance of gestures in music performance and perception of 
music, in particular that “different types of gesture are used for specific co-performer and 
audience engagement, underscoring the role of social interaction in the construction of a 
performance […]. It could well be that the presence of others promotes the use of these 
communicative gestures” (McPherson, Gary and Parncutt, 2002, p.244) The inter-
personal nature of gestural imagery will be discussed in section 2.3. 
 
2.2.6. Social and communicative aspects of music-gesture: 
gestural styles, cultural identity 
 
2.2.6.1.  Cultural markers and social interaction in music gesturing 
For Merleau-Ponty, and in the words of Matthews (1996), the inherent ambiguity of 
human existence – at once the subject and object in the world 
makes human beings essentially social rather than essentially isolated 
as Sartrean individualism maintains. We are social beings because we 
necessarily communicate our thoughts and feelings to each other by 
means of signs of different sorts. Some of these signs are more 
'natural' than others: for example, basic facial expressions and 
gestures. They are relatively natural in the sense that they appear to 
have a fairly direct connection with our biological constitution. 
(Matthews, 1996, p.98) 
 
It is possible to compound the statement that the expression of a feeling is different 
because the feeling differs, with the idea that the feeling is changed according to 
changes in the embodied expression of such feeling: changes in the embodied sign of an 
emotional state alter the way the emotion is emoted. James-Lange's theory, as well as 
Damásio, points to the body itself being the depository of emotions, rather than the way 
emotions find a 'way-out-of-the body'. 
 
Cultural assimilation and cultural variations must play a role in the coding and decoding 
of meaning, with the cultural variations becoming more noticeable as the complexity of 
thoughts or emotions increases. “To speak of this variation as merely 'conventional', 
however, is, Merleau-Ponty argues, misleading, since it implies that the variation is only 
in a superficial sign, rather than in the feeling or concept signified. It is not just the word 
for 'love', for instance, which varies from culture to culture, it is love itself: the feeling is 
differently expressed because it is a different feeling" (Matthews, 1996, p. 98). 
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For Merleau-Ponty, what determines the meanings to embodied signs (the totality of our 
presence) is the culture where we exist, and not our biology. In opposition to Merleau-
Ponty, Paul Ekman's research into facial expressions, as well and Chomsky's proposal 
that linguistic structures are innate and tied in with neurological evolution. Equally, 
Gordon's theory of musical aptitude development, which seems to point to an innateness 
of musical understanding, rather than a purely cultural construction, does not 
immediately negate the importance of the cultural/historical flow within which the 
individual communicate and formation of ideas and emotions, but no doubt expands the 
complexity of the coding/decoding process exponentially into a blurred continuum where 
we make sense of each other and ourselves in the world by appropriating, manipulating 
and transforming both genetic and cultural signs and signifiers with extreme dynamism, 
speed and subtlety.  
 
The communicative nature of adaptive, regulatory illustrative and display gestures in 
music making can also fulfil a social role. Davidson (in Rink, 2002) offers the example of 
stage craft gesturing in traditional western classical music performance: how the 
performer walks on stage, how they dress and how they bow at the start and end of a 
performance as socially constrained gesturing, with ritualistic and stylistic readings that a 
familiar audience will understand. Gesture provides a vocabulary of cultural identifiers 
that culturally bound groups of individuals around a commonly agreed aim. I propose that 
the audience’s gestural behaviour itself is also part of a learnt set of communicative 
actions, style bound, characteristic of a genre and tradition, and part of social cement 
that allows the musical event to take place in the first place. How both player and 
audience negotiate their shared space is the topic of the next section of this text.  
 
Davidson’s reading of the communicative nature of performance gesturing allows us to 
expand the matter of embodied musical practice beyond the music-gesture and its ability 
to take part in the creation of a music-gesture imagery, and to consider the importance of 
the non-musical gesture as well, taking us closer to the holistic expressive presence of 
the performer – vigilance – that I referred to at the start of this chapter (Davidson, 2001). 
 
With this in mind, vigilant musical practice encompasses much more than the musical. It 
allows, even demands, that the full field of human action (with its multi-modal complex 
web of relationships) is recruited into the performance ritual. In that sense, vigilant 
musical practice is open to all, musicians or not.  
 
Clayton divides musical gestures into six categories: 
1. voice; 
2. external object manipulation (instruments); 
3. movements of body not for sound production but for clarification of musical 
intentions (similar to speech-accompanying gesture); 
4. whole body dance, processional, space engagement; 
5. social dimension:  synchronization between musicians, group sharing through 
learning; dance; 
6. embodied metaphors (verbal association): music moves, jumps, etc. that can 
be linked to actual, not metaphorical physical movement (Clayton et al., 2013, 
p. 195) 
 
Returning to Kendon’s linguistic gesture continuum, we can now draw more precise links 
between linguistic gesture and musical gesture. Kendon’s continuum and Clayton’s 














External object manipulation (instruments); 
voice;  
Movements of body not for sound 
production but for clarification of musical 
intentions (similar to speech-
accompanying gesture); keeping beat 
Speech Like 
Gestures 
Illustrative Embodied metaphors (verbal association); 
music moves, jumps that can be linked to 
actual, not metaphorical physical 
movement. 
Pantomime Illustrative Whole body dance, processional, space 
engagement; mime (air guitar) 
Emblems  Illustrative/regulatory/e
mblematic 
Social dimension:  synchronization 
between musicians, group sharing through 
learning dance; Style specific dances or 
gestures with no musical connotation (e.g., 
index and small finger stretched out, ring 
and middle fingers curled into the palm: 
horn-fingers) 
Signs Illustrative/emblematic Curwen hand solfége  
 
My interest lies in exploring how ‘gesticulation’ and ‘speech like gestures’ can be 
understood in music practice. Pantomime, emblems and signs are not so directly 
relevant to my research into embodied music practice, though, as important social 
signifiers they are not refused in the rehearsal room or on the performance platform. 
 
In my experience as a performer across different styles, music specific gestures bound to 
each musical style are certainly a reality. I find that I repeat certain full-bodied gestures 
when I play certain musical phrases, within the stylistic constraint of that particular music 
genre or performance style. The precise origin of my own musical-gestural co-relations is 
largely irrelevant. Whether I make a movement because I’m consciously or 
unconsciously copying another musician’s movement, or whether it is a simply a 
previously learnt movement, or through multi-modal stylistic emulation, or triggered by 
deep-seated and yet unidentified genetic algorithms; what is important for me is that the 
imagery connection with music making seems unavoidable. I believe the gestural bond 
with speech is present with music as well. 
 
Relevant to the pedagogic aims of this project, Davidson (in Rink, 2002) highlights that 
those learnt gestures which form part of the vocabulary of a tradition can also be 
responsible for the creation of meaning and of expression: "all kinds of movement 
behaviours are learned from other people” (Davidson, in Rink, 2003, p.148). 
 
Clayton and Leante’s study of the hand and body gestures in the vocal performance of a 
raga by Indian singer Manjiri Asanare-Kelkar point the shared nature of the musical 
gesture as simultaneously cultural, style bound, and multi-modal, erupting from within 
webs of embodied sensory interference, “metaphors based on an embodied image 
mental schema” (Clayton et al., 2013). Davidson refers to Gellrich’s suggestion that 
“specifically learned movements and gestures furnish a performance with expressive 
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intention, and that these gestures can have both positive and negative effects on the 
production of the performance” (Davidson, in Rink 2003, p.148). 
 
To draw universal behavioural algorithms from music-gesture activity is not the aim of 
this research. Individual variations of gestural engagement between different performers 
will no doubt be present, but those variations are part of my creative aim: I want to 
expose those individual variations, rather than to use the imagery-gesture-music bond as 
a means of exploring uni-directional choreographies. I am satisfied that I do not know if a 
certain music-making gesture goes with a certain musical intention. Those actions are 
decided by the performer, according to their own unique and individual patterns of 
engaging with their own embodied presence. In vigilant practice, embodied presence 
cannot be pre-choreographed by an external entity, like a composer or a choreographer, 
or a playwright. I believe that if they do, bad faith, incongruous mimetics, and fake 
personas are inevitably detected by onlookers (Runeson and Frykholm ,1983).  
 
The music-gesture bond, if it in fact exists, is equally specific and determined by cultural, 
stylistic, individual and situational conditionings, as proposed by Davidson, Godøy and 
Leman, Clayton, Parncutt, Gritten and King. Windsor warns us against considering that a 
music-gesture bond may operate in the same way the language-gesture bond. They fulfil 
a different communicative role. 
 
The gestures that 'accompany' music […] are potentially a primary manner in 
which an audience has direct contact with the performer: we cannot see what a 
performer thinks but we can hear and see them move, and this may provide us 
with useful information about their conception of the music they are playing, or 
at least allow us to form an interpretation of what we think this conception might 
be (Windsor, in Gritten and King, 2011, p.48). 
 
Leman clarifies my proposal that musical meaning is inseparable from gestural imagery:  
 
Listeners can engage in different degrees of involvement with music without 
having to draw upon a reference to know what this music expresses. 
Nevertheless, the music is recognized as expressive. This is possible because 
expression can be captured by the mirroring system (motor resonances) and 
corporeal imitations. It provides a basis for corporeal understanding without any 
need for a reference (Leman, 2008, p. 131). 
 
I believe there is enough data to posit the hypotheses that gestures in music-making may 
have similar functions and modes of operation as in speech and can be broken down into 
the same functional categories as McNeill/Kendon does for the speech gesture bond.  
 
But the aim of my research project is not to categorise gestures, and their relationship 
with music making, or their possible meanings. For me, as performer and composer, 
what is important is to conceive of performances and scores as vehicles for performers to 
develop their own imagetic and gestural engagement, in particular the possibilities 
opened by Kendon’s ‘gesticulation’. The precise details of a musical- gesture, the inner 
triggers that drive a performer to move in such or such away, those decisions are better 
left to the performer, like they are in when they speak and use gestural patterns 
simultaneously, in an improvisatory way.  
 
How can I create such a vehicle? Scores, in whatever format, can be useful in 
choreographing aspects of making sound and movement (similar to ‘indicating’ in 
theatre), even in defining an intention and effort level (as theatre scripts often do in 
speech and action directions, as well as in textual instructions in traditional western 
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music scores – con bravura, dolce, etc.), but that is not my artistic aim. I desire an 
authenticity of presence, of expression, that is unique to the person performing and to 
their unique audience in their unique shared environment, for that unique moment in 
time, a rare authenticity that is not easily imposed externally on the performer by scripting 
or scoring gestures, or musical outcomes. Authenticity by definition needs to be brought 
about by each performer, regardless of the music being performed. In that sense – like in 
jazz performance practice, for instance – the composer is relegated to a lower 
hierarchical position than the performer. 
 
2.2.7. Effort, non-normative states and expressivity 
 
I believe that, in forging tools for the creation of a music-driven imagery dialectic, another 
element plays an important role in physical engagement and informs the generation of 
meaning: non-normative states and non-normative effort levels. In my work, these two 
concepts have become the routes through which my scores can reach a performer’s 
potential for embodied imagery and expressivity. 
 
Eric Clarke, writing about expression and expressivity in performance points to "the basic 
principle that expression is a departure from some norm" (Clarke, E., in Rink, 2005). 
When I observed performers and performances that touched me, regardless of the music 
being performed, a ‘departure from some norm’ was precisely one of the aspects that I 
identified. The norm can be culturally established, through genre and style of 
performance – the ritual of the performance (unusual ways to dress, walk, talk, venue 
design, etc.) –, but also defined within the performed object itself: a regular pulse defines 
tempo, and departure from the normative pulse (i.e. a change in tempo – an 
accelerando, a rallentando, a rubato) is a vehicle for expression. Humans tend to speak 
with a particular voice quality3, at the low register of their voice. Use of voice qualities 
that differ from the speech norm may be perceived to be expressive: high pitch, 
sustained frequencies, tilted thyroid cartilage, very thick or very thin vocal folds (used in 
many singing styles); cricoid cartilage tilt, thick vocal folds, high pitch (as used in 
screaming) are all departures from normative vocal behaviours (which may be more than 
cultural and in fact be imbedded in our genetic encoding, as is the case of belting, which 
emotes emergency, or sob/crying, which emotes sadness).  
 
Stylistic departures from normative day to day behaviour can be said to have the a priori 
potential to be expressive, but departures from established stylistic norms themselves 
can also be perceived to be expressive, for instance when a singer uses a voice quality 
that is not expected in a particular style (e.g. Montserrat Caballé singing a pop song with 
Freddie Mercury, or Sting singing Dowland songs (Potter, 2006)). For an expressive 
performer, the awareness that one needs to operate beyond the boundaries of some sort 
of established and accepted normality is one of the aims of my workbook exercises. This 
approach is similar to Boal's disjunctive techniques, which try to retrain individually learnt 
body behaviours and expand the scope of action within the field into areas of non-
normative behaviour beyond a performer’s acquired gestural and embodied vocabulary. 
 
Pochinko/Morrison’s clown training uses group improvisation exercises where two 
excesses of emotional effort – experience and innocence – confront each other in quick 
succession. The two excesses, the excess of pain or joy, and the excess of playfulness 
and lack of restrain, when present in a performance offer to the audience a spectrum of 
                                                
 
3 Estill Voice Model refers to Speech Voice Quality as: larynx at middle height, thyroid cartilage 
not tilted, cricoid cartilage not-tilted, aryepiglotic sphincter not engaged, vocal fold mass thin to 
mid – that is to say, all physiological vocal structures use low effort levels). 
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emotional expressiveness that I find unique, and that I wish to capture in music making. 
To be able to access any point in the spectrum between extremes of excess is a gateway 
to expression.  
 
But non-normative states also exist outside the formality of the performance ritual, where 
the actor, or the musician can control the flow from normative to non-normative states. 
Other situations rely on departures from normative states in order to provoke empathic 
expressivity: the car crash victim on the motorway, the misery of the homeless, the 
exuberant joy of a child; the myth of the tortured Christ, the inescapable tragic destiny of 
Oedipus, can fulfil their function as meaningful objects when there is an empathic link 
with the characters embodying those stories. An escape from the norm offers these 
stories the ‘expressivity’ that is required for an empathic link to form, as we find in the 
mirror neuron system, and in embodied attuning. 
 
With regards to music, "expressive actions are inseparable from the musical structures. 
Expression is involuntary" (Cook, 2014). That is to say, the display of expressivity cannot 
be voluntarily added to the recipe. This idea resonates with Sartre’s theory of emotions, 
which are not voluntary and cannot be deliberate. Equally, how we read expressivity in 
musical actions is also involuntary: "the body can be used to understand expressive 
musical material and to communicate that meaning to co-performers and audience" 
(Davidson, in McPherson and Welch, 2012, p.769). The human body and its 
phenomenological trace, seen as the first and last repository of meaning and human 
communication, can also be seen as the repository of musical meaning and expression 
(Todd 1992, 1995; Friberg and Sundberg (1999), in Davidson, 2001) A relationship is 
drawn “between human movement trajectories and musical expression” and a call is 
made for a music pedagogy that “incorporates physical skills and musical concepts” on 
the grounds that “music has a core expressive component that is necessarily 
communicated in human action" (Davidson, in McPherson and Welch, 2012, p.773).  The 
acquisition of physical skills (executive skills) is bound to the development of expressive 
grammars and correspondent expressive movements. Such pedagogic routes have in 
fact been undertaken by Dalcroze in the first half of the 20th century and by Edwin E. 
Gordon in the second, which, as I will explain in chapter 3, have been central in the 
design of my own training tool, Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians. 
 
 
2.2.7.1.  Removing obstacles to embodied musical imagery 
Davidson’s pedagogic appeal is for the musician to explore “the role of the body in the 
production of the expressive as well as the technical features” (Davidson, in Rink, 2002, 
p.146). This is precisely my aim. For Davidson, to be able to access the emotional and 
expressive potential of one’s body is fundamental in offering a musically expressive 
performance. Such physical freedom is obstructed by any obstacle to movement and 
gesturing, excluding naturally the constraints of playing a musical instrument. The 
presence of a paper score is one such obstacle, which I identified as problematic early 
on in my compositions.  
IN PRACTICE: 
[GESTURE] 
Pieces that address the development of gestural vocabularies in music making are 
listed here: 
GMNM.6; GMNM.7; GMNM.8; GMNM.9; GMNM.13; GMNM.14; GMNM.15; 
GMNM.16; GMNM.17; GMNM.18; GMNM.20; GMNM.22; GMNM.24; GMNM.25; 
GMNM.26; GMNM.28; GMNM.29; GMNM.30; GMNM.31; GMNM.32; GMNM.33; 
GMNM.36; GMNM.37; GMNM.38; GMNM.39; GMNM.40; GMNM.41; GMNM.42; 
GMNM.44; GMNM.50; GMNM.51; GMNM.63. 
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Williamon’s study (Williamon, 2004) of audience responses to performances of music 
with and without a physical score is revealing. Audiences were asked to judge similar 
musical performances but each performance offered a different position of the music 
stand, or no stand at all. Williamon found that music enjoyed without music stands 
scored higher with audience emotional rating. Without the fixing presence of a music 
stand, the performer is freer to move and to navigate a wider spectrum of physical effort, 
thus being able to explore a wider expressive realm, which the audience responds to. 
 
2.2.8. Developing individual Effort Scales 
Building on the notion that expressivity is something that lies beyond a ‘norm’, my 
concept of vigilant practice seeks to explore the fringes of normative behaviour by 
presenting actions that are made using a ‘non-normal’ level of ‘effort’, that is to say, too 
much or too little effort in performing an action. For this to happen, I propose to 
performers engaging with my scores that they construct their own individual effort scale 
for a specific action, gesture, or musical event.  
 
The creation of effort scales, which I have adapted from the Estill Voice Model, allows a 
performer to explore a specific action with different levels of localised effort, from zero 
effort, when the action itself will become impossible to fulfil, to the extremely effortful, at 
the very edge of the physical capacity, pain, and safety. Once established, an effort scale 
presents to the performer the full spectrum of physical and emotional possibilities, which 
they can access during a performance, from stasis to pain, and with it, of expressivity.  
 
The notation of precise effort levels is, in the context of this research project, largely 
unimportant, since I am presently more interested in allowing each performer to use the 
effort scales tool in order to make their own personal discoveries. Precise notation of 
effort levels is nevertheless a possible route for future compositional practice. I have 
attempted to work with effort levels with a small level of precision in the vocal studies The 
Nine Circles, also included in the gestural version of On Light and Darkness. More is 
possible in the future. 
 
I will return to the topic of effort levels in Chapter 3, and at the same time explain my 
proposed activities for the development of individual effort scales  
 
2.2.8.1.  The effortful voice 
Dal Vera, in ‘The voice in heightened affective states’ makes a deep connection between 
extreme emotional states and physiological states, including the voice. Dal Vera maps 
with precision primary emotional states with respiration patterns, postural attitude and 
muscular effort, facial expression, speech rate, pitch range, and average loudness and 
articulation effort. The voice, as well as the whole body, is the locus of emotion (Dal 
Vera, 2001). By exploring what Edgerton (Edgerton, 2015) refers to as the traditional 
extra-normal voice the embodied performer can simultaneously explore what I could refer 
IN PRACTICE: 
[EFFORT SCALES] 
The exploration of individual effort scales forms a crucial part of my vigilant practice 
proposal, and is perhaps the cornerstone upon which my whole compositional and 
performative practice is constructed, and the element I have been searching for in my 
compositional attempts. 
Pieces that explore effort scales are listed here: 
GMNM.9; GMNM.18; GMNM.24; GMNM.25; GMNM.26; GMNM.29; GMNM.31; 




to as the extra-normal emotions, which are of course completely normal, but perhaps 
have been forgotten or are repressed.  
 
At this point the notion of emotional freedom (that is, being free to show emotions), or 
emotional literacy (developing a wide vocabulary of expressed emotions – which is very 
distant from talking about emotions) becomes relevant. A search for emotional freedom 
surprisingly became one of most important personal outcomes of this research project. I 
will return to this important issue in Chapter 4. 
 
 
2.2.9. Embodied Imagery Tools 
In the context of performance, I have identified two tools that need to be present in my 
definition of multi-modal embodied imagery in performance practice: 
 
1. Full body engagement (including facial expressions and readiness to use 
the voice in all its qualities, both singing and spoken); 
2. Physiological structures which are used according to full individual effort 
scales, ranging from no effort to maximum effort; 
 
Additionally, in the context of my proposal for a vigilant practice, the imagery tools above 
are not precisely scripted, scored or choreographed, all parameters being open to a 
varying degree of improvisation. In chapter 3 I will explore practical activities I have 
developed which make use of these two tools. 
 
2.2.10. Multi-modal imagery in performance practice 
In practice, multi-modal imagery is of course present in many artists’ work and in many 
performance traditions. In fact it is the very core of the work of many art forms.  A very 
brief list of specific performers where multi-modal embodied musical imagery plays an 
import role might include Laurie Anderson, Roy Hart Theatre, Glenn Gould’s 




In my portfolio of compositions the voice plays a special role in developing and 
expanding a sense of embodied imagery and vigilance practice. Many of the pieces in 
the workbook ask for the use of the voice, both musically and speaking. The portfolio 
also includes a set of nine voice pieces which can be sung independently as The Nine 
Circles or included in On Light and Darkness. These pieces use Estill Voice figures, and 
the Estill figure of the Effort Scale. Unlike Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, 
these pieces require previous training. They can be performed by both trained and 
untrained voices but they do require knowledge of the Estill Model. These pieces explore 
the expressive possibility of both extremes of effort, that is to say the positive extreme 
effort at one end of the scale and total absence of effort at the other end. They propose 
the exploration of unfamiliar modes of voice production and of non-normative voice 
qualities. Prior to studying these pieces it is advantageous to experiment with the text 
scores in the Games and explore the concept of vigilance it presents. 
 
Two video recordings exist of a performance of two pieces from The Nine Circles, with 
commentary in the Catalogue. 
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2.2.11. Summary of Section 2.2: Embodied multi-modal 
imagery 
In this section I have attempted to build an argument for the existence of an embodied 
multi-modal imagery dimension in the making and enjoyment of music. I have proposed 
the existence of an internal and external music-gesture imagery, and the presence of a 
music-gesture dialectic, very much like it exists in language, with which music shares 
many of its neurological, cognitive and social processes. I have made an argument for 
expression as a deviation from normative behaviour, and proposed the use of full effort 
scales as a way of exploring expression and expressivity. Similarly to language, the 
presence of a dynamic dimension of music-imagery best inhabits an improvisatory 
framework. For that reason, I have proposed that an improvisatory stance in 
performance, rather than a scripted or choreographed one, is better attuned to my aims 
as a performer and composer and to the development of a vigilant performance practice. 
I have given examples of artists, composers and performance traditions that use some or 
all of the parameters and skills I identified as relevant in a multi-modal embodied 
practice.  
 
A vigilant musical practice welcomes embodied imagery and gesture, and also the gaze 
and the voice into its toolbox. The development of a pedagogy of embodied and vigilant 
music performance, of music improvisation, and a practice of music composition can and 
should include the imagetic and the gestural, not as scored, or un-scored but pre-set 
choreographies, but as opportunities for vigilant, multimodal and communicative actions 
between the performers and their audience. 
 
In the way it operates – through innumerable and ineffably complex gestural signs, 
uncontrollable at the most meaningful detail – embodied multi-modal agency is, in my 
view, the foundation for dynamic inter-personal communication. 
 
In the next chapter I will take non-normative cognitive states [IN] and embodied multi-
modal imagery [OUT] as the starting points upon which to develop the third arm of my 
definition of vigilant practice: inter-personal communication [IN/OUT].  
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Vigilance (“the authority of the body when the body is not separated but fully in 
agreement with the truth of place” (Blanchot, 1982, p.266)) is not a purely internal, 
mental process. It is not only a process of projecting an embodied imagery to the 
world outside us. It also means to be responsive to the world around us and to the 
multi-modal images and meanings we form of it. Such responses are made visible 
through communicative channels that shape how we react and respond to the 
environment around us, because “all that is ever known about others during social 
interaction is how they actually behave” (Hargie, 2006, p.18) The third aspect of my 
definition of vigilant musical practice is therefore Interpersonal Communication. 
 
2.3.1.  Communication v. information exchange 
At the onset of exposing my definition of interpersonal communication in the context 
of vigilant music performance, I would like to make an important distinction between 
two models of communication: transmission models, and synchronous models. In 
transmission models of communication, like the Shannon-Weaver model (1949) or 
the Berlo model (1960), data (the message) is displaced uni-directionally between 
one agent (transmitter) and another (receiver). The flow of data can operate in both 
directions, alternating between two (or more) agents, but it is not seen to be 
simultaneous (Shannon, 1949). On the other hand, in synchronous communication 
models, such as Barnlund’s transactional model (1970), or Hargie’s Skilled 
Interpersonal Communication model (Hargie, 2017), the data, the channel, and the 
information it carries is constantly being modulated, adjusted, and altered in real-time 
by all agents. Hargie’s Skilled Interpersonal Communication model that I have 
adopted to scaffold my definition of vigilant music practice shares this characteristic 
of synchronous communication. I use the terms information exchange and 
communication to refer to one or the other models of communication. The difference 
between the two lies in the way the participants in the conversation or exchange 
influence each other’s own participation. Let us consider as an example two modes 
of encountering the other in a conversation: a face-to-face meeting, and a collection 
of handwritten letters between two people. In a face-to-face conversation how one 
person articulates their message to the other influences the response of the other. A 
continuous two-way flux is in place where one person’s facial expressions, 
movements, breathing pattern (that is, their multi-modal embodied presence) in 
response to another person’s presence influence the latter’s way of being, their tone 
of voice, their movements, their own embodied presence. And a feedback loop is 
thus formed: Anna sends out a message to Ben. Ben responds with changes in his 
embodied presence. Anna reads the changes in Ben’s behaviour and adjusts her 
embodied message in response. Ben in turn reads changes in Anna’s embodied 
presence and adjusts his own. The tight loop of responses means that the message 
itself is continuously being modulated in response to the way it is being received by 
the recipient of the message. The message could be considered to be continuously 
re-defining itself in the process, by reaching out and appropriating the recipient’s own 
response. Information communication technologies (including video technologies like 
Skype which carries an inevitable delay and an incomplete embodied message) 
favour transmission rather than synchronous models. 
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Information exchange on the other hand does not present a tight feedback loop. In 
the example of the hand written letters, the way the embodied presence of the letter 
– a multi-modal presence, the actual piece of paper, the ink marks on the paper, the 
size of each word, the difference depths in the pressure marks of each different 
letter, the smell of the paper – the way the embodied author’s marks on the letter are 
perceived and multi-modally decoded by the recipient of the message will not alter 
the way the letter has been written. The time delay between writing a message on a 
letter and it being read means the feedback loop I mentioned above is not possible. I 
will call this type of exchange information exchange. 
 
Based on Brooks and Heath’s (1993) definition of interpersonal communication as 
“the process by which information, meaning and feelings are shared by persons 
through the exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages”, Hargie describes this 
process as inherent to, and dependent on the “dynamic and changing character of 
communication, [where] both participants are, at one and the same time, senders 
and receivers of information. Each is, even when silent, acting and reacting to the 
other" (2017, p. 6). Michelson et al. (1983) propose that social skill is “a process in 
which the individual implements a set of goal directed, interrelated, situationally 
appropriate social behaviours, which are learned and controlled” (Hargie, 2006, 
p.13). 
 
It is the presence of this dynamic feedback loop that I consider fundamental in my 
use of the term communication. Conversely the absence of the feedback loop is what 
defines information exchange. This distinction between communication and 
information will be useful later on in considering different ways of understanding and 
exploring vigilant presence, and in creating a tool for grading and assessing vigilance 
in a work or performance. 
 
From a composer perspective, I will argue that scores where vigilance is explored 
are scores that create an opportunity for communication rather than just an 
information exchange. Equally, performances and performance traditions that 
promote a constant two-way communicative modulation will fall within my definition of 
vigilant practice. Vigilance fundamentally inhabits the realm of communication, the 
continuous dynamic modulation of presence, rather than the discreet steps of 
information exchange. 
 
It is my aim, as a composer, to write scores that emphasize communicative events, 
rather than informative ones. A vigilant and embodied presence is by definition 
communicative. It responds clearly and immediately to its environment, to the other 
and to the self. Open channels of two-way communication are, in my view, important 
in offering our presence to the other. Let us now observe the channels of 
communication that are available to us. 
 
2.3.2.   The trace of communication: body, voice, writing 
From communication to information exchange one could imagine a continuous line, 
with face-to-face, proximal, verbal and tactile interactions at one end, and at the 
other end perhaps a typed email containing words, or a mathematical equation, a set 
of numbers, an emoji. Along this continuum, we can find for instance, a phone 
conversation, where only sound is used (tone of voice, breathing patterns, 
background noises), hand written letters, video calls, typed messages, email, etc. 
where the physical trace of the other’s body becomes increasingly fainter. I should 
point out that multi modal cognition can create in the recipient’s mind an embodied 
presence – a facial expression, a body, a gesture – just from hearing a voice, even 
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when the transmitter is not seen. Other multi-modal combinations are possible, as I 
discussed earlier. 
 
The trace of each of these communication types can offer more or fewer clues about 
the transmitter herself. For my artistic purposes, the important distinction to make is 
whether the trace of the communication can be subject to a dynamic feedback loop 
in response to the presence of the other or not. Hargie’s Skilled Interpersonal 
Communication offers a model that incorporates such feedback loops. 
 
2.3.3.   Hargie’s Skilled Interpersonal Communication model 
Hargie’s model of skilled interpersonal communication can be useful in 
understanding aspects of the relationships that exist during a music performance 
between musicians and their audience. Though the author highlights its usefulness in 
social services, education, even criminology, Skilled Inter-Personal Communication 
can be applied to any situation where humans interact with each other in a 
meaningful way, in what Hargie describes as an inevitable process. Hargie’s process 
is based on “three basic assumptions. The first is that people act purposefully; 
second, that they are sensitive to the effects of their actions; and third, that they take 
steps to modify subsequent action in the light of this information” (Hargie, 2017, 
p.23). One could argue that these three assumptions can equally apply to 
performances. I would like us to hold the third point in mind. Michelson, Sugai, Wood 
and Kazdin (1983), cited in Hargie (2006, p.13) propose social skills have the 
following six elements:  
 
1) Are learned 
2) Are composed of specific verbal and non-verbal behaviours 
3) Entail appropriate initiations and responses 
4) Maximise available rewards from others 
5) Require appropriate timing and control of specific behaviour  
6) Are influenced by prevailing contextual factors.  
 
Though the six elements identified by Michelson et al. can be observed in 
performative events such as theatre and music concerts, I identify some elements 
that tend to be more common in the impacting, high validity performances I referred 
to in Chapter 1 and that were absent in less impacting, low validity events. In 
particular I felt that element 6 (being influenced by prevailing contextual factor) and 
element 3 (appropriate initiations and responses) were uniquely present in higher 
validity performances. I identify element 6 in performers that make noticeable and 
intentional changes to their behaviour on stage in response to the audience and to 
the environment. I identify element 3 in performers that initiate a positive 
engagement with their audience, mainly through the direction of their gaze and often 
through verbal and non-verbal communication cues directed at the audience (which 
requires element 2 to be present as well). Two elements: to initiate communication, 
and to respond appropriately, letting external factors influence the action. I 
considered if the absence of either of these elements from a performance could be 
related to reason why certain live performances of music which is dear to me 
(including my own performances), left me untouched and unmoved, un-transformed. 
Injecting these two elements of communication into my scores and into my 
performances is one of the main steps in defining a vigilant musical practice, both 
from a compositional and performative perspective. I will explain how I have 





Hargie’s model for skilled interpersonal communication is schematically described in 
Figure 1. Notice the presence of the several feedback loops between the agents of 
communication and within each agent. 
 
Approaching the performance situation under the light of Hargie’s Interpersonal 
Communication model allows me to consider where one may be ignoring a 
communicative skill in favour of another, therefore disrupting interpersonal 
communication from taking place? Could I work towards developing each of the skills 
in this model, both in my own performance but also in the writing of scores, which I 
am considering as training tools? In my workbook, some pieces fall into different 
training sequences and the six inter-personal communication skills are present one 
way or another throughout the combined sequences.  
 
In the context of live music performance, the mirror neuron system can encode the 
physical expressions (gestures) of the musicians, as well as the motor control 















































Figure 1 – Skill model of interpersonal communication (Hargie, 2017, p.22) 
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Listeners can engage in different degrees on involvement with 
music without having to draw upon a reference to know what this 
music expresses. Nevertheless, the music is recognized as 
expressive. This is possible because expression can be captured 
by the mirroring system (motor resonances) and corporeal 
imitations; it provides a basis for corporeal understanding without 
any need for a reference. In contrast, cerebral understanding 
(cognition) often results from a search for something that is 
imitated. (Leman, 2008, p.131) 
 
2.3.4.   Mead’s loop 
For social behaviourist and pragmatist G.H.Mead the self is a social act (Mead et al., 
2000). Mead explains that the self is constructed between the “I” and the “Me”. The 
“Me” is a social entity, a social self; the “I” is the self’s response to the “Me”. Together 
they form a tight loop of stimuli and response formed around the self’s relationship 
with the social realm. Note the similarities between this concept and Sartre’s being-
in-itself and being-for-itself. More important to my research into vigilant practice in 
live performance is Mead proposal that “gestures become meaningful symbols when 
they provoke in the person gesturing the same reaction they provoke in observing 
individuals” (Mead, G.H., in McNeill, 2005, p. 250). 
 
McNeil refers to this dynamic interaction as Mead's Loop: “meaningfulness depends 
on simulating a social response – the social response of another in yourself, a kind of 
auto-socialization" (McNeill, 2005, p.250) McNeill poses the possibility that Mead’s 
loop is grounded on the mirror neuron system, which were not known at the time 
Mead was working.  
 
Mirror neurons could be the mechanism of this gestural self-
response [...] one's own gestures activating the part of the brain 
that responds to intentional actions, including gestures, by 
someone else, and thus treats one's own gesture as a social 
stimulus (McNeill, 2005, p.250).  
 
A consequence of Mead's loop is that gestures “activate one's own mirror neuron 
circuit” (McNeill, 2005, p.251). McNeill highlights that the social nature of the gesture 
“explains why gestures occur preferentially in social contexts of some kind (face-to-
face, on the phone, but not when talking to a tape recorder)” (2005, p.251). Gesture, 
language, voice quality and the completeness of human presence all partake in the 
functioning of Mead's loop – that is, seeing self and other through mirror neurons–, 
which in turn leads to the dynamic gesture in language proposed by McNeill. The 
dynamism of the gesture/speech bond is only activated through the encounter with 
the other (which can be real or imagined, visualized). At this point, according to 
Mead's loop, our own representation of our selves is combined with our 
representation of the other. Mead’s loop supports Skilled Interpersonal 
Communication Model and the existence of the looping mechanisms in Hargie’s 
model of interpersonal communication. By proposing a model of embodied 
performance practice that includes Hargie’s interpersonal communication feedback 
loops, I am also bringing Mead’s loop into my model, which will play an important role 
when I discuss the transformative role of vigilant performance practice. 
 
By resorting to the idea that there is a deep and inevitable interpenetration between 
self and other, we are moving very close to the arguments I presented in section 2.1, 
when I referred to the importance of awareness and representation of the self in 
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performance, but now tempered by the presence of, and the reaction to the other, 
thus approaching a closure to the circle I have been drawing in this proposal for a 
vigilant practice. 
 
2.3.5. Embodied simulation and embodied attuning 
Another important concept in support of Hargie’s interpersonal communication loops 
and Mead’s loop is embodied simulation. Embodied simulation, which is an extension 
of the mirror neuron system, refers to the way one's body mimics the body of 
another: smile, speech and accents, emotions (Drinko, 2013). Drinko, citing 
Niedenthal et al. study on embodied attuning in relation to facial expressions, 
describes a study performed by Hennenlotter where “people who were injected with 
Botox in their foreheads experienced less response in their limbic systems when 
mimicking angry expressions” (Drinko, 2013, p.102). The expression of an emotion is 
found to be directly connected to the physical capacity to reveal such emotion. “By 
reducing the muscle movement of the face, part of the embodied meaning of the 
anger was lost” (2013, p.102). Equally, the loss of embodied expression of an 
emotion impairs the very understanding of that emotion in other people (Drinko, 
2013). In another experiment led by Krumhuber, studying how we read and 
understand emotions on other people,  
 
participants had to rate the genuineness of various smiles. Half the 
group had to hold pencils in their mouths, thereby preventing them 
from unintentionally mimicking the smiles. The participants that had 
the pencils in their mouths were unable to distinguish genuine from 
false smiles. (Drinko, 2013, p.102) 
 
Niedenthal et al. explain, "the ability to mimic facial expressions was essential for 
distinguishing true from false smiles, implicating embodied simulation in performing 
these judgements accurately." The phenomenon of embodied simulation is thus 
central to both expressing and understanding the emotional meaning of the other’s 
presence. It is also part of the mechanism by which a speaker confirms that his or 
hers embodied meaning is being received accurately: if a person does not respond to 
my laughter with a laugh, I will understand that my good disposition is not 
reciprocated, signalling the possibility that the other person may feel they are the 
target of my jocosity and may be offended by my laughter, directing my awareness 
back to my own actions and suggesting that my immediate reaction should be to 
change my behaviour! This idea can be seen to support Sartre's and Mead’s view 
that one is aware of oneself (for-itself) in presence of the other (Cox, 2006). 
 
The eyes and the gaze seem to be of particular importance in establishing a positive 
level of embodied simulation. “Focusing one's attention on someone else's eyes 
triggers embodied simulation, which quite literally allows us to feel what someone 
else is feeling” (Drinko, 2013, p.102). McConachie (2008), studying patients with 
aphasia, raises the possibility of the mirror system providing an inextricable link 
between gesture and communication, in particular the role of the face and eyes: "the 
eyes and the muscles around them are especially revealing" (McConachie, 2008, in 
Drinko, 2013, p.101). Drinko also cites a study by Bavelas et al. (Bavelas et al., 
1986) where participants, exposed a pained facial expression “unconsciously 
mimicked the facial expression of the first. Interestingly, eye contact made the 
unintentional mimicked pain expression clearer than the participants who did not 
make eye contact” (2013, p.101). Looking directly into someone’s eyes helps the 
participants to “unintentionally embody that person's facial expression and better 
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distinguish the meaning behind it” (Drinko, 2013). In the context of performance, 
Drinko favours being able to exchange glances with the audience: 
when picking up communicative cues it is especially important to 
be able to see someone's eyes. The mirror system is then better 
able to 'mind read' or interpret and relate to the speech and gesture 
(the linguistic system) of others. (Drinko, 2013, p.101) 
 
Another aspect of embodied simulation that I find relevant to my work, and has 
helped me structure the sequence of piece/games in Games for Musicians and Non-
Musicians is gestural appropriation and mimicry. McNeill refers to the sharing of 
communicative gesturing as a process prone to the assimilation of the person’s 
gestural and spoken repertoire. This process, according to McNeil facilitates the very 
understanding of the other’s communicative goals:  
If one person assimilates another person's gesture or speech, the 
material carriers of being, this inhabits some aspect of this other 
person's verbal thinking. The joint inhabitance includes gesture 
sharing and this appears in two broad forms – mimicry 
and appropriation. (McNeill, 2005, p.159) 
 
In this statement we can see another way in which interpersonal communication 
influences and modulates the formation of meaningful images. I use both gestural 
mimicry and appropriation in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, namely 
pieces that involve copying another player’s gestures or speech, and pieces which 
involve sharing a gestural procedure between two or more players, for instance, by 
improvising gestures for others to play music to, what I refer to as body-scores.  
 
I will expand on the practical implementation of embodied simulation, gestural 




The following pieces from Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians make use of 
mirroring activities: 
GMNM.7; GMNM.13; GMNM.14; GMNM.15; GMNM.16; GMNM.30; GMNM.33; 





In the introduction to my Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians I make special 
mention to the importance of the gaze. Some of the pieces/games deal 
specifically with the gaze by asking the players to engage in a series of activities 
and mental processes based on looking into another person’s eyes: 
 




2.3.6. Interpersonal communication in therapeutic models and 
social transformation models: Moreno’s Psychodrama 
and Boal’s Forum Theatre 
Psychologist Moreno worked with theatrical models as tools for healing. 
Psychodrama, the therapeutic practice he devised involves a group of ‘patients’ and 
a director meeting regularly to enact aspects “of life they want to work on: fear of 
death, relationships, authority” (Karp, M., et al. 1998, p.5). In a Psychodrama 
session, one person in the group is elected as the Protagonist. The Director guides 
the group in enacting the Protagonist’s traumatic event. The director can choose 
anyone else to be the Auxiliary Ego,  
 
who plays a role representing a significant other in the life of the 
Protagonist. This maybe a role external to the protagonist. [...] it 
may be an internal role, such as one's former self, child self, or 
one's inner voice [...] the double helps express that which is not 
being expressed, with or without words. Because Moreno felt that 
the route to the psyche is not the word but non-verbal expression, 
the auxiliary ego can express, by gesture, posture or distance 
those unspoken secrets in relation to the protagonist. [...] the body 
remembers what the mind forgets. (Karp, M., et al. 1998, p.7) 
 
The ritualised theatrical event extends to the audience – the group- and a dialogue is 
initiated within the audience about the action being portrayed, which influences the 
action itself.  
the subject or actor is asked to be himself on stage, to portray his 
own private life; the audience is a sounding board of public opinion 
as well as the subject itself - it becomes healed by taking part; the 
auxiliary egos have a double significance: they are extensions of 
the director, exploratory and guiding, and extensions of the subject, 
portraying the actual or the imagined. The director has three 
functions: producer, counsellor and analyst. (Karp, M., et al., 1998, 
p.4) 
 
A channel of communication is open in both directions: between the actors and the 
audience, and between the audience and the actors.  
 
Playback Theatre, created by Jonathan Fox and Jana Sala extends from Moreno’s 
praxis. In Playback Theatre the audience offers their own stories for the actors to re-
enact. Augusto Boal’s Forum Theatre shares aspects with the model by working with 
whole communities to solve social problems, address conflicts in the community. The 
Forum thus created is supported by the joker, an appointed person whose role is to 
push the debate forward. 
 
Again, the duality of communication we observe in these models is also present in 
some of the pieces in the workbook in several ways. One of those ways involves 
improvised spoken scores. In these pieces one player takes on the role of giving 
instructions to other players – akin to Moreno’s director, or Boal’s Joker. The 
instructions are improvised but in some pieces the improviser is given specific aims 
and instructions to follow. Any one, including the audience, can take on the role of 




2.3.7.   Interpersonal Skills in the context of performance 
practice 
In the light of my exploration of communication, I have identified three skills that I 
believe need to be present for the conditions of interpersonal communication to be 
present in the context of live performance. I can summarize them as see, be seen, 
act/react 
 
1) See: to see the presence of the other – a clear awareness of other people, 
both of other musicians, and audience members, but also awareness of the 
shared space, including extraneous noises. Synchronicity and empathic 
response play a role. 
 
2) Be seen: be noticed; in particular the importance of the gaze in securing 
the player’s presence before the other. 
 
3) Act/react: set up clear communicative feedback loops, visible responses 
and reactions to the environment 
 
2.3.8. Interpersonal communication in performance practice 
(Composers, performers, traditions) 
Interpersonal communication appears in, and in fact forms the backbone of a variety 
of performance genres and traditions, and is largely absent – or incomplete – in 
many others. I will briefly point to traditions, performers and composers where 
interpersonal communication as defined by Hargie (that is, with the inclusion of 
feedback loops) plays a role.  
 
Theatrical traditions such as Pochinko’s ‘Clown Through Mask’ (which was devised 
by combining European clowning traditions with Native American trickster 
shamanistic practices); Jonathan Kay’s fooling; some strains of stand-up comedy 
that make use of improvised audience interaction; improvisation forms such as Del 
Close and Charna Halpern’s The Harold and its many variations; Augusto Boal’s 
Forum Theatre and Invisible Theatre; Jonathan Fox and Jo Sala’s Playback Theatre; 
Moreno’s Psychodrama (strictly speaking a therapeutic form); all share an aspect of 
deep and intense relationship with their audience, either by improvising around the 
audience’s initial contributions (The Harold, Playback Theatre, Forum Theatre, 
Psychodrama) or by engaging the audience moment to moment, bringing the 
uniqueness of reactions of each person in the audience into the very development of 
the performance (Invisible Theatre, Clown Through Mask, Jonathan Kay). The three 
skills I have identified above (see, be seen, act/react) all appear in these 
performance traditions and in the work of these performers.  
 
2.3.8.1.   Pop/Rock performances 
In the area of music performance, we can observe Pop/rock music performance 
practices that often deploy the three inter-personal communication skills, in varying 
IN PRACTICE: 
[IMPROVISED SPOKEN SCORES] 
The following pieces from Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians offer examples 
of the use of improvised spoken scores and the role of the facilitator: 
GMNM.15; GMNM.25; GMNM.26; GMNM.33; GMNM.37; GMNM.50; GMNM.51; 
GMNM.63. 
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degrees. Some behavioural patterns are pertinent to this genre, such as addressing 
the audience directly, maintaining eye contact with the audience (though, because of 
the intensity of stage lights we often cannot see the audience from the stage: eye 
contact is often feigned. Nevertheless the intention is present and clearly understood 
by the audience); engaging the audience in physical entrainment through stage 
dance and clapping (Davidson, 2001; Kurosawa and Davidson, 2005). Though 
dynamic feedback loops between the performers and audience are observed, at the 
level of the embodied presence and gesturing, even voice qualities, the loop 
reactions of the musicians to their audience don’t often have a profound influence in 
the actual music being played. That is to say: the audience’s reactions will not 
necessarily change profoundly the music being played. Obviously this is because the 
music being played is not open to fully improvised situations, and it tends to follow a 
musical script: a pre-set meter and repertoire of rhythmic, harmonic, and melodic 
patterns stay largely unchanged regardless of feedback loop struck between 
performer and audience. Nevertheless, according to Davidson’s studies, such 
feedback loops between audience and performers are visible in pop/rock 
performances. 
 
2.3.8.2. Scored communication: Christian Wolff, James Saunders 
Christian Wolff’s scores (such as Burdocks (1970-71) and James Saunders’ things to 
do) present another example of Interpersonal Communication, but this time between 
the players, which have to react and respond to each other, following clear and often 
intricate rules of engagement. In these scores, the feedback loops tend to be limited 
to the performers and do not extend to the audience. The ludic component of the 
scores, established by its strict rules, points to the quality of group flow proposed by 
Sawyer. 
 
One last example of interpersonal communication I would like to present comes for 
Meredith Monk, who states that: 
As a soloist I can be very precise and very rigorous and yet at the 
same time, its a kind of a pinpoint focus and at the same time I feel 
that I am very open and very fluid to what is happening in the 
moment. It's that thing of trying to be really present in the 
experience.  (Vanloo, 2009) 
 
2.3.9.  Summary of Section 2.3: Interpersonal Communication 
– [IN/OUT] 
The two-way flow of communication as understood by Hargie will play an important 
role in helping to frame a concept of vigilant performance practice (“…the body in 
agreement with truth of place…”): when communicating, like one does in a 
performance of music, one needs to be open to receive the dynamic and changing 
character of the situation, and I, as a performer, need to send out but also to receive, 
and update my possible reactions accordingly. I need to react to the audience’s loud 
or silent reactions to my presence and change my actions as a result. The design of 
my scores and the performances I take part in should take into account the possibility 




In section 2.1, I proposed that the ideal mental states for a vigilant practice are those 
states that take us away from normative states, either in the direction of intense 
mindful meta-cognition or in the direction of mindless flow – precisely because of 
their non-normative nature, which I have scaffolded on Cook’s proposal, presented in 
section 2.2, that expressiveness arises from non-normative or unusual events, “a 
departure from some norm” (Clarke, in Rink, 2005, p. 22), and on the state of flow 
proposed by Drinko. Now I close the circle by proposing that states of non-normative 
consciousness, supported by modes of non-normative bodily engagement and 
imagery through exploring extreme effort levels, and enacted in the context of 
interpersonal feedback loops can be responsible for an enhanced level of 
communicative and expressive actions. The three aspects of my definition of vigilant 
musical practice – cognition, imagery and communication – are thus inseparable and 
indivisible in vigilant practice. Cognition, imagery and communication are not 
separable elements in vigilance. They influence and inhabit each other in a profound 




A significant amount of the pieces in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians 
address cognition and cognitive states. I have listed them below according their 
skills development tools (see Chapter 3): 
[THE GAZE]  
GMNM.2; GMNM.5; GMNM.13; GMNM.16; GMNM.27; GMNM.38; GMNM.39; 




GMNM.3; GMNM.7; GMNM.10; GMNM.11; GMNM.12; GMNM.13; GMNM.14; 
GMNM.15; GMNM.16; GMNM.17; GMNM.18; GMNM.20; GMNM.21; GMNM.27; 
GMNM.30; GMNM.33; GMNM.34; GMNM.35; GMNM.36; GMNM.38; GMNM.39; 
GMNM.40; GMNM.41; GMNM.42; GMNM.45; GMNM.46; GMNM.48; GMNM.49; 








GMNM.14; GMNM.15; GMNM.18; GMNM.45; GMNM.46; GMNM.47; GMNM.48; 
GMNM.49; GMNM.50; GMNM.52; GMNM.59; GMNM.63. 
 
[GROUP DEVISING] 









In this section I will bring together the three skills that form my definition of vigilant 
music practice – non-normative cognitive states, embodied multi-modal imagery and 
interpersonal communication. 
 
I will make a case for using improvisational models and open scores in vigilant 
practice – in contrast with choreographed, scripted and parametrically notated 
prescriptive scoring approaches. 
 
In Chapter 3 I will put forward tools and activities that may contribute towards the 
development of those skills. 
 
2.4.1.   A definition of vigilant musical practice 
My definition of vigilant musical practice is as follows: 
 
Vigilant music practice is at once cognitively dynamic, makes use of multi-modal 
imagery, and engages in a two way communicative flow with the surrounding 
environment. 
 
2.4.2.   Vigilance skills 
In establishing a vigilant musical practice according to my definition above, I 
searched for the presence of specific performance skills, skills that I could relate to 
validity in my performance experience and my observations of meaningful 
performances. In this chapter I will discuss the performance skills I observed and 
formulate an essential list. According to my definition of vigilant musical practice, one 
can call a performance to be vigilant if one detects that set of skills to be present. In 
the following section I will enumerate and explain the skills I highlighted during this 
chapter, in reference to each of the three elements of my definition. This list of skills 
will allow me to create an assessment scheme to evaluate if a performance is vigilant 
or not, if a score promotes vigilance or not, and what skills may need to be 
developed in order to operate development in the direction of a vigilant musical 
practice. At the same time, enumerating the skills necessary in order to consider a 
performance to be vigilant will allow me to create a developmental schedule – that is 
to say, a learning sequence – that performers interested in expanding their own 
personal practice in the direction  – myself included – may use. Games for Musicians 
and Non-Musicians presents one possible version of such a learning sequence. In 
Chapter 3 I will discuss how I have made practical applications of my definition of 
vigilant practice, including the learning sequence proposed in Games for Musicians 
and Non-Musicians, by creating a series of tools that promote the development of 
each skill. In chapter 3 I will discuss the difference between skill, tool, and activity. 
 
2.4.2.1.   Cognitive Skills [IN]: 
In section 2.1 I discussed how states of cognition and awareness can vary from the 
normative, day-to-day cognitive states:  
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• Mindlessness and flow, intuitive cognition can help us make quick decisions 
and forge relationships;  
• States of Mindfulness and Metacognition can help us bring our own 
presence in a situation to the fore and observe the relationships we are 
immersed in.  
 
In between these two extremes sits day-to-day cognition, the normative state. The 
skills required in vigilant cognition are then to be able to navigate away from 
normative states in the direction of the extremes of flow or metacognition (System 1 
and System 2). Normative cognition for a particular situation could suggest room for 
the development of vigilant cognition skills through performance activities. 
 
2.4.2.2.   Multi-modal Imagery Skills [OUT] 
The skills required for the creation of holistic and multi-modal imagery involve: 
 
• Full body use: being free, able and ready to use the whole presence (that is, 
the whole body, including the voice) and 
• Individual effort scales: use the body within the scope of a full effort scale, 
from no effort to maximum effort.  
• Improvisation of embodied imagery 
The absence of Imagery skills is suggested by normative body use and a reduced 
effort scale, which avoids the exploration of the possible extremes of effort or 
relaxation. 
 
2.4.2.3.   Interpersonal Communication Skills [IN/OUT] 
The skills relevant to Communication are:  
 
• To see;  
• To be seen;  
• To act and react to the environment.  
 
Communication skills are absent if the player is not seen (no presence), fails to 
notice the environment surround him/her, and does not react to it. 
Referring back to Chapter 1, and to the performances that I considered to be, in a 
subjective way, of particular importance in my personal artistic development, I 
believe that the presence of these skills is what separated meaningful events from 
performances that left me untouched.  
 
2.4.2.4 The relationship between the three skills 
The relationship between IN (self), OUT (world) and IN/OUT (communication) is 
important. According to Damásio, they are not separable (Damásio, 2000, pp. 184–
186). The sense of self arises from the interaction of the individual with objects in the 
world (either physically present, recalled or predicted). [IN] is thus formed by [OUT]. 
Equally the influence of communication [IN/OUT] on both the sense of self and on 
how the objects of the world is fundamental: the sense of agency, of being able to 
impact on other people and being equally impacted by other (what Maurice Merleau-
Ponty refers to in his concept of the chiasm; the capacity to reflect self or other, and 
vice-versa folds back on itself to construct both the object of our attention (in the 
case of performance practice, the human other) and further even, to mould our sense 
of ourselves. Seen separately, the three layers that I am proposing (non-normative 
cognition, multi-modal presence, and inter-personal communication) loose their 
fundamental mode of existence because each is formed and continuously morphed 
by its connection to each other:  
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The story contained in the images of core consciousness is not told 
by some clever homunculus. Nor is the story really told by you as a 
self because the core you is only born as the story is told within the 
story itself. You exist as a mental being when primordial stories are 
being told and only then; as long as primordial stories are being 
told, and only then. You are the music while the music lasts 
(Damásio, 2000, p. 191). 
 
Damásio's description of the proto-self and core consciousness being primarily 
formed by 'images'  (neurological patterns) informs and supports McNeill's gestural-
linguistic model, which I rely on to support my views on multi-modal presence in 
music making, but also Gordon's appropriation of Dalcroze and Laban's 
gestural/imagetic understanding of musical syntax. The performance work I am 
proposing aims to draw the performers' attention, in the act of performing, to core-
consciousness and the auto-biographical self (learnt past experiences), and, to an 
extent to impair the interfering role of extended consciousness – the long term (past 
and future) mapping of experiences. 
 
Figure 2 below is a graphic representation of the relationship and interdependence of 
the three vigilance skills. At the bottom of the pyramid lie the cognitive states (system 
1 or system 2). These are invisible to the audience. One cannot see what the other 
person is thinking. At this level lie the intentions and motivation of the performer, 
what Nattiez calls the poietic level. The second stage – multi-modal and embodied 
imagery – relates to all the body actually does when performing. This layer is 
visible/audible to the audience. Nattiez would call this the neutral stage, the material 
residue of the intentions and motivations nurtured at the poietic level. The third stage 
of the pyramid – communication – appropriates the stage below and constructs 
meanings and personal strategies. This corresponds to Nattiez’s aesthesic level. At 
the aesthesic level the neutral stage gains meaning and an aesthetic response. This 
stage is not possible without the two stages that support it: intention and agency are 
necessary for communication. 
 
 
Figure 2 - The relationship of interdependence between the three skills of vigilant 
























Invisible to audience 
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2.4.3.   Vigilance Skills: Improvisation and Choreography 
At several points in my text I make a stand against scripted behaviours, learnt 
choreographies (in the sense of pre-decided, scripted gestures or scored 
movements) in favour of open scores and improvisation. Having now explained the 
three aspects of my definition of vigilant practice I would like to revisit the opposition 
between choreography and improvisation and summarise my arguments in support 
of improvised behaviours. 
 
2.4.3.1.   Choreography: a definition 
I adopt Graham and Hoggett’s (2009, p. 125) definition of choreography:  
By choreography we mean any formalised movements that 
become set and can be repeated. This can be the dynamic and 
spectacular or it could be the minute and precise. It can be 
explosive and it can be introspective.  
 
I extend this definition beyond physical movements to include the whole of the image 
making presence of the performer: their facial expressions, voice qualities, musical 
gestures. For me, the problematic key words in Graham and Hogget’s definition are 
formalised, and repetition.  
 
My artistic aim is to strike a direct relationship between performers and their 
audience through revealing their personal and unique imagery. As such, opting for 
formalised gestural repetitions will inevitably rule out the unpredictable panoply of 
gestures and imagery that each singular performance may stimulate. My 
compositional option has been to minimise in the score the possibility for formalised, 
repetitive behaviours. In the instructions for Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians 
and other pieces I advise against too many rehearsals creating the risk of ossifying 
behaviours and responses.  
 
2.4.3.2. Cognitive [IN] and choreographies 
There are several reasons for my decision to favour improvisation over 
choreography, but expression and expressivity is an important one. I would like to go 
back to Sartre and his concept of Bad Faith that I discussed in section 2.1 on 
cognitive states and consider again its consequences in the light of my discussion on 
multi-modal imagery. 
 
2.4.3.2.1.   Action: Bad faith and performance 
When is Bad Faith present in performance? How does bad faith in performance 
affect the experience of performance?  How does bad faith reveal itself in the 
audience? Is there a causal relationship between bad faith in the performers and bad 
faith in the audience?  What can a performer do to promote amongst the audience an 
awareness of their own bad faith, and the option to abandon it? These questions are 
at the core of this research. By reframing my research questions under the light of 
Sartre’s existentialism I can hope to clarify some of the psychological processes 
behind a successful performance and how to guide performers through score, 
rehearsals and performance.  
 
For the performer, the problem of choreographies in the light of the idea of Bad Faith, 
in as much as choreographies are a visible element in a given performance, is not 
only that it creates a visible lack of authenticity in what has just happened on the 
stage (the past action), but more important it solidifies the state of mind and being of 
a performer into one single possible field of action in the very near future, which is 
locked by the script, the score, the choreography. It has the negative potential to limit 
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the possibilities of future action to the prescribed scripts. The problem here lies in the 
future, not in the past. Sartre’s waiter, or the friend of the closeted homosexual pose 
good examples of this problem: by limiting themselves to clear and prescribed roles 
and modes of action (in the waiter’s example the mode of action is in a way ritualistic, 
similar to a performance situation), they exclude from their field of possibilities their 
many other possible ‘selves’. It is fundamental to clarify that the notion of ‘multiple 
selves’ is not related to acting or faking, very much the opposite: it is about allowing 
the multiplicity of true and real ‘selves’, our many masks to reveal themselves in 
performance. Pochinko’s Clown Through Mask, as taught by Sue Morrison can bring 
light into this apparently labyrinthine argument: the clown faces all directions of 
themselves at the same time, and is prepared to take any direction. 
 
But choreographies have consequences for the audience as well. Fundamental to 
existentialism is the responsibility of freedom – where do we want to be? – for which 
we require a view of ourselves as both subjective and objective entities (Merleau-
Ponty's ambiguity, the intertwining), capable of observing and modulating our 
relationship with the environment around us. In improvised vigilant practice, all 
responsibility lies with the individual rather than with a prescriptive score (Kanno, 
2007). Improvisation is an existential statement of freedom and responsibility. By 
creating feedback loops that include the audience, the performer is bringing the 
audience into the making of the performance itself. Once aware of their role in the 
making of the performance, the audience is faced with the existential freedom to 
embrace or refuse established roles of bad faith (Adams, 2007). 
 
2.4.3.3.  Imagery [OUT] and choreographies 
McPherson and Parncutt refer to Barthes’ observation of "the actor's disturbing 
corporeality”. Barthes sees theatre as “consummate artificiality: the actor's body is 
artificial but not fictitious, and thereby a part of that delicate transcendence, of an 
exquisite, essential savour by which Baudelaire had defined the power of the artificial 
paradise” whereby “corporeality exceeds the mask"  (McPherson, Gary and Parncutt, 
2002, p. 79). The mask of the actor is betrayed by the presence of the actor. For me, 
Barthes lesson is to clarify attempts to construct the actor’s mask through the writing 
of scripts, choreographies, through scoring, through the deployment of acquired 
stylistic gesturing and gestural patterns, which only delay and taint with a certain 
calculated dishonesty the encounter with the person concealed behind the 
actor/player and their masks. 
 
The embodied multi-modal imagery aspect of my definition of vigilant practice, if 
understood under the light of Nattiez tri-partite analysis equally refutes the need to 
precisely score, script or choreograph a priori the gestural actions of performers on 
stage. Scoring multi-modal imagery and gestures faces an inevitable discrepancy 
between all three parts of the tri-partite approach: the composer/choreographer’s 
intention of the scored gesture and, at another level, the performer’s gestural 
intention; the gesture itself, devoid of any reading; and the reading of the gesture 
perceived by an audience. The composer’s intentions (the poietic level) is inevitably 
‘capped’ by the performer’s own presence (the neutral level), and by the audience’s 
reading of the performance (the aesthesic level). The inevitable discrepancy of 
meaning between the three levels renders in my view any attempt to score, 
choreograph, and compose gestural imagery not only difficult, even impossible, but 
perhaps pointless in achieving my aims of promoting direct communicative bonds 
between performers and audiences. 
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2.4.3.4.   Communication arguments against Choreography 
Finally, choreographies tend to focus the performer’s attention in the choreography 
itself: one action following another, one sound following another sound. Such 
tendency to focus on inner processes – reading scores or recalling memorised 
actions – may impair the performers’ capacity to focus part of their awareness on the 
communicative feedback loops, on the outwards processes. On the other hand, it is a 
very real possibility that a state of flow can be reached when a performer is engaged 
in very well mastered choreographies, as it often happens when a musician knows a 
piece of music so well that a state of flow is achieved through mastery. More remains 
to be explored. 
 
2.4.3.5.  Mirror Neurons: Choreographies and improvisation 
Giacomo Rizzolatti’s discovery of mirror neurons (in Goldstein and Brockmole, 2017, 
p. 163) in the 1990's can perhaps cast some light on the phenomena of cross-modal 
cognition and multi-sensory integration that I am proposing in my definition of 
embodiment. Mirror neurons are capable of providing information regarding the 
intentions of another person, "not just to what is happening but why something is 
happening, or more specifically, to the intention behind what is happening" 
(Goldstein, 2017, p.163). Also  
that mirror neurons may help us understand (1) communications 
based on facial expressions (Buccino et al., 2004; Ferrari et al., 
2003); (2) emotional expressions (Dapretto et al., 2006); (3) 
gestures used while speaking (Gallese, 2007); (4) the meanings of 
sentences (Gallese, 2007); and (5) differences between ourselves 
and others (Uddin et al., 2007). (Goldstein, 2017, p.163) 
 
It is possible that mirror neurons play and important role in guiding social interactions 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; Yoshida et al. 2011), we can invest on the mirror 
neuron mechanism as a possible way to create connections between performers and 
audience. Mirror neurons, by providing us with a simple –but not infallible– 
mechanism to explain how we begin to understand each other’s presence, that is, 
the understanding our own experiences, offers us at the same time a tool for 
facilitating, and even imposing, one's embodied experience onto the other. By 
observing the other, the self experiences the other's experience. But this observation 
is tainted by the self's previous experiences – without which the mirror neuron 
system does not activate. This is a useful platform upon which to begin to construct a 
theoretical frame work to address the desire to create deep and transformative 
relationships in a performance situation: the performer has to engage in actions, 
display facial and emotional expressions, gestures, spoken meanings and 
differences between self and other that are likely to be apprehended by the other in a 
way that can trigger, in some way, their own mirror system. That includes actions, 
sounds, intentions, etc. that are closer to universals, that are not so uniquely virtuosic 
that a spectator would fail to empathise with what they observe. At the same time the 
performer can make use of extremes of effort within the context of a familiar set of 
actions – say for instance in terms of use of vocal qualities associated with a 
particular extreme emotions – that, despite not being used often in our daily routines 
are nevertheless part of the shared repertoire of human embodied experience, and 
capable of being accessed by the audience’s own mirror neuron system. If a 
performer sobs, the audience recognizes that embodied experience. If a performer 
screams to exhaustion, the audience will both recognise screaming, and exhaustion. 
Because the mirror neuron system recognises familiar actions, it is important to me 
that what the performer offers the audience is never choreography, or a set of learnt 
actions, like a dancer or a theatre actor might do.  
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It is important in my notion of vigilance that the experience offered is never seen to 
be fake, that no pretence if observable, because it risks dismantling the deep 
connection offered by the mirror neuron system, and replace it with the universally 
shared experience of faking and pretending. I revisit this problem several times in the 
construction of my scores and in rehearsals. Part of the training that I am proposing 
appropriates the notion of non-acting, of not-pretending – and in that sense away 
from traditional character-driven theatrical training practices and towards the training 
practices of post-modern theatre practitioners such as Grotowsky, Barba, Boal, 
Pochinko and Zappora, and performance artists such as Marina Abramovic or Neville 
Gabie. Extreme physical displays and any connected emotional meanings are 
welcome in many of the scores, but they must be truly extreme: don't pretend to be 
tired: be tired; don’t pretend to be tense: be tense; don’t pretend to be aroused: be 
aroused. For this reason, I tend to opt for a language that focuses on what can be 
perceived, rather than what can be imagined or visualised.  
 
What meaning a spectator makes from a performer's actions is in great part out of 
the performer's control, and so it should be – or performing would be nothing more 
than emotional imposition, some sort of 'intravenous mood' dispensation. That is not 
the artistic objective of this work. The spectator of the performance operates their 
own personal transformation – or none at all! – through their own mirror neuron 
system, and from their own experiences, memories, desires and patterns of 
behaviour. The role of the performer in this work is to offer a carnal model of full 
physical, emotional and human engagement and involvement with their environment, 
which the audience may be free to accept or reject.  
 
2.4.3.6.   Some examples of composers and performers where choreographies 
obstruct embodied presence, and where openness/improvisation facilitate it 
Strategies to highlight the role of the body, of gesture and of imagery abound in the 
music literature. I have mentioned a variety of composers, and performers 
throughout this text. Not all attempts to make conscious use of the body and gestural 
imagery fulfil the requirements of my definition of vigilant practice. Some examples of 
scores that make use of gestural notation include many of Stockhausen’s theatre 
pieces and operas, Mauricio Kagel’s instrumental theatre scores, e.g. Pas de Cinq 
(1965), Christopher Fox’s Patrol (1999-2001), and Sara Carvalho’s Imaginary Bars 
(Carvalho, 2017).  
 
Similarly, a variety of scores make use of gestural imagery without notating 
movements, but by requesting or provoking gestural actions. According to McNeil 
(2005), Davidson (2012), Godøy (2010), gestures, unlike movements, have an 
intention. From there, we find imagery, and from imagery we find meaning.  Some 
examples are Jürg Frei Un champ de tendresse parsemé d’adieux, Atau Tanaka’s 
sound-body interfaces, Yoko Ono’s text scores in Grapefruit, John Cage’s 
Songbooks, David Pocknee’s Parameters VII (2012) for four dancers or Cipher for 
the Lighthouse Twins for two readers (2016). Though these scores by no means 
guarantee an adherence to the principles of non-normative cognitive states, 
embodied multi-modal imagery, and inter-personal communication I have presented 
in my definition of vigilant musical practice – that responsibility always lies with the 
performer – these scores nevertheless allow the open space necessary for a vigilant 
practice to flourish. 
 
2.4.4.   Summary of Section 2.4  
In this section I have presented my definition of vigilant musical practice and the 
skills that scaffold vigilant practice. I have presented arguments towards favouring 
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improvisation over choreographed actions in the light of my definition, with examples 
of composers and practitioners.  
 
In the next chapter I will discuss practical applications of my theoretical definition of 
vigilant practice in my compositions and performances. I will propose tools that may 
promote vigilance in performance. Using those tools, I will suggest a sequence of 
learning activities for vigilant practice, underpinned by educational and pedagogic 





Part 3 -– Solving the problem: 
Theory in practice 
 
Introduction 
In Part 1 I have identified a problem surrounding the craft of composing (notating) 
music: how can the composer, through the score, promote a meaningful and 
transformative performance experience, given that so much more than the sounds of 
music are involved? My inquiry at this stage is to look into the issue of notational 
reliability: how can I guarantee that my scores reliably provoke valid performances? 
 
In Part 2 I have made an inquiry into performance validity. Through cross referencing 
the literature with my own performance practice, and various performance practice 
trainings I undertook, I have identified three interconnected aspects in the act of 
performing (cognitive states, imagery and communication), which I have 
denominated as skills, and derived a set of tools that I consider necessary for 
performers to present in order to bridge communicatively meaningfully and 
transformatively (vigilantly) towards their audiences. 
 
In this Chapter I will explain my proposal for developing compositional and 
performative tools for musicians and non-musicians interested in exploring embodied 
modes of performance and music improvisation. I will start by listing the outcomes of 
this research project so that I can refer back to them as I expose my arguments for a 
practical implementation of the theoretical framework I have constructed in Chapter 
2. The outcomes include not only my portfolio of compositions, but also several 
rehearsal processes, public performances and personal development training 
periods. 
 
I am concerned with the need to consider the process of music making as 
fundamentally a learning process, and the importance of the pedagogic role of music 
practice, especially in groups, and also of the pedagogic aspect of writing scores. For 
that reason, I will propose a set of practical tools to promote and develop the skills 
identified in Chapter 2, supported by several pedagogic theories and other current 
training practices. Those tools form the foundations for Games for Musicians and 
Non-Musicians, a sequential workbook of pieces/games that forms the central part of 
my composition portfolio. 
 
I will explain my choices and strategies for notating the scores in my portfolio. I will 
describe how my notational choices serve my artistic inclinations and the training and 
pedagogic aims of this research. 
 
I will report on the practical implementations of the skills presented in part 2, in the 
form of public performances and rehearsal processes of a selection of pieces from 
my portfolio. 
 
3.1.  Research Output and Outcomes / Summary of 
practice 
Before I present a summary of the practice developed during this research I would 
like to make a distinction between output and outcomes. By output I am referring to 
the scores I produced and form the composition portfolio, but also performances and 
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rehearsal periods. The outcomes are less tangible and can be summarised as 
particularly important and transformative moments in my personal practice as 
composer and performer. 
 
3.1.1 Output 
Though the portfolio of compositions may be the most palpable output, it would not 
have been possible to write the pieces I am presenting without a sustained effort to 
test and experiment ideas in several periods of work in the rehearsal studio and in 
public performances. See the Catalogue of Pieces for a list of pieces, rehearsal 
periods and performances.  
 
The research methodology I adopted was one of research-informed practice and 
simultaneously of practice-informed research. Intense periods of theoretical reading 
around a particular subject, such as music and gesture, or the nature of 
consciousness and the sense of self, as well as attending workshops and training 
sessions, may have found a particular resonance in performance practice that led to 
the writing of a particular text score. Once tested in rehearsal with other musicians 
the ideas in that score may have evolved to such an extent that the initial score was 
lost in transformations, or may have led in turn to a period of study in another 
subject, previously irrelevant, such as entropy and thermodynamics, speech and 
gesture, or the universality of facial expressions. My research notebooks contain 
written recollections of events and video evidence of rehearsals and concerts with 
multiple connections to a variety of subject matters, some now utterly central to the 
research (such as speech, music and gesture, while other topics lost their centrality 
yet remain important in carving the space for my research (such as thermodynamics 
and entropy, which no longer forms part of the theoretical underpinnings of this 
research, yet is still very present in some of my scores that deal with group 
improvisations and sound masses). I am presenting video documentation of 
rehearsals and performance as both the output and the outcome of the research, not 
all relating to the pieces in my compositional portfolio, but relevant none the less to 
the performative aspect of the research. Equally important in the development of this 
research were periods of self-development and training with theatre and music 
practitioners whose work I considered to hold important clues to answering my 
research questions.  
 
3.1.2. Personal development: training attended 
During this research I considered it important to experience personally some of the 
performance traditions that I had identified as being of particular relevance to my 
artistic aims. I attended Sue Morrison’s course in Pochinko’s Clown Through Mask, 
several Estill voice training seminars, ‘La Voix Humaine’ weeklong workshop at Roy 
Hart Centre at Malerargues and Guy Dartnell’s Voice (e)motion course, Butoh dance 
with Natsuko Kono; capoeira, ashtanga yoga; mindfulness training (ongoing). Later in 
this chapter I will explain ways in which these training events influenced the 
research. 
 
3.1.3. Intrinsic outcomes: transformation of performance 
practice 
One of the aims of this research project was to transform my own personal 
performance practice.  
 
I will offer an example of performances that I considered to be transformative – not 
necessarily a valid performance, but moments when a new awareness was reached. 
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Backyard Boogaloo launch event 
In the autumn of 2015 Nick Buckle and Graeme Owen (Thee Ones) invited a series 
of musicians to choose one song from their new album Backyard Boogaloo and 
perform it at the launch event at the Goods Shed in Stroud, England. I was privileged 
to have been asked to take part in this event. Complete freedom was given to each 
musicians to adapt the original song how ever they wished. I chose I’m a Man, which 
I sang accompanying myself on a Roland RX-800 using a glassy electric 
piano/Fender Rhodes register. In preparation for the concert I made profound 
changes to the song: I slowed it down, substantially altered the lyrics, and changed 
the mode (from major to lydian). A video recording of my performance at the event is 
included in the video documentation databank, with a commentary in the Catalogue. 
 
As is expected in this type of event the audience was noisy, ordering drinks at the 
bar, freely conversing with friends, even during each band performance. But as I 
started singing my song the audience went absolutely silent and still. I watched the 
videos of the performance many times trying to understand what had caused this 
extraordinarily welcoming response, which I consider in line with the aims of my 
research. 
 
My hypothesis is that two actions are possibly responsible for the audience’s 
reaction: one was my gazing at the whole audience before I started the song, the 
second was the embodied imagery I created, in particular my raised shoulders, held 
in tension, and the slightly unbalanced position which accompanied the suspended 
long first chords that introduce the Lydian mode. My gaze drew the audience to my 
field of engagement, and the embodied image of a held, tense and unresolved 
music/body-gesture, maintained their attention. An added sense of fragility was also 
offered by the glassy timbre of the electric piano. I feel that perhaps there was an 
image of impending failure, akin to the tension of a funambulist’s act or another 
dangerous moment, which held the audience quietly with me and the music to the 
end of the song. Elsewhere in this thesis I make reference to the importance of 
failure in my aesthetic vision – this was certainly a performance that explored the 
possibility of failure as a communicative and transformative tool. 
 
Blancmange 
I have performed with the band Blancmange since 
2011, initially as a VJ but soon after as a keyboard 
player and singer. Over the years of this research I 
have noted a change in the way I perform, in 
particular the way I engage physically when I play, 
and an increased engagement with the audience 
through eye contact and being prepared to respond 
gesturaly to the audience. My work with Blancmage 
has been useful as a testing ground for aspects of 
this research. I have tried and experimented with the 
variants of vigilant practice in the many years of 
performing similar songs for similar audiences. 
Blancmange has been my own journal piece, as I 
propose in the introduction to Games for Musicians 
and Non-Musicians. This photograph of a 
Blancmange live performance was taken in Glasgow 
in 2019 (©Neil Arthur) and offers an example of using 
the gaze as communicative medium with the 
audience. 
 
Figure 3 – Performing with 
Blancmange: the gaze and 
embodied imagery promote 





3.1.4.   Composition portfolio 
The main work in my portfolio of compositions is a collection of 64 text scores/games 
entitled Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians (GMNM). This work is structured 
as a sequential workbook, addressing the development of the skills I identified in 
Chapter 2 using tools I will present later on in this chapter.  
 
The workbook of compositions was created over the period of the research, as both 
practice-research and research-practice, where a series of public events were used 
both to test acquired concepts and practices, and simultaneously helped generate 
new concepts and compositions that were later incorporated into the workbook. 
Besides being a collection of pieces, Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians is 
also a pedagogic tool – pedagogy here being considered as any tool that promotes a 
change, or transformation in someone’s own practice (Berkowitz, 2010; Coburn and 
Morrison, 2013; Damásio, 2000; Dewey, 1938; Matthews, 2011; Spatz, 2015; 
Wheeler, 2015)– a sequential workbook of text scores that guides a group of 
performers through what I identified in the literature and in my own personal 
performative practice as the most important skills likely to approximate us to a 
practice of vigilant music improvisation, and that I have presented in Chapter 2. 
Though on the surface its aim may appear to be process-based – to operate a series 
of personal transformations through work shopping pieces and musical games–the 
workbook engages the group in music-making as a product-creation activity, that is 
to say, the group makes performances that can be presented to a (sometimes 
inconspicuous) audience. The final draft of the workbook was tested as a pedagogic 
sequence over various periods of intense rehearsals with several groups of 
performers, prior to its present format being finalised. The workbook proposes and 
promotes ways of approaching live performance that can be transferred to the 
performance of the other pieces in my portfolio. As such, all other pieces in the 
portfolio benefit from a preliminary period of rehearsals playing through some (if not 
all) of the games in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians.  
 
In addition to Games for musicians and Non-Musicians, my portfolio of compositions 
offers other pieces that inform this research (see Catalogue). 
 
3.1.5.  Skills-development sequences and skills-development 
tools 
The three skills I have identified in Chapter 2 – non-normative cognitive states, 
imagery through effort, and dynamic interpersonal communication – have been 
subject to a careful study and a preliminary sequential developmental process for 
each skill has been designed. For each skills-learning sequence, I have created a set 
of developmental tools, and practical activities that support and promote each skill. 
The scores in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians are a materialisation of those 
tools. I believe they offer a reliable way of developing vigilant performance skills. 
Future work is necessary to allow a quantitative study of my claim of notational 
reliability. At present, my claim can only be substantiated by the subjective 
impressions and feedback from performers and audience that have engaged with my 
scores in rehearsals and in performances. 
 
I can compare the relationship between skill, skill development tool, skill 
development activity and score to the art of cabinet making. If I wish to learn how to 
make cabinets (the skill), I first need to gather the necessary tools: hammers, saws, 
wood, nails, and also the knowledge of how to use them (the developmental tools). 
Then I need to act upon my tools in order to shape the wood into a cabinet. I need to 
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measure, cut, hammer, glue, paint – these are the developmental activities. The 
detail of each activity is given by a blue-print for a specific cabinet design, a set of 
technical instructions that guide with more or less precision how each drawer should 
be joined, how each door should be decorated (the scores). 
 
The table below explains the relationship between skill, skill development tools, skill 
development activity, and the corresponding text scores in Games for Musicians and 
Non-Musicians that implement developmental activities. 
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Table 6 – Skills, non-normative states, tool, activities and scores 
Skills Non-normative 
states 
Skill Development Tools  Sequential Skill 
Development 
Activities 
Scores in Games for Musicians and 
Non-Musicians 
Cognition [IN] 
(System 1 or system 
2 are chosen as 
performer sees 




Awareness of self, of own 








Quick and intuitive reactions Mirroring/synchronicity 
– fast decision making 
3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, (20), 34, 35, 38, 
39, 40, 41, 42, 53 
Story-telling, stream of 
consciousness 
14,15 
Audiation  Internal listening: recall and 
predict sound 
Internal listening 7, 28, 29, 44, 47, 59 
Improvising sound  4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 23, 
25, 26, 31, 34, 37, 44 
Embodied Multi-
modal imagery 
(OUT – the focus of 
the work is on 
outwards action) 
Non-normative effort Effort scales Developing individual 
effort scales 
24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 49, 57, 58 
Meaningful gesture Full body engagement, 
embodied imagery 
Gesture and the 
meaningful body 
5, 6, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 
32, 33, 50, 51 
Body/sound gesturing 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36, 
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 51 
Mirroring/synchronicity 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 30, 33, 36, 38, 
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– embodied attuning 39, 40. 41, 42, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52 
Voice qualities and 
the meaningful voice 
6, 8, 9, 12, 22, 33, 53 




(IN/OUT – the focus 





Initiate and respond to a 
communicative situation 
The gaze 2, 3, 5, 13, 16, 27, 53, 55, 57, 60 
Synchronicity – 
empathy 
3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, (16), (17), 18, 20, 
21, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38, 46, 48, 50, 51, 52, 
53, 55, 59 
Improvising sound in 
groups 
5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 
59, 61, 62, 63, 64 
Spoken scores 15, 18, 25, 26, 33, 37, 50, 51 
Story telling 14, 15, 18, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 52, 63 
Group devising and 
long forms 
51, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64 
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I explored the notion of communicative performance validity in chapters 1 and 2, and 
concluded by proposing a framework for vigilant performance practice. I will now 
explain the pedagogic underpinnings and models that led to the construction of skill-
learning sequences, and to my choices of compositional and scoring strategies and 
activity design. 
 
3.2.  Pedagogic models 
Cognitivist and constructivist pedagogic theorists, such as Dewey, Piaget, Gagné, 
Vigotsky, Bruner, focus on how mental structures, or schemas, which have evolved 
and developed in response to environmental stimuli and are mediated by personal 
experiences are at the foundation of learning processes, be it skill acquisition or the 
development of conceptual thinking (Wheeler, 2015). Mental schemas can operate 
motor, emotional, social, logical structures. Learning is seen as a change operated in 
such mental schemas. The relationship between environment, experience, and past 
experience is at the centre of the learning process. Learning happens best when the 
learner is actively involved in the matter to be learnt. Experiential learning, problem-
based learning and inquiry-based learning are key pedagogic concepts in the work of 
cognitive and post-cognitive writers (Wheeler, 2015). 
 
Russel describes Dewey’s approach to knowledge as one that “does not aim at 
judgements that shall be absolutely 'true', or condemn their contradictories as 
absolutely 'false'. In his opinion there is a process called 'inquiry', which is one form 
of mutual adjustment between an organism and its environment” (Russell, 1995, p. 
777). Dewey’s definition of knowledge as inquiry is particularly relevant to the final 
format of my scores. The scores, with their strict rules, but yet without proposing a 
final product, make a proposal for personal and group discovery, an inquiry, whose 
product and consequences are yet to be discovered. 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, cognitivist pedagogic theories fall short of explaining the learning 
process satisfactorily. His critique of the cognitivist approach is centred around the 
precept that the learner improves through experience and practice “by abstracting 
and interiorizing more and more sophisticated rules” (Dreyfus, in Carman and 
Hansen, 2005, p. 129). 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s view of the cognitive approach is that it does not  
explain how the organism could possibly use features of the current 
situation to determine which rule or concept should be applied. 
There are just too many features, so the selection of the relevant 
features requires that one has already subsumed the situation 
under the relevant concept" (Dreyfus, in Carman and Hansen, 
2005, p. 129)  
 
In opposition to behaviourist and gestalt theories, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
view guides us to an understanding of learning processes where one cannot learn 
new rules simply by repeating old rules. How the acquisition of new features, skills 
and concepts takes place poses a problem if we are talking about how to transform 
the way we undertake a set of complex performative tasks, musical or otherwise. 
Merleau-Ponty's critique of the behaviourist approach that developing one skill will 
lead to the acquisition of a new skill is particularly problematic in music education. 
This problem is a Peter’s Paradox of pedagogy. 
 
I observe this repeatedly in the context of western art music, when technically 
proficient musicians fail to develop other fundamental musical skills (for instance 
competent sight reading skills, stylistic improvisational skills, or inter-personal 
 99 
communicative skills in performance) because skills are developed independently 
and not holistically and sequentially. Returning to the sight-reading example, it is 
expected that the teaching of technical proficiency alone (rather than the training of 
audiation skills and embodied practice) will eventually develop those other skills, 
which is not consistently the case. Even in countries (such as the United Kingdom) 
where a strong emphasis is placed on developing sight reading skills in the curricula 
of major music exam boards, it is not evident that it produces musicians that are 
versed and comfortable and competent in other musicianship skills, such as 
improvisation or gesturally expressive performance.  
 
According to Mishra (2014), clear progress in sight-reading skills is mainly observed 
in sound before symbol methodologies, such as Kodaly and Gordon’s Music 
Learning Theory, where several musicianship skills can be taught sequentially and 
holistically. The experiential, sequential and skills driven curriculum. Other national 
music education plans place more or less attention on developing musical 
comprehension skills over execution skills (Mishra, 2014).  
 
According to Gordon, the learner can only initiate this high level of inferential self-
learning after a long and sustained period of learning by rote, through imitation and 
differentiation.  
 
The design of a training tool must take into account specific practicalities surrounding 
the acquisition of several skills: communicative skills, musical skills, improvisational 
skills and body-voice skills which can be accessed in the context of a vigilant 
performance. Each new skill, once identified, needs to be introduced through the 
design of a learning sequence that can facilitate a transformative progression from 
an initial state of complete unawareness of such a skill to subsequent stages of 
awareness (i.e., differentiation), control (repetition), mastery (improvisation) and only 
then be able to operate further inferential and independent learning of other skills 
levels (Gordon, 2007). 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, experience – the embodied physical experience of being-in-the-
world – is at the very core of the complex edifice of shared and shareable 
knowledge. McNeill points in a similar direction when he describes learning as a 
“relationship of a point to a background” (McNeill, 2005, p. 107): the shared 
knowledge forms the background, and as further afield we look into that shared 
background, the more we notice that it is the body, and the embodied universal 
meanings it carries, that provide the most basic foundations and sustenance for all 
subsequent learning. For Merleau-Ponty, transmitting and acquiring knowledge 
requires the foundation of a shared experience.  
 
Zen Buddhist epistemology refuses the notion of knower in opposition to known 
object. Zen epistemology sets out to define the process of learning as an 
instantaneous phenomenon, without transmission of learning, therefore without 
learning or teaching, where intuition and inference define the whole epistemological 
process. At its most elementary, this shared experience is provided by the body and 
its ‘understanding’ of its place in the world, what Merleau-Ponty calls the intertwining: 
the known object and the knowing subject are inseparable and cannot be considered 
in isolation. A subject observing the world and being an object in the world are 
inseparable, intertwined experiences. Matthews describes Merleau-Ponty’s view with 
clarity: “we are neither totally detached subjects, pure eyes outside space, nor are 
we simply one kind of object among others" (Matthews, 1996, p. 94). This 
intertwining operates from within the shared experiences of the body, the most basic 
instinctual responses, before words, before conceptualization, before culture, history, 
memories, experience and expectations. The intertwining offers us a way of 
understanding how our understanding of each other’s presence can be constructed 
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from the most basic cognitive responses, into shared behavioural patterns of 
response to the environment, – a smile, a cry of pain – which leads, in an increasing 
spiral of complexity, to other shared types of knowledge: a hand gesture, a tone of 
voice, words, mathematics, logos, values, laws. I cannot share with another person 
what a ripe peach tastes like, or what is the colour green, or what it feels like to be 
thirsty, angry or erotically aroused, unless we share a priory some experience that 
we may use to bridge between our own individual experiences. Saying that a peach 
is sweet, juicy, fragrant goes some way towards transmitting what it tastes like, if you 
already know the experience of juicy, sweet and fragrant (the shared knowledge), but 
still a long way from a convincing and reliable transmission of knowledge about the 
taste of a peach. I can tell you green is the result of mixing blue and yellow, but you 
have to know what blue and yellow are. Unless you already know what blue is, or 
what a peach tastes like, my attempts at sharing with you the knowledge of its flavour 
are always vague approximations, doomed to fail. A gap exists between the 
experience and the explaining and transmission of the experience that cannot be 
easily and completely bridged. Yet I can use shared knowledge as an approximation 
to discover a place where we can both find a common ground whereby some salient 
aspects of the experience can be communicated. Such common ground (the words 
of a shared language, the shared knowledge of algebraic symbols, the shared 
understanding of the resolution of a perfect cadence…), requires a previously agreed 
background upon which the point of differentiation can move, a context that both 
parties assume (by mutual agreement) that is equal for both: the mastery of a 
particular language, the sharing of algebraic representations, improvise a perfect 
cadence together. But, as proposed by Ekman (Ekman et al., 1972) and his work on 
Universals, such an agreed background is, at its most basic level, inscribed in the 
embodied experience and in our experience of bodies in the world, in facial 
expression, gestures, instinctive reactions to the environment we inhabit. This most 
basic shared background is not taught and it is not learnt. It can be shown, shared, 
demonstrated, experienced, expanded, but not fully transmitted with words or 
discussions. 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the knowledge(s) and meaning(s) that are created, transmitted, 
learnt, absorbed through embodied presence and communication - the words 
spoken, but also the tone and quality of voice, the facial expressions and physicality - 
are never fully (or better) understood by the word. In that sense, semantic 
representations of embodied knowledge are always incomplete; the complexity of the 
embodied presence fails to be described by the tools of philosophical and logical 
dissection. It relies on its own lack of 'verbality' for its transmission and reception. In 
that sense, embodied communication and knowledge could be said to be, 
paradoxically, metaphysical, because it cannot be verbalised or logically 
systematised in order to extend the understanding of the object and its physicality in 
the world. Yet it can be understood - like jokes, koans, and oracles. Embodied 
knowledge, presence and communication could perhaps be described as being 
meta-logical: it follows a logic, but one that is not fully understood or described by 
Logic. The acceptance that the complexity of embodied presence lies somewhere 
beyond the field of verbal or symbolic representation had an important role in the way 
I decided to write my scores in order to represent what is not symbolically 
representable. In the context of this research project text score presented the most 
versatile format. I will return to the problem of scoring later on in this paper. 
 
My proposal for the development of a vigilant musical practice is grounded on the 
notion that it is through experience that such a practice can be developed, and later 
perhaps even understood. For that reason, the work I am proposing is done through 
rehearsing pieces and performing them before an audience. The objective is that the 
lived and shared experiences of performing music become the vehicle for personal 
development, for individual transformation. 
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3.2.1.   Pedagogic theories applied in Games for Musicians 
and Non-Musicians 
Taking these pedagogic approaches, I have appropriated some of their concepts into 
the structure and design of my Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians. 
 
3.2.1.1. Reflection 
Reflection, individual and in-group, after rehearsing and performing a piece is 
important. In my pieces, and in particular in the Games, I call for reflective 
discussions to be held by a performing group after each rehearsal and after each 
performance, acknowledging the importance of Kolb’s experiential learning cycle 
(1980). It is through the very individual experience of performing the pieces that the 
possibility of a transformation in the player’s approach to performance can take 
place. Reflecting on such transformations, individually and in-group can help 
sediment positive transformations. This is the view of pragmatist thinkers, such as 
Dewey, to whom reflecting on the learning experience forms a central aspect of the 
process of inquiry. According to Moon, “reflection in the experiential cycle tends to 
concern it as a way of making sense of experience, reflection in such activities as 
reflection in- and on-action tends to be focused on change in the quality of the 
outcome - in the practice” (Moon, 2013, p. 21). 
 
 
3.2.1.2.  Journal Pieces 
In Games, I have also asked the players to use a piece of music or song they know 
very well – the journal piece – and revisit it throughout the rehearsal period. 
Revisiting the journal piece has the aim of creating an individual benchmark upon 
which the players can observe any changes, hopefully positive ones, in their 
personal approach to performing. Gordon proposes a process of learning by 
comparison: by playing the same journal piece in different days of the rehearsal 
period, the player is confronted with several different versions of the same piece. 
Comparing them and identifying the differences forms the basis for transforming 
one’s practice. My Games offer the possibility of the players to assimilate the concept 
of vigilant practice by experiencing, experimenting and reflecting on each of the three 
skills I defined in chapter 2. 
 
3.2.1.3.   Separation of skills – examples from music education 
Separation of skills is an important notion in the structuring of Games for Musicians 
and Non-Musicians as a learning tool. Though adopting an experiential and holistic 
approach to the design of Games, I felt it was important to allow the players to focus 
in turn on the individual development of each skill. Some activities and games focus 
on cognition more than communication, other focus more on communication than on 
the formation of embodied imagery, etc. Yet all three skills are revisited throughout 
the workbook. 
 
Gordon’s music learning theory proposes a similar learning structure, where each 
musical skill (rhythm skill, tonal skill, harmonic skill, timbral skill) is taught separately 




The following videos offer examples of group discussions before and after 
rehearsing the piece: 
GMNM.1; GMNM.4 [Tk2]; GMNM.8 [Tk4a]; GMNM.9 [Tk1]; GMNM.10 [Tk1]. 
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3.2.1.4.  Estill Voice craft: skills separation and effort scales 
Estill Voice Craft training also teaches through the separation of skills. In this case 
each skill refers to being able to control individually each of thirteen physiological 
structures that affect voice production. The physiological structures connected with 
each of these figures are used in isolation (as much as possible, because they can 
interfere with each other). An individual effort scale is developed for each of the 
figures, from no effort to maximum effort, and the perceptual and sonic results are 
analysed at each effort level, thus offering the possibility of full control of each 
individual figure. Alter the effort level for each of these figures and the perceptual 
quality of the voice is also altered (Steinhauer et al., 2017). The use of individual 
skills in connection with individual effort scales is for me, what makes the pedagogic 
model of Estill Voice Craft very interesting, for two reasons: 
 
-Effective pedagogic structure: each skill is introduced separately, and revisited 
circularly, in an increasingly difficult progression. 
 
-Effort scales promote the making of mistakes, or unexpected events, leading to an 
ease with accepting the inevitable errors that working with improvisation brings; 
extreme effort levels in particular push the player beyond the zone of normative 
behaviour, towards a zone where expressiveness, according to Clark, is more likely: 
"the basic principle that expression is a departure from some norm" (Clark, E., in 
Rink, 2005, p.22).  
 
Figure 2 – Effort scales and failure zones 
 
An enjoyment of failure is a necessary part of this work. A search for the profound 
human beauty of getting things wrong, is necessary to understand my compositions. 
I propose the term poetics of failure to describe this search. I will refer back to this 
concept in section 3.3.11. 
 
3.2.1.5.   Sequential learning 
Gordon’s learning activities are based on the acquisition of small patterns (one or two 
bar rhythms, three pitches that form a tonal pattern, three-chord bar progressions). 
The learner hears and repeats or names patterns of increasing complexity. 
Unfamiliar patterns are added to the activities until they become familiar, thus 
creating an increasingly large vocabulary of patters. At this level of learning, which 
Gordon calls discrimination learning, the student is being asked to notice differences 
and similarities between patterns. No inferences or deductions from the part of the 
student regarding the nature of the patterns are expected. When the student has 
acquired a substantial amount of patterns, they are then asked to make their own 
inferences, make their own connections between familiar patterns, improvise using 
the recently acquired vocabulary of patterns, create their own patterns. Gordon calls 
this level of learning inference learning. There can be no inference learning until 
there has been discriminatory learning. Gordon also states that much of the 
discriminatory learning a young musician does, is done informally, by listening to 
lullabies, nursery rhymes, songs from their own musical culture, a type of learning 
minimum effort normative state maximum effort
failure zones
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that starts in utero. Gordon makes the interesting point that in discrimination learning 
the student is firmly aware they are being taught, by repeating patterns and songs 
their teacher sings or plays. In inference learning the student is not aware they are 
being taught: they are simply making discoveries, or inquiring, to use Dewey’s term. 
 
Discrimination learning and inference learning are present at different stages in the 
workbook, with pieces that require mirroring and imitation appearing at the start of 
the book, and pieces that require a higher level of decision making and inference-
drawing appearing at the later stages of the book. I have replaced Gordon’s musical 
skills activities (which use only rhythmic, tonal and harmonic patterns) with cognitive, 
gestural/imagetic and communicative patterns, sequenced in a way as to make the 
unfamiliar familiar, thus increasing the player’s vocabulary of patterns of cognitive 
skills as well as multi-modal imagery and inter-personal communication.  
 
Table 6 relates skills, skill-learning tools and activities to the games/pieces in Games 
for Musicians and Non-Musicians. 
 
3.2.1.6  The wider composition portfolio and the vigilance skills development 
sequence 
 
As I explained in chapter one, this research project stems from a sense of frustration 
that the scores I was writing did not always produce the type of performance I 
cherished and imagined, a mismatch between performance validity and notational 
reliability, revealed in the discrepancy between poietic visions and aesthesic realities. 
I felt there was a need to re-train the performer’s skills (my own skills included) from 
the bottom up, and the creation of Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians appears 
as a possible first stop training tool in vigilant practice. But once such a training has 
operated a transformation in the performers’ own practice, and the notion of vigilant 
practice has gained root it felt to me that I could visit other musical ideas under the 
light of vigilance skills, and develop scores that relied on the vigilance 
transformations acquired previously through GMNM. My portfolio of compositions 
contains other pieces that are intended a second step in vigilant practice, after 
GMNM has been explored. As I mention in Chapter 3, a varying level of previously 
acquired knowledge is required to perform any score. In the remaining pieces in my 
portfolio, the previous learning required includes awareness and experience of 
vigilance and vigilance skills and, in the case of the voice pieces (The Nine Circles, 
Four Songs for a Time of Blindness, and Four Songs for the Return of the Light), 
additional knowledge of the Estill Compulsory Voice Figures. 
 
Though theoretically these pieces can be performed without any experience of 
GMNM they are in reality intended as graduation pieces, that is to say, they are 
intended for performers that have already assimilated and experienced the skills 
relevant to vigilant practice.  
The nine voice pieces (The Nine Circles) in particular are aimed at performers who, 
in addition to having experienced the training proposed in GMNM, also hold basic 
training in the Estill Voice Model or equivalent. This collection of pieces makes 
reference to specialist Estill terminology and Estill Compulsory Voice Figures and 
should not be performed by performers unfamiliar with the Estill Compulsory Voice 
Figures. I should clarify that, as in GMNM, the performers need not be trained 
musicians. It may seem like a contradiction to include in my portfolio a workbook that 
lauds itself on its inclusivity by welcoming non-musicians, while simultaneously 
include pieces that require what is quite specialist (and expensive) voice training. My 
explanation for this apparent contradiction lies in the special role the voice plays in 
my notion of vigilant practice (imagery and the creation of meaning), and the need to 
push each performer to explore their own effort scales, out of their comfort zone, 
away from learnt behaviours into new vocal territories (failure zones). Some 
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simplified attempts at this are made in several of the pieces in GMNM that address 
voice skills. The nine voice pieces go further in this exploration of the voice. To use 
teacher’s vernacular, these pieces are extension and enrichment activities, while 
GMNM is the basic activity. 
 
3.3. Performance Training Models 
I have exposed a few pedagogic theories with a generalist character upon which I 
have anchored my Games. I have discussed general concepts about how we learn, 
and more specifically about how we learn music. I will now discuss training practices 
in some areas of performance that I consider relevant to my aims: dance and 
movement, theatre, clown, martial arts and the voice. This discussion will bear 
relevance when I later on expose my proposal for a learning sequence and 
corresponding activities, for the development of vigilant practice. 
 
3.3.1. Askeology: training for performance 
Moving further from general pedagogic principles to subject specific pedagogic 
approaches, I would like to introduce Matthews’s concept of askeology. Askeology is 
the study of training for the specific environment of performative arts. He is careful to 
point out that askeology is not concerned with the study of the specific technicalities 
of performing (saying lines, making a movement, controlling a musical instrument) 
but rather with the vocation for performing – the internal, personal operations 
necessary for a person to choose to perform. Matthews proposes “to map out the 
meta-disciplinary terrain of training through the identification of vocation, obedience, 
formation and automatisation” (2011, p. 32). The decision to engage in performative 
actions is sustained by a sense of obedience to the unique demands of performing, 
which in itself spawns a desire to do better, to improve and continue to develop and 
to master the performative actions required. For me, the value of askeology is to 
consider performance as a continuous learning process, with-in and with-out of the 
performance stage, a transformative learning that we can transfer to all other areas 
of our personal and communal journey. 
 
3.3.2.  Training gesture and movement 
Spatz (Spatz, 2015; Spatz et al., 2013) makes a differentiation between technique 
and practice which is useful in understanding how best to construct a pedagogic 
framework for embodied and multi-modal performance practice. For Spatz, technique 
is a shared body of knowledge that “travels in time and in space, across cultures” 
(Spatz, 2015, p.41). Practice is time and space bound. It happens once. It is an 
event, an exercising of a particular technique. Technique is an aggregate of 
practices. Technique grows with repeated practices, that is, through training. Training 
is seen as the act of exchanging or transmitting a particular technique. 
 
Spatz gives the example of a particular gait used by a male film star that was quickly 
adopted by many males in several countries. Spatz considers the transmission of a 
gait across time and space as constituting a learnt technique, re-enacted in practice 
by the audience every time they walk. Training, through practice, constructs, 
consolidates, and develops a technique. 
 
3.3.3.  Practice and technique 
So is my work an attempt at forging a technique? Partly yes. Partly no. Yet, in my 
work there is an unequivocal attempt at un-training. If I consider the personal aims of 
my research, I am attempting to dismantle an inefficient performance technique, 
which I have identified in myself. This pursuit of an anti-technique led to the creation 
of new skills and developmental tools (the skills and tools of vigilance), by the 
amalgamation of other theories and techniques, some old, some recent, some 
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musical, some theatrical, pedagogic, which I believe may be equally helpful to other 
performers who may have encountered similar obstacles as me. 
 
But is it not the case that my assumption that Western classical, jazz and 
pop musicians, like myself, need help improving their own practice through technique 
is at the very least misguided, at the very worst, arrogant? Could one argue that all 
scoring of events is inherently charged with a similar arrogance? Do playwrights write 
plays because they think actors are poor storytellers? Do storytellers tell exciting 
stories because audiences have uninteresting lives? Do architects design houses 
and cities because people cannot build their own shelters or organize their shared 
environment? Is scoring an attempt to train their target audiences? Can all scores be 
read as a way of proposing, through practice, developments to a technique? It is 
early to answer with certainty to all these pertinent questions, but at present I lean 
towards answering ‘yes’ to all of them. The joy of collaboration and a sense of 
communal creation can provide a good answer to all these questions, nevertheless, 
scores have the pernicious role of telling people what to, so they do not have to 
decide for themselves – the obedience Matthews includes in his model for 
askeology. Writing scores carries with it an unexpected and uncomfortable moral 
conundrum: I am proposing to write scores that promote the players’ sense of holistic 
and independent agency, at a personal and social level, because I think they can’t do 
it themselves. For me this is a moral and political short circuit, a logical trap which I 
have not yet fully resolved, beyond accepting Matthews’ need for obedience in order 
to perform, in this case obedience to the instructions in my scores (including the 
instruction to disregard the score!) 
 
In the light of Spatz's reading of technique and practice, my research is both 
technique and practice. As a score, proposing a specific way of approaching music 
improvisation in general, it is a technique; as events (training rehearsals and 
performances) it is practice. Much of the theoretical workings I have attempted to 
define in this paper so far fall in the area of technique, yet in each actual rehearsal 
and performance, where the technique is brought into action-on-stage, a process of 
training and practice is taking place. Practice, through training and performing, 
sediments a technique; technique defines the parameters of the practice. Repetition 
of experience through practice events builds a technique – travels in time and space 
(through the score, video records, oral transmission) (Spatz, 2015). The pedagogic 
aims of my compositional work thus find a way forward into the world, by proposing a 
process of experiential growth from practice to technique, or to use Dewey’s 
terminology, the experiential continuum (Dewey, 1938, p. 28). 
 
3.3.4.  Grotowsky: a problem with technique 
Grotowsky identified a practical problem surrounding the acquisition of a technique 
through practice. I have approached this very problem when I discussed the issue of 
performing pre-designed, scored or choreographed actions, as opposed to 
improvised actions. Mitter (2006. p.94) states about Grotowsky and his via negativa: 
 
Although technical ability provides the actors with an opportunity to 
be themselves, it does not compel that revelation. […] If one learns 
how to do, one does not reveal oneself; one only reveals the skill of 
doing... […] For years one works and wants to know more, to 
acquire more skill, but in the end one has to reject it all and not 
learn but unlearn, not to know how to do but how not to do. 
 
A process of un-training. I find resonances here with Pochinko/Morrison Clown 
Through Mask training, and other clown masters working in Europe (like Lecoq and 
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Gaulier): the embracing of failure, of dismantling of any predictability of technical 
mastery; of not expecting but welcoming; of not knowing but wanting.  
 
Zeami, the thirteenth century writer and actor, the creator and the highest exponent 
of Japanese Nō theatre, makes a proposal to tackle the problem of technique and 
practice that falls short of offering a solution to the specific context of composing and 
writing scores. Yet his concern with the problem is revealing in as much as it shows 
that he had identified the very same problem of performance validity that this 
research project is attempting to address. In his training manual for Nō actors, Zeami 
writes about the Nō actor's final stages of training, beyond the skills and the practice, 
referring to it as the the flower. He also talks of an even higher level of attainment in 
this unique art form, beyond the flower, which he calls the wilting. A flower is only 
beautiful because it will wilt, and the wilting of grasses or trees is of no interest. Only 
the wilting of flowers (with its promise of new fruit, seed and rebirth) is of interest to 
Nō actors (Zeami, 2006, p. 94). Zeami admonishes against aiming for technique and 
loosing sight of the flower. Unfortunately, he falls short of explaining how one can 
attain the flower and the wilting. He does point to a careful process of learning 
through observation and imitation: “carry your body in accordance with the various 
circumstances, and the action will come to itself. [...] this is difficult to perceive in the 
written materials. When the moment comes, you should learn it just by watching” 
(Zeami, 2006, p. 93). This statement is particularly revealing of Zeami’s awareness of 
the incomplete and fallible role of the score (in this case the written script), and the 
need to observe and learn by example in order to assimilate the stylistic constraints 
and liberties of Nō performance practice. Observation, learning by example and the 
importance of face-to-face transmission has been important in the design of the 
group-working model of Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians. 
 
For many theatre practitioners and traditions, the ideas behind my concept of vigilant 
practice are not new. It is useful to observe how those practitioners and traditions 
engage in the training and learning process. I will focus on a few examples that have 
been important in arriving at my description of valid performances.  
 
I would like to add to my review of relevant performers and performance techniques 
the work of Pochinko/Morrison Clown Through Mask, Roy Hart and The Roy Hart 
Theatre, Meredith Monk, Marina Abramovic’s Method, Frantic Assembly and the 
gaze, Butoh dance (training), Capoeira (training) observing specifically how the valid 
elements in each example are taught and practiced – their pedagogic strategies for 
each of the three vigilant skills. I have trained with some of these practitioners, and, 
as relevant, I will make connections to my personal training experiences and how 
they have influenced my research. 
 
3.3.5.  Pochinko/Morrison’s Clown Through Mask training: 
Bad faith’s good faith. 
In the winter of 2015 I attended the Pochinko/Morrison Clown Through Mask’s 
course in Toronto. The training takes place over a series of daily workshops, usually 
taken over five or six weeks. During these workshops, the group goes through a 
series of exercises leading to the creation of six individual masks, each mask 
representing one aspect of the personality and character of the clown. Each person 
will find their own masks, and imbue them with personal memories, episodes, stories, 
traumatic events, moods and meanings from their own life. Though each clown’s 
mask is unique in appearance and meaning, the process of creating each mask is 
the same for all clowns and involve two sequential stages: experience and 
innocence. In experience clowns recall a traumatic event, relive it, its emotions, 
physicality, taste, sounds, and improvise freely on their own for a period of time until 
the essence of that moment is found, that is to say, until they can articulate verbally, 
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in one word or two, what that recalled experience signifies. At this stage, the player is 
primarily concerned with his or her own interior mental and cognitive experiences – 
the first skill of my vigilant model of performance. A group discussion allows each 
clown to pinpoint the other mood, the prevalent experience mood of each mask. 
Immediately after this discussion the whole group embraces the innocence stage, 
which is characterized by a child-like playfulness. An innocence mood is discovered 
and again a group discussion helps each clown find its most defining quality. The 
process is repeated six times, producing six masks, each with its two aspects, two 
moods, two ways of being and responding. The six masks are slowly brought into 
existence week after week, and as each mask is discovered, the clowns present 
them to the group in short solo performances, guided by Sue Morrison. The masks 
are no longer physically worn, but the mood, the way of being, the dichotomy of each 
mask (innocence and experience) are retained in the clowns demeanour and 
motivations. The up-to-now internal, cognitive process becomes exterior, multimodal 
and imagetic, communicative and responsive. The second and third skills in my 
model of vigilant performance are present here. During each clown’s turn, Sue 
Morrison guides and prompts the new clown into opening its wings and trying a first 
flight. The new mask, that is, the new mood is presented, usually without words in 
the earlier stages, by the gaze and facial expression of the performer, and their 
relation with each person in the audience. The clown is not pretending to be another 
person. The clown is not a character. The clown is an enormously magnified, 
distilled, purified facet of the person performing, disrobed of the hindrances of 
experience, and fuelled by the most honest innocence. The clown presents itself as 
bad faith’s good faith, using Sartre’s terminology: the clown pretends, lies and fakes, 
but with a clear and transparent honesty.  
 
The clown, a good example of a vigilant performer, draws to my mind Max Weber’s 
concept of the Ideal-Type. Max Weber introduced this term as a means of testing 
possibilities that though abstract at the onset may reveal in the end valuable data 
(Maher and Groves, 2004). I am pursuing in this research an ideal-type performance, 
an ideal-type relationship between the performer and the audience. Understanding 
what such an ideal-type relationship may be, and how to use scores in order to 
facilitate (train) the ideal-type performer to create and develop such ideal-type 
relationship is an abstract operation. Yet, the actual creation of vigilant performance 
situations, of vigilant relationships between performers and audiences is no longer an 
ideal-type situation but a unique, non-ideal, real and unpredictable situation, where 
the ideal-types are no longer applicable, or desirable for that matter. In this sense, 
there is an inevitable chasm between the conception of a training program, be it a 
single score or a sequence of scores, and a performance somehow based - or 
triggered- by such a score. What the score works with – the ideal type – is not what 
the performance situation works with. What connects the two is an attempt at the 
ideal-type, a training impetus towards a dynamic, and indeterminable model. The 
ideal-type score and the real-type event are doomed to be misaligned, never to 
exactly superimpose upon each other. In this game, fallibility is a rule, not an option, 
not an error. Personas are ideal-types, while persons are real-types. Like in 
clowning, I am working with persons, not personas. My ideal-type performance is 
based on real-type relationships. 
 
3.3.5.1.  Clown-through-mask: teacher/ facilitator role and Spoken Scores 
activity. 
Yet, during training, the clown very often simply crashes to the ground with a 
disjointed, contrived, acted out, bad faith, performance, and is brutally castigated and 
ashamed by their failure. Though I disapprove of the honest cruelty thrust upon a 
failing clown, I can not help but accept that without that honesty the clown would not 
find its good-faith, its masks, its motivations, ways of moving and of talking. I cherish 
a more supportive, positive, but equally honest way of helping the improvising 
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performer along the way. In particular I found the facilitating role of the clown master 
– offering suggestions for action, demanding more effort – inspiring and productive. I 
have retained this aspect of Clown Through Mask training strategy in my Games for 
Musicians and Non-Musicians. Several of the pieces/games ask for a member of the 
group to take on the role of the facilitator during someone else’s performance. The 
facilitator improvises a spoken score, in which they offer suggestions and ideas for 
further improvisation, and to help a performer navigate through an effort scale, 
demanding from them more and more, or less and less effort. 
 
3.3.6.  Roy Hart theatre training: body/voice synthesis and 
effort levels 
In 2014 I spent a period of time training with the Roy Hart Theatre, at the Centre 
Artistique International Roy Hart (CAIRH) in Malerargues in the south of France. 
Having attended several of Guy Dartnell’s ‘Voice/Body synthesis’ workshops, who 
trained at CAIRH, I felt it was time to go directly to the source of this work and 
enrolled in the weeklong course entitled ‘La Voix Humaine’.  
 
The structure of the course involved doing daily voice/body warm-ups, focusing on a 
particular aspect of the voice, the body and gesture (body/voice patterns). The warm-
up was followed by a carefully introduced voice/body exercise, game, or 
improvisation, where the newly discovered voice/body possibilities (the patterns) 
could be experimented with. This learning sequence – skill assimilation followed by 
improvisation – is in agreement with Gordon’s Music Learning Theory, but engages 
the whole body rather than primarily the sonic self. Each exercise combines voice 
production with physical activity. For instance, one exercise involved miming 
throwing a stone up in the air, as high as possible and vocalising, with a descending 
pitch from a high note to a low one, the trajectory of the imaginary stone as it falls 
back to ground (the pattern). At each attempt, the physical effort levels were 
increased, by trying to throw the stone higher and higher. As a result of increased 
physical effort, loudness increased, the starting note of each glissando went higher 
and higher (by raising the larynx higher and higher), and the level of emotional 
engagement in the activity increased as well.  
 
Reading through my notes from the course I notice that most exercises demand, or 
inevitably fall into, a continuous increase in physical effort, with the effort foci placed 
in different parts of the body, as I had encountered in the Estill Voice model. In Roy 
Hart Theatre’s work, physical effort, voice qualities, and emotional display are 
profoundly interlinked, and a rich tapestry on embodied and multi-modal meaningful 
images (the second vigilant skill) were created quickly and convincingly, that is to 
say, in good-faith. 
 
I have encountered the same focus of directed effort levels in Butoh dance training I 
undertook in November 2016 with Natsuko Kono at the Lansdown Space in Stroud, 
United Kingdom. Through playing with extreme effort levels, an immediate emotional 
display arises in each performer that is inseparable from the movements themselves: 
the same arm movement becomes equally a signifier for tiredness, or anger, 
frustration, boredom, etc. The meaning of the movement is not thrust upon the 
presence of the performer: it derives from it. It is therefore authentic, and not acted. 
Its imagery appears in good-faith. In its use of embodied effort scales to generate 
multi-modal imagery in a responsive and communicative way, Kono’s Butoh training 
is vigilant. 
 
3.3.7.  Marina Abramovic method 
In Chapter 1, I have referenced the Abramovic Method, as created by Marina 
Abramovic in the Terra Comunal intervention in São Paulo, Brazil, in 2015. I only 
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encountered descriptions of the Abramovic Method late into this research, and was 
impressed by the similarities it carries with my own proposal for training and 
development of a vigilant practice.  
 
The four thirty minute exercises, performed by the audience, progress from an initial 
internal, introspective moment, proceeding to one of physical, corporeal and tactile 
engagement, followed by the sudden encounter with the other, and with it, with the 
self, through the gaze, and finally a moment of action, in this case group walking, 
where awareness of self and other, mindless (system 1) action, and active response 
to the presence of the other all intertwine in a vigilant group performance. The low 
levels of effort in the actions resemble, for instance, performances by the 
Wandelweiser group, where actions are brought to a minimum. 
 
3.3.8.  Martial Arts training - Capoeira 
Capoeira training, as done by Oficina de Capoeira in the United Kingdom, is based 
around group learning, by rote, of a series of short movements (gestural patterns) 
which, when mastered, are combined into longer sequences, which are used in 
improvisations at the end of each training session. 
 
From my practice in capoeira, I absorbed the way the whole group strongly support 
each learner, at whatever stage of learning (marked with a different coloured belt, 
like judo) they are at. Advanced capoeiristas play with absolute beginners; children 
play with older peers; older women with young boys. There is no room for 
competitiveness in the training process. I have reflected on the important role group 
creativity has in my definition of vigilant practice, in particular the inter-personal 
communication skill.  
 
3.3.9.  Group Learning: creating communities of inquiry 
I will make a brief mention of performers, composers and therapists for whom 
working directly with a group of performers in their music and performances is the 
way in which its very style and syntax is developed. They range from groups where a 
clearly defined leader instructs and explains, to groups where a community of 
enquiry is created, with a stronger input from each of the participants. I have chosen 
these practitioners because their work addresses, in one more ways, positively or 
negatively, the concerns of this research. 
 
3.3.9.1.  The troupe as training system 
I am using the word performing troupe to describe a group of people that work 
together for a period of time for a common performative cause. This includes 
pop/rock bands, theatre and dance companies, circus companies, training and 
workshop cohorts. Groups like the Philip Glass Ensemble, Steve Reich and 
Musicians, the Wandelweiser group of composers/performers, all share a 
commitment to developing very specific musical aesthetics, and with it performance 
practices that are sedimented not through the score/script but through the 
continuous, shared and communal experience of rehearsing and performing the 
music. The troupe is more than a performing group: it is a professional training 
methodology. As I have discussed previously, learning by discrimination (by rote, by 
comparison, by pattern acquisition, by pattern improvisation) requires a clear 
differentiation of roles between the person learning and the person teaching, though 
these roles can change swiftly and unexpectedly. Learning by observation and 
imitation fits well with the business and social model of a performing troupe, where 
many hours of contact between the players are expected.  
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3.3.9.1.1.   Troupes with Leader/teacher 
Zeami, writing about the training of a Nō actor, which took place within the family, 
states that the wilting flower (the highest point in an actor’s craft) cannot be taught, 
directly or by the script, and it “is difficult to perceive in the written materials” (Zeami, 
2006, p. 93). To acquire the flower, that actor “should learn it just by watching”. 
Learning is once again done non-verbally, experientially, in a very personal way. The 
idea of personal learning and transformation through a communal experience sits at 
core of my artistic concerns. In the introduction to Games for Musicians and Non-
Musicians I propose ways in which the communal experience of the group can inform 
personal experience and individual transformation: establishing a safe rehearsal 
space; alternation of roles within the group (player/audience, facilitator, spoken 
scores), mirroring and reacting activities; group reflection after a performance or 
rehearsal; group devising and decision making. 
 
Other examples of troupes with a leader include Karlheinz Stockhausen, Meredith 
Monk, glass, Reich, and the psychotherapeutic practices of Psychodrama (Moreno), 
and Playback theatre. 
 
It is not possible to ascertain reliably the relative weight of decision-making between 
the leader (Reich, Glass, Stockhausen) and the players in their troupe. Does the 
leader define and control all aspects of the players’ physical presence, or do the 
players have creative agency over their own presence? Is there a community of 
inquiry (Dewey, Peirce) in action in these troupes? 
 
Psychodrama operates according to a leader/led relationship. Though the role of the 
facilitator can alternate between members of the group, the leadership role is still 
present. Though a Psychodrama session obeys a strict model with well defined rules, 
those rules are positively accepted by the group because they are “not imposed by a 




3.3.9.1.2.  Troupes without leader 
There are interesting examples of groups of performers – troupes of kinds – that do 
not have a leadership structure.  
 
To name but a couple, the work that Alexis Porfiriadis has developed with 6daEXIt 
Improvisation Ensemble, or John Zorn’s Cobra, are examples of troupes without a 
leader. 
 
3.3.9.2. Troupes: a solution for the fallibility of scores? 
We have seen how some composers, in parallel to writing scores, also direct their 
own ensembles, training of performers directly. The presence of the composer as 
leader brings the advantage of filling in any blanks left in the score, acknowledging 
the fallibility of the score to transmit many non-musical, embodied aspects of 
IN PRACTICE: 
[FACILITATOR/SPOKEN SCORES] 
The Director appears in several of the scores, usually referred to as facilitator, or 
model. I suggest a description of the role of the facilitator as instigator, which is 
greatly based on Moreno’s Director. The use of spoken scores, where action is 
instigated as a response to a spoken question from the facilitator also appears in 
the following pieces: 




performance. We have seen the examples of Stockhausen, Steve Reich, Philip 
Glass, where the score offers action detail, and the composer/director fills what is not 
represented in the score (gestural presence, etc). A similar process of embodied 
anchoring can be seen at popular sing-along screenings, where the audience not 
only sing the songs, but move and dance like the character on screen. In this case it 
is the moving image that is providing the score. 
 
3.3.10.  Performance as Transformation 
Each of us constructs and perpetuates our own personal mythologies. As Damásio 
explains, our autobiographical self is an important part of our sense of self. The lady 
in the pool, where I am writing, says she is “terrified of insects”. All of them? or just 
some?, I think to myself. The man in the café is a “man of action”; the young girl 
talking to my children hates her native language and loves “foreign sounding things”. 
This is who they recognize themselves to be and forms their own personal 
mythologies about themselves. Personal mythologies, like tribal ones, prepare us for 
action in response to external events (Damásio, 2000). They are pre-sets for reactive 
behaviour. Yet, it is possible to consider that at least some of such mythologies may 
change overtime, even be profoundly altered or abandoned all together as personal 
experience grows, or through trauma. The lady in the pool may one day find that she 
likes butterflies and lacewings, and may even find beauty in some fat spiders; the 
man of action may learn to take a break and let others make decisions; the young girl 
may realise that her native language is also a foreign language. This is what I am 
referring to as transformation: a shift in our personal mythologies, in our 
autobiographical self, in our performance of being ourselves. For me, what is 
important is to acknowledge the transformative power of human interaction, in 
particular in the context of rituals and within the focused and cognitively non-
normative nature of rituals: concerts, religious rites, games, theatre and performance. 
This is the aim of vigilant performance practice: to facilitate and promote personal 
transformations. 
 
One sees in the Abramovic Method – which is, beyond a training method, a 
performance on its own merit – the desire to change the very deepest and most 
basic of human knowledge, to offer the possibility of transformation to each and 
every one of the participants, a deep and slow-growing transformation into a new and 
unfamiliar way of being. I see here parallels with Matthews’s notion of ‘training as 
metabolism’ (Matthews, 2011).  
 
For Sue Morrison, ‘performance is about ritual, and ritual is about transformation’ 
(Coburn and Morrison, 2013; Morrison, 2015). Transformation is a central part of the 
goals – and tools – of the clown. In class, Morrison talks about the clown’s search for 
Innocence after Experience, not before, ‘which is what children do’. For Morrison, 
Innocence is the un-socialised, childish intuitive wisdom of ignorance, its wide and 
wild emotional spectrum, but in Clown it is tempered by the experiences of embodied 
presence – of pain, joy, sorrow, elation. It is the articulation between the lived 
experience of existence, which we all share and communicate in one way or another, 
and the quick intuitive emotionally broad response of innocence that opens the doors 
for communal transformation. 
 
Taking into account Herbert Blaus’ view that  'what is universal in performance is the 
consciousness of performance' (Matthews, 2011, p. 33), the ultimate objective of a 
performative act is similar to that of a religious ritual, or medical intervention: to 
transform the participants into new, examined (and hopefully better, if not necessarily 
happier) individuals and communities, a concept expressed by Boal as ‘theatre is 
knowledge’ (Boal, 2013, p. 20). The notion of transformation – of learning as 
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transformation (Dewey), of performance as ritual and transformation (Morrison) – is 
central to my compositional and performative project.  
 
3.3.11 .  Towards a poetics of failure 
At several points in this text I make reference to the importance of failure and using 
failure techniques in my pieces, both as a pedagogic tool and an aesthetic aim. 
Pedagogic aims: As mentioned in 3.2.1, the formulation of personal effort scales 
implies the exploration of personal failure zones. A player that tries to sing a note that 
is beyond their comfortable register is exploring their failure zone, in this case a vocal 
effort failure (probably larynx height and false vocal fold retraction). Though she may 
have failed to sing the note, she could have learnt to identify the physical effort level 
beyond which she can no longer sing comfortably. She would have also learnt what 
an uncomfortably high note sounds like, and may choose to appropriate that sound in 
future improvisations. A failure quickly becomes a learning opportunity, often in a 
more profound and engrained way than a successful performance can offer. C. 
Dueck’s work on fixed and dynamic mind sets further informs the importance of 
embracing failure as a learning opportunity. 
 
Aesthetic aims: Beyond being simply a pedagogic tool, failure presents itself as 
opportunity for deep personal change. Wabi-sabi, the Japanese concept of beauty in 
imperfection flourished in Japan since the 15th century. Objects are admired for their 
imperfect uniqueness. Imperfect pottery cups and woven cloth, calligraphy, cuisine 
are often cited when discussing wabi-sabi (Juniper, 2003; Koren, 2015, 1994; 
Larson, 2019): 
 
Wabi-sabi is a cracked and glued together ceramic bowl (check 
the concept of kintsugi); a funnily shaped, home-grown tomato; a 
dinner created from leftovers; falling cherry blossom; a worn 
wooden hallway and an elbow patch on your favourite jumper. 
Therefore, it’s an appreciation of all that is simple, modest and 
imperfect. Yet, loved deeply. When you embrace Wabi-sabi, you 
realise that nothing is permanent— even fixed objects are subject 
to change and taint. A great example of Wabi-sabi in creativity is 
the art of kintsugi, where cracked pottery is filled with gold-dusted 
lacquer as a way to showcase the beauty of its age and damage 
rather than hiding it. This art highlights and praises the faults 
instead of hiding them. (Larson, 2019) 
 
In the area of performance arts, I have felt immediately attracted to 
Pochinko/Moprrisons clowns’ performances. The feeling of impending failure and the 
possibility of serious humiliation in a clown performance is an important part of the 
genre; that is facilitated by the clown’s openness to failure, by allowing herself to face 
all directions of the self at the same time: joy, shame, guilt, lust, greed, sadness, etc., 
and also failure. 
 
The complexity of the physiological actions and reactions in an emotional response 
involve an enormous amount of muscular movements, most not conscious, but all 
meaningful. These movements are immediately detected, if not consciously, by an 
observer (Paul Ekman's Universals point to a genetic ability to read meaning into 
those external signs). In my compositions, such a complexity points away from any 
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attempt to notate some of such physiological reactions into a choreography, or 
towards acting out. All bar the utmost accomplished actors will be able to trigger all 
the external signs of an emotional state. I, for one, cannot, and as a composer I 
cannot expect other players to do what I cannot. Authenticity and honesty become 
crucial words. Good-faith and bad-faith once again enact their eternal struggle for 
dominance (Sartre, 2006). For this reason – honesty of emotional presence – I shy 
away from notating strict choreographies or acting out emotional instructions. What I 
find interesting is to observe in a performer and be part of myself is the unpredictable 
flow of emotions, clearly unscripted, obviously not-planned, dangerously fallible. I 
have a personal enamourment with the possibility of failure; with the honesty and 
good-faith that it brings to the fore; with the empathy that it can trigger in others 
through shared experience and shared humanity; with the opportunity for learning 
and transformation that it offers. But failure also presents us with the drama of the 
possibility of overcoming failure, with hope, with progress, transformation (personal, 
social, political). This enamourment frames my aesthetic choices. I could perhaps 
propose that the enjoyment of observing and enduring failure, its beauty and 
profound lessons forms the basis of a poetics of failure. I believe the scores in my 
portfolio reliably support this objective. 
 
3.4.  Training Vigilance Skills 
Building on the models of performance training I studied during this research I have 
developed a training and learning strategy for developing the three skills of vigilant 
practice. My aim is to offer the performer, through experiential learning, personal 
tools that can establish a broad physical, emotional and communicative spectrum, 
through, amongst other things, the construction of extreme effort scales, which in 
turn allows the construction of a vocabulary of physical end emotional engagement 
upon which the performer can define a field of individual emotional and 
communicative freedom – Blanchot’s “being in accord with the truth of place”.  
 
I will now describe in context my proposal for a training process to develop the three 
vigilance skills. I will propose a set of possible training tools and developmental 
activities for each skill, and will point to pieces in Games for Musicians and Non-
Musicians where they were implemented. 
 
3.4.1.  Skills, skills-development tools, skills-development 
activities and scores: a differentiation 
At this stage I’d like to clarify the difference between vigilance skills, skill 
development tools, and skill development activities. Table 6 in 3.1.5 maps vigilance 
skills to skill development tools, and to skill development activities. 
 
Vigilance skills: the three interconnected aspects I have identified as 
offering performance validity: non-normative cognitive [IN] states that promote 
multi-modal embodied imagery [OUT], supported by inter-personal 
Communication [IN/OUT]. 
 
Skill development tools: the tools I designed in order to progressively 
promote the development of each of the three skills. Some examples of skills-
development tools are: awareness of self, effort scales, to initiate and 
respond to a communicative situation 
 
Skill development activities: generic activities that promote through practice 
the sedimentation of a technique. Their aim is to help performer explore non-
normative states. Examples of skill development activities are metacognition, 
mindlessness, audiation; effort scales and non-normative states, use of the 
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whole body to form meaningful gestures; to see, be seen and react 
communicatively.  
 
Score/Games: a set of instructions for live performative actions, which 
engages the players in skill development activities, with the aim of developing 
the skills of vigilant practice. Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians is a 
collection of such scores.  
 
Performance: the practical realization of a score/game. A performance is a  





Figure 3 – The relationship between vigilance skill, tools, activities, scores and performances 
3.4.2. Normative states for each skill  
I will briefly re-expose my concept of normative and non-normative states, which I 
have made reference to when I discussed the importance of creating personal effort 
scales for each of the three vigilance skills. The following figures describe what 
constitutes normative (blue) and non-normative (green) states for each skill. Each 
individual performer subjectively establishes the effort level necessary to attain non-
normative states. 
 
[IN] – Non-normative cognition (Drinko, 2013; Hussain, 2015):
 















[OUT] – Multi-modal and embodied imagery (Gritten and King, 2011; McPherson, 
Gary and Parncutt, 2002; Spatz, 2015):  
 
Figure 5 – Vigilant effort scales 
 
[IN-OUT] – Inter-personal communication (Hargie, 2017, 2006; Hewes, 2012; 
Sawyer, 2015): 
 
Figure 6 – Vigilant inter-personal communication 
 
3.4.3.  Vigilance skills and skill-development activities (in 
portfolio of compositions) 
The tools presently identified as most relevant for the research topic and capable of 
sustaining non-normative states are presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9, and connected 
to proposed sequential developmental activities. 
 
I propose these tools as developmental aids for the three skills of vigilant practice. 
Miss one of them, and the depth of vigilance lessens. The tools are used in the 
pieces of the workbook and ordered in a training sequence. 
 
Each skill is considered separately and independently developed throughout the 
workbook (part) but explored in combination with other skills in a variety of pieces 
and games (whole). The first skill to be addressed is cognition, followed by imagery 
and later on communication. The division between the three skills is not watertight 
and a process of iteration happens where skills and tools are revisited throughout the 
sequence. The list of pieces at the end of Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians 
offers a quick visual map of the sequential progression through the three skills, in the 
order I mentioned above. A critical commentary explaining the practical outcomes of 
each skills learning sequence is presented below. 
 
3.4.3.1.  Non-normative cognition [IN]: tools, activities, scores and learning 
sequence  















Table 7 – Cognitive skills, tools and activities [IN] 
Non-normative 
cognitive states 
Skill development tools Sequential skill development 
activities 
System 1  Awareness of self, of own 
thoughts and of decision 
making processes 
Meta-cognition, mindfulness 
System 2  Quick and intuitive reactions Quick reaction by 
mirroring/synchronicity, speech 
as stream of consciousness  
Audiation  Mental listening: recall and 
predict sound events 




3.4.3.1.1.   ‘Awareness of self’ and ‘quick reactions’: Skills development tool for 
cognitive states 
As I discussed in chapter 2 metacognitive processes, when equated with Sartre’s 
being-in-itself, in its fight with being-for-itself, can have the negative effect in 
improvisations of halting action and quick reaction (Drinko, 2013) and the quick 
formation of a genuine pallet of communicative imagery. The self-consciousness of 
being-for-itself hinders the player’s quick reaction and intuitive agency. According to 
Drinko, embodied improvisation aims to promote being-in-self (flow, System 1, Self 
A), and minimise being-for-itself (metacognition, System 1, Self B).  
 
In performance, inward reflective focus risks hindering through judgement and 
signification the constant flux of emotional states. The distinction that Sartre makes 
between consciousness and reflective behaviour is useful in clarifying this issue. 
Sartre frames the difference between mindful and mindless action in the following 
way: 
 
In order to act it is not necessary to be conscious of the self as acting – quite 
the contrary. Unreflective behaviour is not unconscious behaviour. (Sartre, 
1948, p. 56)  
 
Sartre heightens the value of outwards action without inwards reflection. The balance 
between inwards reflection and outwards imagery can be achieved in unreflective 
behaviour, where the inner eye is still seeing, but the outer body is moving in the 
world regardless. This figure of unreflective behaviour, all IN and all OUT at the same 
time is very present in Pochinko/Morrison’s Clown Through Mask training, in the 
daze of pop music performance, and in shamanic practices, sports events, crowd 
behaviour. Vigilant cognition is a heightened awareness of performance- all inwards 
and all outwards.  
 
Being conscious is not the same as reflecting on our behaviour, even in real-time. 
The outwards action I am describing relies on being conscious of our environment 
and how we can interact with it safely. The inward focus that seems to hinder 
spontaneous improvisation activity (Drinko, 2013) is one where reflection takes 
place, that is, the assignment of value and meaning to ones actions even before they 
are performed. Sartre's differentiation can help us stratify improvisatory actions into 
two categories: one in which the performer is constantly attentive to the possible 
meaning of the self's actions, and the other where the performer is constantly 
attentive to the relationship between the world around and the self's actions pre-
meaning, what Nattiez calls the neutral aspect of performance. A training tool should 
exploit this differentiation between states of awareness: on one side the generation 
of relationships and responsive actions, and on the other the generation of 
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meanings. Drinko posits the possibility that both approaches (System 1 and System 
2) interfere with each other and may be neurologically incompatible: 
 
System 2, Mindfulness: “know what is happening while it is happening”. See 
be seen- self –awareness; automatic speech (awareness of own thoughts).  
 
System 1, Mindless: “not knowing what is happening while it is happening” 
(Nairn, Mindfulness Association, n.d.) – tools: imitate, mirror; fast action, 
quick responses, short reaction times. 
 
During rehearsals and performances related to this research, I have noticed a 
tendency in players (including myself) to fall back on familiar patterns of action when 
more deeply engaged in System 1/Flow moments. Because of the prominent role 
granted to intuitive and quick reactions, players are more reliant on using familiar 
body/sound patterns in unfamiliar sequences of patterns. In reverse, I have also 
noticed a tendency during moments of meta-cognition and self-awareness, when 
rationality and careful consideration are taken before each action, to engage in 
unfamiliar patterns of action, but in clearly familiar sequences. The macro-gesture 
seems to be more predictable, more clearly expected than the fine detail of 
body/sound gesturing. 
 
I have devised pieces in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians that play with the 
awareness of being-for-itself, of System 1 (e.g. GMNM.1, GMNM.43), but also 
included in the workbook pieces that promote being-in-itself, (e.g. GMNM.10, 
GMNM.38) to offer the contrasting context necessary for learning by comparison to 
take place.  
 
3.4.3.1.2.   Audiation 
Some pieces pay special attention to the mental process of audiation, through sound 
improvisations. Some later pieces combine sound improvisation with gesturing, effort 
levels and synchronicity.  
 
3.4.3.2   Mirroring activities as tools for all three skills. 
I will now discuss in detail the tools and activities I have designed for each of the 
three skills. But there are many situations where one tool or activity (score) may be 
pertinent to more than one skill. In this part of the learning process, isolated concepts 
or patterns are reconnected with other skills to form a holistic experience. For this 
reason, I need to make a preliminary reference to the mirroring/synchronicity tool, 
because it is a development tool that has the potential to promote all three skills 
simultaneously, albeit by different routes.  
 
The Mirroring/Synchronicity toll and derived activities asks a group of players to copy 
one aspect of another player’s presence. This can be a musical phrase, spoken 
worda particular way of holding and playing an instrument, a way of standing and 
walking. This requires a close observation of the other player’s embodied presence 
and an immediate imitative response, in synchrony. In some pieces the players are 
IN PRACTICE: 
[MENTAL PROCESS - AUDIATION] 
The following pieces address the mental process of audiation and space 
audiation: 
GMNM.1; GMNM.3; GMNM.4; GMNM.7; GMNM.28; GMNM.29; GMNM.37; 
GMNM.43; GMNM.44; GMNM.47; GMNM.53; GMNM.54; GMNM.55; GMNM.57; 
GMNM.63, Dandelions in May. 
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asked to do the opposite of another player, but in order to do the opposite they must 
still observe with care. 
 
Mirroring/imitation tool plays a role in the development of [IN] through fast decision 
making, in the development of [OUT] through embodied attuning, and the 
development of [IN/OUT] through a process of empathy. 
 
3.4.3.2.1.   Non-normative cognition [IN]: Mirroring/imitation – fast decision 
making 
Novel ways of moving and communicating, that is to say, non-normative ways of 
moving and communicating are comparatively easy to observe than novel ways of 
being cognizant (in either system 1 or system 2). Cognition, being an interior process 
is not directly visible, and therefore is not easy to imitate in others. All one can imitate 
are actions, gestures, meaningful intentions, not thoughts. Mirroring and miming 
strategies will not directly address cognitive skills. Yet research (Winkielman and 
Schooler, 2011) proposes that cognitive states are affected by the environment and 
the activity of the subject. Mindless tasks seem to facilitate the state of flow, of 
intuitive and immediate action of System 1, which Drinko observed in theatre and 
comedy improvisers. 
 
The ‘being-in-itself’/System 1 can be transferred to the embodied presence by 
imitation, through the break in the decision-making processes that imitation provides. 
Mirroring/imitation activities thus fulfil a multiple roll in all three skills. 
 
 
3.4.3.3.   Embodied multimodal imagery [OUT]: tools, activities, scores and 
learning sequence. 
I will explain how I have constructed tools and activities for the development of 
embodied multi-modal imagery in improvised music performance, and propose a 
possible learning sequence. I will make connections to my portfolio of scores and 
performance videos as it becomes relevant.  
The learning sequence and tools for training embodied multi-modal imagery is, at the 
time of writing: 
 
Table 8 – Multi-modal embodied imagery skill development tools and skill development activities [OUT] 
Skill development tools Sequential skill development activities 
Full body engagement Gesture and the meaningful body; body/sound gesture 
 Mirroring/synchronicity- embodied attuning 
 Voice qualities and the meaningful voice 
 Body Scores 
Effort Effort scales 
 
It seems to me that embodied multi-modal imagery in music performance is in fact 
always present, in the same way that multi-modality is inseparable from verbal and 
non-verbal communication. Nevertheless, through training and stylistic practice, the 
scope and potential of multi-modality is somehow reduced: each learnt musical style 
IN PRACTICE: 
[MIRRORING/IMITATION [IN] – QUICK REACTIONS] 
The following pieces propose mirroring and quick-reaction activities: 
GMNM.3; GMNM.10; GMNM.11; GMNM.12; GMNM.14; GMNM.16; GMNM.18; 
GMNM.34; GMNM.35; GMNM.38; GMNM.39; GMNM.40. 
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expects a vocabulary of stylistic practices based of stylistic patterns (certain 
gestures, specific voice qualities, dress-codes) which are promoted in detriment of 
other patterns which may not be part of that performance style. I am attempting with 
this work to expand the vocabulary of multi-modal and embodied imagery, by the use 
of mirroring/synchronicity activities, body/sound gesturing, body scores, and the 
exploration of effort scales. 
 
3.4.3.3.1.   Body/Sound Gesture: gesture and the meaningful body 
Spatz highlights that the concept of embodied technique, far from being a static body 
of physiological processes should be seen as “a field of variation between individuals 
and also within the lifetime of an individual being. This field of relative reliability and 
variation is what affords embodied technique an area of knowledge” (Spatz, 2015, 
p.43). The learning sequence I am present for the development of multi-modal 
imagery is grounded on the observation of the field of reliabilities and variations, 
similarities and differences, in embodied signification. 
 
Davidson (Davidson, in McPherson and Welch, 2012, p. 778) shows “how technical 
and expressive elements become co-specified in motor programs,” which are 
necessary to develop instrumental skills (musical or other). The programs are, to use 
Spatz’s terminology, the physical residue of an embodied technique, and as such, 
liable to be subject to practice, that is to say, liable to training, to learning. Davidson 
opens up a door for a multi-modal pedagogical approach to music practice and 
education when she writes about the body in performance fulfilling the role of offering 
not only meaningful images but also in providing, through gesture “crucial sources of 
perceptual information between co-performers and between them and the audience” 
(Davidson, 2012, p.779). These sources of embodied communication which 
Davidson refers to are often attached to stylistic boundaries – different styles and 
traditions of music may adopt different gestural repertoires– and as such, they are 
learnt, sometimes in a conscious and structured manner, but often learnt intuitively, 
by cultural exposure, in a haphazard manner by inferences and approximations. If 
gestural aspects of music making are learnt, I propose they can also be taught. In 
fact, Davidson writes that: 
The creative teacher can help the individual or groups of students 
being taught to maximise their alignment and expressive potential 
of the music performer through the use of an engaged body. 
(Davidson, in McPherson and Welch, 2012, p.780) 
 
Training for full use of the body, including the voice, and within each player’s physical 
abilities, is the first tool in the sequence. It is not about being acrobatic or agile, but 
about being prepared to engage the whole body in the act of performing, including 
large muscle-skeletal structures, but also facial expressions and voice qualities in 
response to the environment, and exploring individually created effort scales, to be 
prepared to make one of an infinite possibility of physical and musical images. 
Meredith Monk, who received a Dalcroze music education, refers to the process as 
training sound and movement together. Physical gesture and musical gesture, as 
multi-modal images, are inseparable and might be better referred to as body/sound 
gestures and images. The body/sound image is the smallest performative unit of 
measurement, the performative atom. 
 
3.4.3.3.2.   Mirroring/ Synchronicity – Embodied Attuning 
Augusto Boal, writing about the training of the actor, refers to the learning process as 
one of ‘un-learning’ established patterns of behaviour, “by destroying the wall of 
mechanisms, which is the actor's mask" (Boal, 1992, p.43). Mirroring and 
synchronicity activities provide an opportunity to experience unfamiliar gestural 
patterns. “Perception ability is influenced by the familiarity of incoming stimuli” 
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(Hargie, 2006, p. 52). The perceptual modalities that one is trying to develop are 
made increasingly familiar to the player. It is about each player observing and 
responding to unfamiliar stimuli enough times for them to become familiar stimuli. 
The reactions and responses to now familiar stimuli are not necessarily decided by 
the composer through a score, or choreographed in advance, but left open for the 
performer to decide in improvisation according to their own intuitive knowledge, and 
using and extending their already acquired vocabulary of gestural patterns. Gellrich 
and Parncutt (2014, p.178) support mirroring and imitation as a learning tool for 
teaching expression: “Learning through pantomime to take on any particular affect, 
and just as fast to drop it, or to tense up and relax at will, can enable practically every 
part of the body to be used to carry expression.” Lecoq puts it differently: “Movement 
provokes emotion; the body remembers” (Murray, 2003, p. 129). 
 
Mirroring and imitation activities ask the players to experience another body’s way of 
moving, of being present; a novel way of moving, talking and gesturing; to contrast 
the other with the players’ own ways of moving, talking and gesturing. Mirroring 
expands the players’ vocabulary of imagery patterns. 
 
3.4.3.3.3.   Effort Scales: Skills-development tools and activities 
The ‘training’ (or ‘un-training’) of an embodied musical practice needs to encompass 
not only un-familiar ways of moving, of engaging the body and the voice, but also 
extreme ways of experiencing emotional and embodied states. 
The risk of this approach, where unusual and unfamiliar levels of effort, both physical 
and emotional or expressive effort, is of course to fall into histrionics, into theatre 
characters, into acting4 - that is,  to pretend one is who one is not, in a place or time 
where one is not, attempting to be who one is not – which is closely related to 
Sartre’s project of Bad Faith), instead of welcoming the infinite possibilities that the 
condition of being present brings. I have discussed the creation and use of personal 
effort scales in chapter 2.2 and 2.4.  
 
3.4.3.3.4.   Voice qualities and the meaningful voice 
In the article The Voice in Violence (Vera, 2001) Dal Vera makes the connection 
between extreme physical and vocal effort and demonstrations of extreme emotion: 
“Train the voice and the body for the demand of extreme emotion”. In Games for 
Musicians and Non-Musicians, I introduce the use of voice as an aspect of whole 
body image making. The voice is used in improvised streams of consciousness, in 




3.4.3.3.5.   Body Scores 
Some text scores ask for players to take other player’s body, gestures and images as 
a score for their own improvisation. I call these activities body scores.  
Body scores are situations where a musician takes their stimuli for improvisation from 
the body of another player: how they stand and sit, move, gestures, momentum is 
                                                
 
1. In Clown Through Mask workshops, I witnessed Sue Morrison crush a failing clown by 
shouting at the top of her lungs: “You are acting! In clown we don’t act. We don’t pretend to 
be. We are!” 
IN PRACTICE: 
[VOICE] 
GMNM.6; GMNM.8; GMNM.9; GMNM.12; GMNM.22; GMNM.33; GMNM.41; 
GMNM.42; GMNM.53; GMNM.59; GMNM.63. 
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taken as score, a trigger for musical action. The body observed is the starting point 
for a relationship between two players, and the musical improvisation a residue of 
that relationship. Body scores are activities that promote both the creation of multi-
modal imagery and inter-personal non-verbal communication skills. I have chosen to 
place body score in multi-modal activities because that is where it first appears in the 
overall learning sequence. As a multi-modal development activity body scores 
provide readiness for non-verbal inter-personal communication which appears later 
in the sequence. The introduction to Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians 
explains body scores in detail.  
 
In conclusion, the five multi-modal and embodied imagery activities attempt to 
expand the players’ vocabulary of full physical engagement, including the use of the 
voice, by offering performers the possibility of engaging in new gestural patterns, 
active body and vocal agency, and its potential in music making, and above all the 
exploration and application of individual effort scales. 
 
3.4.3.4.   Interpersonal communication [IN/OUT]: tools, activities, scores and 
learning sequence 
The learning sequence and tools for training inter-personal communication skills is, 
at the time of writing: 
 
Table 9 – Inter-personal communication tools and activities [IN/OUT] 
See The gaze: awareness of self and other 
Be seen 
React (communicatively) Mirroring/Synchronicity: empathy, embodied attuning; 
Improvised sound (in groups); 
Improvised spoken scores; 
Improvised story telling; 
Group devising 
 
3.4.3.4.1.   The Gaze 
The gaze, (acknowledging the other’s presence (and their own) by making eye-
contact), is a crucial tool in the vigilant performer’s toolbox by creating an immediate 
communicative loop between two people. Abramovic places it at the centre of her 
method, and of her performance practice in general, as does Pochinko /Morrison 
Clown Through Mask. Graham and Hogget, in ‘The Frantic Assembly Book of 
Devised Theatre bring our attention to the fact that “Eye contact is such an important 
part of performance and theatre. When it happens you know you are being spoken 
directly. There is no confusion and that recognition is instant. Yet it can be one of the 
more terrifying tasks for young practitioners and students to master" (2009, p.121). I 
acknowledge in my own experience both as performer, director and audience the 
difficulty of training the gaze as a tool for vigilant practice – in my view, the most 
important tool. For that reason I have included in Games for Musicians and Non-
Musicians several pieces that deal exclusively or to some extent with the gaze. The 
gaze offers both the player and the audience an immediate communicative signal. It 
IN PRACTICE: 
[BODY SCORES] 
In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, the following pieces introduce and 
explore body scores: 
 
GMNM. 7; GMNM.8; GMNM.13; GMNM.15; GMNM.16; GMNM.17; GMNM.18; 
GMNM.33; GMNM.36; GMNM.38; GMNM.39; GMNM.41; GMNM.42. 
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acknowledges each other’s presence and prepares the player and their audience for 
an exchange. It is an aspect I return to time and time again.  
 
The pieces in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians that focus on the gaze 
appear throughout the workbook combined with other skills and activities.  
 
3.4.3.4.2.   Mirroring/Synchronicity: empathy  
Some pieces focus on responding to each other’s physical and sonic presence by 
mirroring or contrasting action. I have discussed the role of mirroring and 
synchronicity activities in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians at the start of this 
section, but this point I would just like to clarify that, when mirroring activities are 
revisited in the context of developing communication, there is an added aspect of 
empathy and embodied attuning through the use of mirroring gestural repetition and 
effort scales, which I hope I have made apparent in the scores. 
 
By practicing observing the other, and being observed, and responding with 
immediate action/reaction, mirroring activities ask the player to search for some level 
of synchronicity with the other. Inter-personal communication continuously modulates 
action; the players decide their actions in reaction to each other’s. A dynamic 
communicative flow is observed in these activities.  
 
3.4.3.4.3.   Improvised spoken scores and the role of the facilitator 
Improvised spoken scores allow a facilitator to prompt another player. This is similar 
to Psychodrama’s director, or Boal’s joker. The spoken score is improvised and can 
be seen as a conversation between two or more players, where one provides the 
instructions and the other provide the actions. Players are naturally, always free to 
not follow the facilitator’s spoken score. The aim of spoken scores is to create a 
mechanism to push players out of learnt and familiar patterns of action and into more 
extreme levels of effort and unfamiliar actions. The facilitator’s role is to gently 
seduce the player(s) into less and less familiar patterns of action. Efficient 
communication is required in this process of seduction. 
IN PRACTICE: 
[GAZE] 
In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, the following pieces explore the 
gaze: 
 
GMNM.2; GMNM.3; GMNM.5; GMNM.13; GMNM.16; GMNM.27; GMNM.38; 
GMNM.39; GMNM.40; GMNM.47; GMNM.50; GMNM.53; GMNM.54; GMNM.56; 
GMNM.57; GMNM.60. 
IN PRACTICE: 
[MIRRORING/SYMPATHY: EMPATHY [IN/OUT]] 
In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, the following pieces explore 
empathy by mirroring activities: 
 
GMNM.3; GMNM.7; GMNM.10; GMNM.11; GMNM.12; GMNM.13; GMNM.14; 
GMNM.15; GMNM.16; GMNM.17; GMNM.18; GMNM.20; GMNM.21; GMNM.27; 
GMNM.30; GMNM.33; GMNM.34; GMNM.35; GMNM.36; GMNM.38; GMNM.39; 
GMNM.40; GMNM.41; GMNM.42; GMNM.45; GMNM.46; GMNM.48; GMNM.49; 




The printed text of the score – which is the only link between the composer and the 
performative processes – is a meta-score: the written score does not necessarily 
address the main performer and does not offer instructions for action (tablature) or a 
result to be expected. It suggests an improvised spoken score for one or more of the 
players, directed at other players. It offers either instructions for processes or modes 
of action (intentions, effort levels). 
 
The improvised spoken score model that I am proposing in my work book can be 
useful in exploring cognitive states of flow, since it creates a secondary control level 
(given to the player that improvises the spoken score – the facilitator), which, while 
preserving its unique, transitory, in-the-moment human presence, can still frame and 
guide the performers to extremes in their personal effort scales where, like we have 
discussed before, expressivity resides. 
 
The introduction to Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians contains a detailed 
description of spoken scores. 
 
 
3.4.3.4.4. Improvised story telling 
Story telling is used as an activity that promotes inter-personal communication 
between the storyteller and the audience and between the storyteller and other 
performers. Improvised story telling pieces ask for one or more players to tell a story 
to the audience. The story should not be scripted or memorized. Some pieces ask for 
players to speak out streams of consciousness, others place tighter constraints on 
the players. 
 
3.4.3.4.5.   Improvised Sound (in groups) 
Improvising sound and making music appears in all three skills sequences. In the 
contexts of developing audiation, promoting body/sound imagery, and now as a way 
of creating and nurturing personal relationships between players. Pieces 38 to 42 in 
Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians ask for players to improvise sound in 
groups and to react to each other’s music. 
IN PRACTICE: 
[SPOKEN SCORES/ FACILITATOR] 
In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, the following pieces explore spoken 
scores and the role of the facilitator: 




In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, the following pieces explore 
improvised story telling: 
 
GMNM.14; GMNM.15; GMNM.18; GMNM.45; GMNM.46; GMNM.47; GMNM.48; 




3.4.3.4.6.   Group Devising 
The last developmental tool in my sequence is group devising. This tool, and derived 
activities ask the players to invent a way of organizing themselves in order to create 
a performance. The introduction to Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians 
includes rules for group decision-making, and the scores themselves offer tips on 
possible ways to start a devising process. 
 
3.5.  Working with scores 
In many theatre traditions, the complex ways in which a performer’s body is seen as 
both object and subject is precisely the subject matter, constituting the training, 
labour and skill of the actor. What is important in my proposal for an embodied 
practice is precisely the realisation that the complex way in which a performer’s body 
is seen, and from which one later constructs meanings, cannot be controlled from 
within the narrow project of a score. That is to say, the score –be it a text score, 
Laban notation, a traditional western music notation – cannot define all the 
parameters that make up the extreme complexity of a performer’s embodied 
presence, without curtailing the performer’s presence itself. The score, if there is 
indeed one, has to choose between addressing either some numbers of variables 
within that complexity, relinquishing the remaining variables to chance, to tradition or 
the (fallible) individuality of the performer, or it can choose to address the underlying 
internal and external processes that precede the performer’s presence, with the aim 
of expanding the performer’s realm of possible actions and of embodied agency, but 
in this case relinquishing the parametric precision of traditional scores. The latter is 
my choice as a composer: many of the scores in my portfolio aim to expand the 
performer’s vocabulary of complex and meaningful actions (which include vocal and 
musical action), which in themselves precede the generation of meaning. In this 
sense, my scores have an unavoidable training aim, a pedagogic purpose. The 
expansion of performers vocabulary of embodied patterns is in harmony with the 
pedagogic model of Edwin Gordon’s Music Learning Theory, as I have discussed in 
IN PRACTICE: 
[MUSIC MAKING] 
In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, the following pieces explore 
improvised music making in groups: 
 
GMNM.5; GMNM.6; GMNM.7; GMNM.8; GMNM.10; GMNM.11; GMNM.12; 
GMNM.13; GMNM.16; GMNM.17; GMNM.18; GMNM.19; GMNM.20; GMNM.21; 
GMNM.22; GMNM.23; GMNM.25; GMNM.26; GMNM.30; GMNM.31; GMNM.32; 
GMNM.34; GMNM.36; GMNM.37; GMNM.38; GMNM.39; GMNM.40; GMNM.41; 
GMNM.42; GMNM.44; GMNM.45; GMNM.46; GMNM.48; GMNM.49; GMNM.50; 
GMNM.51; GMNM.52; GMNM.53; GMNM.56; GMNM.58; GMNM.59; GMNM.61; 
GMNM.62; GMNM.63; GMNM.64s. 
IN PRACTICE: 
[GROUP DEVISING] 
In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, the following pieces explore group 
decision-making and devising: 
 
GMNM.51; GMNM.55; GMNM.56; GMNM.59; GMNM.61; GMNM.62; GMNM.63; 
GMNM.64. 
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the previous section, namely the learning, with a wide variety of contexts, of a wide 
vocabulary of patterns.  
 
This research project’s focus is not only rehearsal and performance validity, but also 
about notational reliability. By notational reliability I am referring to strategies that 
ensure that a score will always produce a valid and vigilant performance, or at least 
tend towards it. I will look at issues I encountered and choices I made in respect to 
score reliability. 
 
I am using the term score in two ways: the traditional way of a score as a piece of 
written music, and as Halprin uses the term, as a stored potential for action: “Scores 
are symbolizations of processes which extend over time” (Halprin, 1976). From this 
perspective a theatre script is a score, a cake recipe is a score, the blue prints for a 
house or a new city are scores, Einstein’s general relativity equation is a score. The 
score is a script for future action. 
 
From this perspective, the composer (seen as score writer, not as performer) 
controls only one of the links in this chain in the production of musical meaning. The 
other links are in the hands of the performers and of the audience. Unless the 
composer is present and active during rehearsals, the score is the only point of 
contact between the composer’s intentions and the audience’s response to the 
performer’s presence. It is a tenuous and far removed link, with many intermediaries 
along the way.  
 
The score, as fixed intermediate point between conception and enactment of an 
event, operates as a similarly reductive algorithm, attempting, as Schoenberg 
dreamt, to do away with music altogether, in the same way Merleau-Ponty dreamt of 
language’s promise to doing away with language itself “by delivering us to things” 
(Merleau-Ponty and Lefort, 1991, p. 4). 
 
One can draw parallels here with the way we approach traditional notation, searching 
for a model to make real, to embody, yet that model does not exist in reality and it's 
embodiment is flawed in its realization, forever unaccomplished. By looking into the 
chasm that exists between the written score and the performance of the score, I am 
accepting and emphasising the a-historicism of live performance – in the sense that 
its historical residue, the written score is no longer a reliable document of a future 
event. Accepting that there are missing links and unwritten clues in any score, from 
any period and any style, is the starting point for rethinking the performer's approach 
to the alertness and vigilance on the stage. 
 
That, in my view is only possible if we do not ignore the noises, the mistakes, stutter, 
the inevitable unwanted (or simply unexpected) events in the events themselves, 
which, through their evidence of an embodied presence provide us with much more 
that the algorithm of the score can accommodate, and perhaps even more that we 
can understand. The score, as algorithm, inevitably accepts its own preferences, 
prejudices and biases: it presents what it chooses to control and deliberately 
conceals what it knows it cannot govern; the score knows what is unsayable and 
says nothing about it.  
 
The score proposes what is possible to happen and excludes what should not 
happen in a performance. In those possibilities and limitations scores can be 
grouped in styles, genres and traditions. At the same time, scores inevitably fail to 
prescribe or refuse an infinity of other events. Some are unpredictable, other are 
simply taken as inevitable. In their incompleteness, it is often the previous knowledge 
of a tradition or genre that allows the performer to complete the score and bring it 
from mere suggestion to real embodied action. 
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Scores rely on the performer having a necessary level of previous knowledge to 
enable them to be performed. The previous learning may include to be able to read 
music, if the score uses traditional western notation; jazz tabs to read a jazz lead 
sheet; be able to read the language it is written in, if it’s a text score; but also to have 
a vocabulary of idiomatic improvisatory patterns in order to decode traditional Korean 
pipa scores; a vocabulary of style appropriate gestures and embodied imagery, of 
body/sound imagery is also necessary in order to convincingly perform music in a 
particular style. 
 
The previous knowledge required also includes some knowledge of the style of 
music – ‘how should this score sound like in comparison to all the other music I’ve 
played before? How does it fit in with the styles, genres and traditions I’m familiar 
with?’ That knowledge is not presented on the score. It needs to be learnt and taught 
– by modelling and imitation. In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians the models 
to be imitated are the players themselves, teaching each other, in a community of 
enquiry, how best to understand each piece. The Nine Circles and other pieces in my 
portfolio do not exist in this realm. 
 
3.5.1.   Score as pedagogic tool 
I would like to propose that musical scores (perhaps any score or script), whatever 
form they present, always have a pedagogic element. Ultimately a score’s aim is to 
teach a person or a group of people how to do something they could not do 
previously, be it play a piece of music, recite a poem, operate a plane, build a new 
city, etc. Scores may or may not have a stated educational intent but it seems to me 
that they always have a pedagogic outcome. 
 
How does one write a score that goes beyond the musicians’ actions, and onwards 
towards vigilance, towards their intentions, their presence, their imagistic potential? 
How does one write a score that goes beyond the composer’s strict intentions and 
into the infinite possibilities of the player’s infinite intentions, so all channels between 
self and other are open, all directions observed, at all levels of effort and expressivity. 
How can a score seduce a player to play in a way that makes it inevitable and 
unavoidable for them to work with personal embodied imagery and intentions, 
body/sound gesturing, rather than deploying stylistically bound learnt action-
sequences?  
 
For Robert Lepage, “the score is best understood as an experience the performer 
goes through, rather than as a concept for the performer to analyse” (Dundjerovic, 
2007, p. 108) 
 
Dundjerovic makes the comparison between Lepage’s use of score and that of the 
traditional theatre script, stating 
In traditional text based theatre, the performer has his or her 
primary relationship with the dramatic text. [...] the director, 
together with the actors deciphers the given text and translates it 
IN PRACTICE: 
[GROUP LEARNING] 
In Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, the complete sequence of pieces 
and the rehearsal room work it proposes explore group learning and propose a 
community of enquiry for a group of players. 
The later pieces in the workbook (GMNM.59; GMNM.61; GMNM.62; GMNM.63; 
GMNM.64) positively promote group decision making by consensus. 
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into the language of the mise-en-scéne. The written text becomes 
the primary focus because it is fixed and entails a certain 
performance mise-en-scéne, whereas in devised theatre, the 
actors' primary focus is on a certain environment or stimulus they 
are working from. (Dundjerovic, 2007, p. 108) 
 
Dundjerovic’s distinction does not clarify that devised and improvisational processes 
can and often are used in script-based rehearsals. The needs of written text are still 
the primary focus but improvisation can be used as a tool to decipher it. 
 
A score can be seen as a tool for the assimilation and development of new patterns 
of action (be it musical, gestural or communicative action), which expand the sonic 
and gestural (and therefore imagetic) vocabulary and present novel possibilities of 
experience. Reynolds makes the point that  
A successful score, then, presents and explains materials 
accurately. It can never duplicate a second function served by the 
actual presence of the creator: the correction of misinterpretations 
and the modification of divergences that are too extreme. An inert 
score is unable to accomplish the feedback that a responsive 
human being can. In placing on paper a representation of his 
intentions, the composer inherits an obligation to anticipate 
possible misunderstandings and to insert suitable admonition into 
the score. Notation is not expected to serve the second corrective 
function, and it supplies only the special instructions related to the 
event envisaged (Reynolds, 2005, p. 127). 
 
Experimental composers have used the score's very potential for misunderstanding 
to force the performer to engage in the clarification process, aiming to empower the 
performer(s). Christian Wolff states that 
The techniques of coordination, interaction and interdependency, 
all players being equal (really, the normal thing in chamber music), 
and the sharing out of musical independence between composer 
and performers – that can have a metaphorical or exemplary force: 
social democracy (Wolff, cited in Saunders, 2009, p.361) 
 
But, as we have seen this decision making process has the potential, through the 
use of recognition heuristics (Saunders, 2015), to anchor itself on traditional 
expectations of what music, performance, theatre, or experimentalism should be or 
appear to be. 
 
For Reynolds the fallibility of the score extends beyond the performance event itself 
into the surrounding historical and social context: “Even in the ideal case, however, 
the notational document is rooted in and circumscribed by its own historical context” 
(p.128). 
 
My research will explore ways in which notation can structure and facilitate the 
rehearsal period and performance event to re-shape, re-educate, re-train, the 
performing musician and to develop new tools that can extend beyond their own 
established music performance practice, what Reynolds here calls their historical 
contexts. 
 
This is my answer to the questions I posed earlier: the open score’s potential to 
propel a player beyond their existing modes of musical engagement and into yet 
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unfamiliar actions can perhaps be realised by focusing on vigilance skills, and using 
vigilance developmental tools and activities. 
 
As in traditional music scores, open forms and open scores, whatever our 
understanding of the terms, do not guarantee per se the validity of a performance. 
That is to say, empowering the performer with more or less decision-making authority 
is not the reason why I found certain performances more transformative than others. 
Scoring itself, whatever score models are used, more open or more closed, does not 
guarantee validity. But if the object of an open score is precisely to make happen 
those types of events that do make a performance transformative (through vigilant 
practice or any other way) then open scores can in fact contribute enormously to my 
compositional toolkit.  
 
Philip Thomas quoting David Tudor writes: 
...If I play music [in which] the actions are undetermined as to their 
context, or at least let's say undetermined as to what they're going 
to produce, then I feel like I'm alive in every part of my 
consciousness. (Saunders, 2009, p. 77) 
 
Tudor's emphasis on making actions, rather than exploring intentions and emotions 
seems to liberate the sounds, but seems to diminish the human connection between 
performer and audience; a sense of human presence is lost if the actions are devoid 
of some emotional cloak. It is as if the musicians’ presence itself is not meaningful 
and it is not part of the construction of meaning the audience will inevitably 
undertake. This has been an important attitude in contemporary experimental music 
practice since the nineteen-fifties – but not in other performative arts, such as 
theatre, dance of performance art –, and it is this attitude that I wish to challenge with 
my scheme for performance validity through vigilant practice. Though the scored 
action cannot be directly imbued with humanity and empathy, through the use of 
individual effort scales and inter-personal communication activities (which can be 
scored) I have experienced and witnessed an increase in vigilant moments in 
performances of my scores. The empathy necessary for a vigilant, communicative 
state does not arise singly from true situations, but from truthful situations. 
 
In open scores there is usually some sort of algorithm, or a series of algorithms, but 
in the way it is conceived the algorithm can return many different possible outcomes, 
the complexity of the equation contains so many interdependent and inter-locking 
variants that the final outcome cannot be statistically predicted. My text scores (the 
language algorithm) may or may not produce predictable results; but they do not 
produce repeatable results. The proposal for action described in the scores does not 
aim for that action – which is just an envelope, a trigger, an excuse – but for 
something else to arise between the people involved in performing it, which I cannot 
predict, or plan, or even desire, since that would amount to a gross interference in 
another person’s freedom. Because it is dependent on a highly dynamic inter-
personal communication process, the players’ actions cannot be my concern 
anymore, but it is the concern of the players and their audiences to agree, vigilantly, 
what the matter at stake is – the human matter – which will be different for each 
performance.  
 
Bayley (Bayley, 2011), analysing the rehearsal process of the Kronos quartet 
working with singers and musicians from Central Asia and with Ukrainian singer 
Mariana Sadovska, highlights that  
The inadequacy of notation is a common denominator in any 
collaboration that isn’t purely improvised. […] And it is the 
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inadequacy of notation that gives rise to the participatory singing, 
gesturing, musicking and verbalizing as compensation or 
supplement. (Clarke and Doffman, Cook, p. 12)  
 
The score itself, if open enough, can be the vehicle for group enquiry and group 
decision making. The writing of my scores – that is to say, the designing of rehearsal 
and devising process and exercises for a group of performers – describes a process 
with many different possible outcomes, rather than describing the product/outcome 
itself, often with no clear clues on how to achieve it, without offering the reliance on a 
specific performance tradition, on a deciding director, or on a learnt performance 
practice to define the processes of rehearsal and preparation for a performance. The 
score is a game, with a set of rules to be followed by a group of people aiming to 
discover a dormant relevant truth, and to then present it, in a relevant way, to a 
relevant audience – of which they themselves are a part. 
 
  3.5.1.1.   Gestural/body scores 
Within the ebb and flow of determinate and indeterminate scores, some parameters 
of the performance have been traditionally determined in the score with more 
attention and detail than others. Traditionally pitch relationships are the main focus, 
the highest level of determinacy. Synchronicity between events (pulse, meter, 
rhythms) is another popular parameter to be determined in notation. Open forms 
often deal with other parameters: objects, time, timbre.  
There are not many scores or composers that convincingly and validly determine 
parameters to do with gesture and embodied imagery, what we may call for now 
gestural determinacy. In fact I would risk that gestural indeterminacy is the rule in 
most traditional scores. Some notable exceptions are some of Kagel’s scores, 
Stockhausen’s highly choreographed operas, scores by Tom Johnson, such as 
Scene for piano and tape (1969).  
 
Phillip Thomas highlights the problem of gestural indeterminacy in scores by 
suggesting that gestural omission in scores leads to gestural omission in the 
performance of those scores.  
Discussion of the music is generally centred upon the stages 
leading towards the creation of the notation, as well of the notation 
itself, but not what is subsequently done as a result of that notation. 
Whilst understanding the conceptual and aesthetic issues pertinent 
to the music being performed will doubtless affect the interpretative 
approach taken, a performer's decision - her actions - may 
conversely shape understanding of the music itself and the extent 
to which it may be considered experimental (Thomas, P. in 
Saunders, 2009, p. 78). 
 
Yet, one could argue that it is the case that even in traditional music scores, whose 
main focus are the parameters of pitch and rhythm, a gestural determinacy arises 
from physical demands of playing the right notes at the right time with the right level 
of effort. Some aspect of the player’s gesture is still 'enclosed' in the score, but 
largely unattended and unintended by both composer and performer. But the lesson 
here is that one undetermined parameter can be affected by another parameter that 
is determined by the score. I can use one aspect of a player’s action to influence 
another aspect. This has been my approach in the construction of many of the text 
scores in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians. Determining one parameter or 
action can influence another undetermined parameter. For instance, in piece 25 
Sisyphus at Work the player is asked to perform an action, any action with as much 
effort as possible over and over again. The action itself is irrelevant for me. To a 
certain degree the instruction to perform it with maximum effort is also irrelevant. 
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What is relevant is the player’s awareness of the moment when they catch 
themselves faking being too tired to carry on so they can stop, not out of exhaustion 
but out of boredom. The moment of personal honesty, of being for itself, that is what 
is relevant, that is what I am asking the player to discover. Yet it is not scored, it is 
not part of the instructions. 
 
 
Open scores offer the opportunity for the participants to enter into an equalitarian and 
democratic mode of relating to each other, both during performances of the score 
itself, and also during the in between moments, rehearsals, reflections, during which 
the piece is slowly constructed and understood by the group. Porfiriadis points to the 
questions that arise during rehearsals: "In the case of preparation and performance 
of an open form piece for a group, some research questions emerge, often neglected 
in the related literature: Who takes the necessary decisions regarding the 
construction of the form? When are these decisions taken? How would the nature of 
these decisions affect the relationships between performer and composer and 
between performers?" (Porfiriadis, 2016, p. 3). I would add to this list of questions 
one about the role of the audience in this decision making process. 
 
3.5.2. Scoring for Improvisers – Games as improvising 
activities 
In my experience working with performers in improvised forms, it is often the case 
that when asked to make free improvisatory decisions, performers often fall back on 
their learnt and acquired solutions and responses. Performers have a clear tendency 
to complete the missing aspects of a score with their own personal experience, in 
particular their training, their favoured style and genre, and the acquired language of 
embodied patterns that they are most at ease with.  Heuristics as a decision-making 
model can explain this way of completing the blanks with tradition and genre. 
Heuristics can also cast some light on what I as a composer can do in order to 
expand a performer’s vocabulary of reaction in a free improvisation situation 
(Saunders, 2015). 
 
If one's intention is to use scores as a means to expand a performer's mode of 
engagement with the situation at hand (vigilance), the score needs to offer pathways 
away from learnt behaviours, from traditions and personal habits and from genre and 
style. Again heuristics, through games construction, can offer a model for propelling 
a performer from areas of mastery into areas of personal unknown. 
 
According to Davidson, Hallam and Berkowitz improvising makes use of specific 
behavioural, cognitive and neurological structures. Understanding what is known 
about how we improvise can help create pieces that deliberately make use of such 
optimised structures. 
 
Damásio’s model of the self which I discussed in Chapter 2.1 supports Gordon’s 
Music Learning Theory, in the sense that Gordon’s theory works to develop the 
IN PRACTICE: 
[BAD-FAITH] 
The video portfolio contains two recordings of piece 25 from Games for Musicians 
and Non-Musicians performed by Uta Baldauff during rehearsals at Lansdown Hall, 
and by James McIlwrath at Amok in York, which demonstrate the moment when a 




acquisition and assimilation of musical patterns at a proto-self level, prior to engaging 
a second level organism-object relationship at a core self level, which, through 
comparison and contextualization, that is to say, using memory and past experience, 
become part of the autobiographical memory, ready to be recalled and the original 
responses reused and adapted to novel situations, familiar patterns of action re-
articulated in unfamiliar combinations, that is to say, improvised, but based on learnt 
events and environmental responses. 
 
3.5.2.1.   Use of text scores 
My decision to write text scores sits on several factors. Firstly, I agree with Smith-
Brindle when he writes that “perhaps indeed the text [score] serves better than any 
notated score, for it so strongly evokes mood rather than action” (Brindle, 1987, p. 
98).  
 
Another reason to choose text scores (in this case written in English, but easily 
translated into any language) is that text scores may offer a very low level of previous 
knowledge and experience necessary to play the games. Text scores are in that 
sense inclusive of people of any background or experience, and possibly to many 
different ages as well. Future research is possible into the adaptation of the work 
proposed in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians for children in the context of 
formal music education. 
 
The text score format, by framing the instruction as a set of clear and simple rules, 
sets itself up as a game, albeit one where there are no winners or losers. Dewey 
refers to games as “experiential learning tools”, and that “games [are] normal social 
control” (Dewey, 1938, p. 59), and, as Sawyer points out, games provide shared 
goals which are a necessary constituent of group flow.  
 
3.6. Conclusion to Chapter 3 
In this chapter I have explained the practical solutions I designed in order to address 
the problem of performance validity and notational reliability I had identified in 
Chapter 1. I have focused on ways of facilitating the development of the three vigilant 
skills of non-normative cognition, multi-modal embodied imagery and inter-personal 
communication. I exposed various pedagogic theories, which I have use to 
constructed a possible learning sequence for each skill, through the design of skills 
development tools, skills development activities and scores for pieces/games, which 
can be performed by a group of players. I have presented each of the sequences 
and made reference to relevant pieces, and (where existing) to documentation of 
rehearsals and performances in the video portfolio.  
 
I have explained my scoring decisions for Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians. 
Through text scores, I have proposed two other forms of scoring and instructing, 
namely body scores and improvised spoken scores. 
 
In the concluding chapter I will pull together the consequences of working in a vigilant 
way, possible wider social consequences and wish lists. I will end by proposing 
possible avenues of further investigation. 
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Part 4 - Conclusion: findings, 
developments and outcomes 
 
4.1. Findings 
In my personal search for what constitutes a valid performance I have encountered 
the values of unmediated and expressive human connection, and a sense of 
transformative personal action that addresses both audience and performers. 
Blanchot’s definition of vigilance seemed to me to encapsulate my performance 
ideals:  
 
Vigilance - the authority of the body when the body is not separated but fully 
in agreement with the truth of place. (Blanchot, 1982) 
 
A vigilant performance reveals a performer that demonstrates: 
 
Authority of the body: agency, fully engaged and ready to react. 
 
The body: not separated: fully embodied imagetic presence. 
 
Truth of place: an understanding of the present situation; an 
acknowledgement of all agents present in the environment. 
 
Agreement: correct response to the environment; does not necessarily 
equate to harmony. Agreement with the truth of place may require conflict 
solving. Agreement also implies a sense of deep individual honesty, and a 
movement towards personal transformation through meaningful contact with 
the environment and the other. 
 
For that reason I have called mine a proposal for a vigilant music practice. The next 
stage of this search was to invent ways in which I could reliably inject those values 
into my scores and performances. 
 
4.2.   Developments 
At the end of this research project, I have generated a set of three basic principles 
that may form the basis for what constitutes a valid music performance. Those three 
performance principles, articulated as performance skills – gathered under 
Blanchot’s concept of vigilance, and tempered by Cook’s proposal that expressivity 
resides on non-normative events (2014, 2001), are: 
 
-  non-normative cognitive states (mindlessness/metacognition) [IN] (Chapter 2.1);  
- the generation of multi-modal embodied imagery through the use of full effort scales 
[OUT] (Chapter 2.2);  
- dynamic response to the environment through inter-personal communication 
[IN/OUT] (Chapter 2.3). 
 
I have identified a set of tools that can facilitate the development of each of these 
skills (Chapter 3). Using those tools I constructed a possible sequence of 
developmental activities, which led to the creation of a series of text scores (Ch. 3). I 
have tested the reliability of these scores in a series of rehearsal periods and 
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performances prior to the final sequencing of the finished sixty-four scores in a 
collection, which I have entitled Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians.  
The three vigilance skills – [IN], [OUT], and [IN/OUT] are interdependent but have 
unique qualities that can be analysed separately. 
 
4.2.1 - [IN] 
Vigilant practice asks for a dynamic awareness of our place in the environment. The 
cognitive patterns that promote such dynamism are, according to Drinko, Damásio, 
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, as well as the meditative practice of mindfulness, the 
propensity for non-normative states of cognition, either by engaging in meta-cognitive 
activities, or by engaging in mindless activities. 
 
The mental processes involved in audiation of sound and space audiation, as 
described by Gordon, are considered part of the vigilance toolbox I have constructed. 
 
Damásio’s structure of the self provides a model for the learning and teaching of 
improvisation by exposing the organism (the performer) to many different contexts 
and patterns, which at a higher level become engrained in the autobiographic 
memory, ready to be accessed and used in multiple combinations, some already 
learnt, others completely new in a growing spiral of potential complexity, yet always 
based on patterns of behaviour that the organism is already familiar with. In Gordon’s 
Music Learning Theory the contexts and patterns that constitute a musician’s musical 
vocabulary are divided in rhythmic, tonal, harmonic, melodic, but I believe the same 
vocabulary acquisition model (which he adapted from Dewey, Gagné pedagogic 
model) can be used to expand a player’s cognitive, gestural, vocal, and 
communicative action patterns. The developmental sequence of vigilant 
improvisation that I am proposing is structured around this very idea: expose the 
player to as many different and unfamiliar patterns as possible (musical patterns, but 
also gestural, embodied, vocal, emotional, communicative states, responses and 
patterns of action) so that the player forms an increasingly vast vocabulary of familiar 
patterns which they can access, repeat, combine and expand in unfamiliar and novel 
ways. 
 
[IN] - Drinko’s work on neurology and cognition during improvisation, which I 
discussed in Chapter 2, proposes that certain mental states are conducive to a state 
of flow (System 1), while others tend to bring the performer into a state of self-
awareness, and meta-cognition (System 2), that halts quick and intuitive agency 
during an improvisation. Drinko’s proposal is based on the observation of theatrical 
and dance practices and it may not immediately fit the specific requirements of 
musical improvisation using musical instruments for the following reason: the mind-
wandering (System 1) state, which Drinko suggests is optimal for physical and verbal 
improvisation, does not seem to interfere with the performers capacity to move or 
speak. System 1 does not impair the tools of improvisation. That may not always be 
true in the case of instrumental music, because the fine motor control and the 
predictive audiation mental process necessary for playing a musical instrument may 
be in opposition to the mind-wandering state.  
 
Many of the pieces in Games ask for performers to copy each other, mirroring 
movements, miming the other. One of the aims of these pieces is to introduce 
players to unfamiliar and novel was of moving, walking, talking, singing. Another aim 
is connected with promoting cognitive System 1. By relinquishing decision making 
authority to another player, the copying player is being asked to ignore input from 
System 2. Decision making about movements, rhythms, pitches is deliberately (if one 
accepts to play the games) passed on to the player whose actions are being copied, 
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and with it, reflective agency over their own decision-making process – System 2. 
Improvisation games build up on this experience to offer the players an opportunity to 
transfer the same cognitive skills (system 1) to act with agency, but now without full 
rational reflection (Drinko, 2013) 
 
4.2.2 - [OUT] 
A vigilant musical practice – in its pursue for a dynamic communication flow with its 
environment and audience– welcomes embodied multi-modal imagery and gesture, 
which encompasses the gaze and the voice into it's toolbox. 
 
The parallels between music communication and verbal/aural communication are 
important in scaffolding the concept of multi-modal embodied practice:  
 
1. Language is inseparable from imagery and gesture (Chomsky, McNeill, 
Kendon) 
2. Music shares many aspects with language at an evolutionary, cognitive, 
pedagogic, social  levels (Gordon; Methen, Davidson Sloboda,) 
3. Music, like language, is also inseparable from imagery and gesture (Gordon, 
Dalcroze, Davidson) 
4. What we have learnt from the embodied and multi-modal nature of language 
should be promoted in the conception and development of a vigilant musical 
practice. 
5. Exploring effort scales and non-normative states may help develop the full 
scope of multi-modal embodied imagery. 
 
Gordon established strong relationships between the way humans think language 
and how we think music, which he calls audiation. In fact Gordon’s music acquisition 
model places the audiation skill at the centre of music training process. Audiation is 
the most fundamental skill to be developed by musicians at every stage of their 
development from pre-birth to maturity. Audiation and space audiation stand for 
music making as thinking stands for speaking.  
 
I am proposing the possibility that the imagery-speech bond that McNeill describes is 
also present in music making, as a music-gesture bond, that may be constructed in 
parallel with language, and possibly use a shared neurological circuitry with 
language-imagery. 
 
The external aspect of the music-gesture bond is the strong force in music 
communication. It is at this level that clear interpersonal communication can occur. 
It is the external and visible aspect that is taught and learnt, formally or informally, by 
osmosis and imitation. It forms the basis for the differences between performance 
styles. It is culturally conditioned and delimitated. It defines stylistically bound notions 
of validity, of correctness, of expressivity, of group connection. 
 
Perhaps the most important finding in this research was the application of the 
practice of effort scales as described by the Estill Voice Model to the formation of 
embodied imagery. Inhabiting non-normative states while engaging in musical or 
non-musical activities offers the player the opportunity to safely discover their 
personal spectrum of embodied imagery potential, and to learn to navigate it. 
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4.2.3 - [IN/OUT] 
To make an inquiry into communication requires an observation of the gestural 
imagery of all entities involved. Similarly, an inquiry into music communication 
requires an observation of musician’s gestural images.  
The two-way interpersonal communication model that Hargie proposes is particularly 
well suited to understanding the language-gesture-imagery bond (Kendon, McNeill). 
 
4.3.  Notational reliability 
My objective is to write scores that are reliable, that is to say, scores that offer within 
their script all the information necessary to create a valid performance – vigilance 
being my personal standard of validity. Each score proposes to develop one or more 
vigilance skills, through the use of development tools and by engaging in 
developmental activities. A score is seen as pedagogic mechanism. Implementing 
experiential pedagogic theories I designed an experiential learning sequence that 
promotes the development of vigilance skills in performers. Games for Musicians and 
Non-Musicians is a set of activities derived from the learning sequence. Personal 
development in vigilance skills is operated experientially, through doing and 
reflecting. Improvisation and openness are considered a central aspect of the 
development of vigilance skills. 
 
4.4.   Output: Portfolio of Works 
A record of the scores produced during this research is presented in the Catalogue. 
The Catalogue contains reports of rehearsals and performances and references to 
the scores and video documentation included in the portfolio. It is presented 
separately for ease of reading and cross-referencing. 
 
4.5.  Other Outcomes 
Personal development: Performer/Improviser; Composer; personal 
transformation 
 
In Chapter 3 I mentioned several performance practice workshops and training 
sessions I attended during the period of this research, which have brought deep 
insights and greatly furthered my performance practice. 
 
As a piece of action research, I included myself as an object of the research. My 
personal practice was used in the research, and it was transformed by the research 
itself. I have noticed a marked transformation in the way I approach live performance, 
music or otherwise. I address the audience a lot more, and I have learnt to engage 
my body and my gestural imagery in my performances and music improvisations. I 
have noticed a profound transformation in my performances with Blancmange, where 
my physical engagement and use of effort scales has become a focus for me. 
 
As a composer I have also noticed my score writing practice – mainly text scores– 
has transformed. My scores have become clearer, more precise, and support a 
stronger individual participation from each player. 
 
4.5.1.  Pedagogic support for the development of a vigilant 
practice 
The development of a pedagogy of vigilant music performance, of music 
improvisation, and a practice of music composition can and should include a 
potential for the imagetic and the gestural, not as scored or stylistically-bound un-
scored choreographies, but, as in language, as opportunities for vigilant and 
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spontaneous and unhindered communication between the performers and their 
audience.  
 
The training of a vigilant practice proposes to open doors for possible actions, to 
expand the individual’s unique repertoire of embodied imagery, rather than to dictate 
stylistic or non-stylistic gestural actions. 
 
4.6. Areas for further exploration 
I will propose future avenues of exploration: compositional use of video scores that 
can explore the interconnectedness between movement, materiality and embodied 
improvisation; social models of interaction using my definition of embodied practice in 
areas other than music and performance practice – education, team working 
environments. 
 
• Further explorations of [IN] 
Writing new scores, promoting in particular deeper integration of mindfulness 
practices into the activities. 
 
• Further explorations of [OUT]:  
Creation of new pieces using video scores, exploring the materiality of image and of 
sonic gestures. Researching the use of live video scores, which can offer players the 
possibility of improvising from a visual stimulus that albeit not human, can present a 
variety of imagery, be it human and non-human multi-modal gestures, movements, 
speed and momentum, colours and textures, time structures as a multi-modal and 
imagetic scoring proposition. The video image is the score. 
 
• Further explorations of [IN/OUT] 
Rehearse and present long form pieces in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians 
(GMNM.53 to GMNM.64), for which a working group of performers will meet during a 
development period. Write new scores that explore communication skills. 
 
• Future development of Games for Musicians and Non-
Musicians 
Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians need to be implemented in performance 
practice development through workshops. It is possible to consider the use of Games 
for Musicians and Non-Musicians in group building activities, away from performance 
situations. 
 
One avenue to consider is to research and develop a version of Games for 
Musicians and Non-Musicians as a music-learning tool for children and young 
musicians. 
 
4.7.  Concluding arguments: hopes, wishes and 
desires 
 
4.7.1.  Emotional Freedom 
I believe there is a social and psychological dimension in the act of making music 
that has the potential to operate personal transformations in the individual and 
groups involved. This power operates not only at the level of the sonic entities of 
music but also at the physical and bodily levels, through multi-sensory cognition. As 
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such, music operates at the deepest level of core consciousness, and also at the 
level of extended consciousness, which encompasses emotional self, awareness, 
and communicative and social agency. The work I am proposing has the potential to 
operate at an emotionally alert and active level.  
 
It is important to differentiate between engaging in verbal discussions about emotions 
and the embodied experience of emotions. Meredith Monk summarized this 
differentiation when she says that “our culture teaches us to describe our 
experiences, to narrate our experiences, and that some how we are one step away 
from the experience” (Vanloo, 2009) 
 
William James says that emotions are physical states: ‘I feel sad because my body is 
crying'. I propose the freedom to publicly express, in the ultimate reality of one's 
body, our emotional flux, the tempestuous rapid of our body-emotion. In our liberated 
bodies reside our liberated emotions: such freedoms would hopefully set us on our 
way to being more complete, truthful, and freer living things. 
 
Freedom becomes an important aspect of this debate, a particular kind of freedom: 
the freedom to nurture and share our emotional selves. Hegel introduces the idea 
that “history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of 
freedom” (Honderich, 1995). Other philosophers of freedom have developed Hegel’s 
idea: Marx, Nietzsche, Steiner, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. 
 
Matthews, in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s writings on freedom and oppression, states 
that “it seems clear to Merleau-Ponty, however, that the oppressed ought to [become 
aware of their situation and desire to change it]: that oppression ought to be removed 
so that human beings could realize their possibility of true community with each 
other, in which each recognized each other's freedom and no one group of human 
beings exercised domination over any other" (Matthews, 1996, p. 101) 
 
Kant proposed that freedom to publicly display the results of one’s reason was the 
most revolutionary action one could engage in. In his words: 
 
For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom 
in question is the most innocuous form of all – freedom to make public use of 
one's reason in all matters. [...] The public use of man's reason must always 
be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men (Kant and 
Nisbet, 2013, p. 3). 
 
I would add, now that we have a theory of multiple intelligences (Gardner), in which 
emotional intelligence plays a large role in defining a sense of self (Damásio), now 
that we have a theoretical awareness of the subconscious and the unconscious – I 
would add that for enlightenment of this kind one needs another type of freedom, 
perhaps even more innocuous that Kant's, which is the freedom to make public use 
of one's emotions in all matters. Not through the a-posteriori use of words about 
emotions and through other analytic and conceptual frame works that do precisely 
the opposite of public emotional freedom, but through the embodied display of these 
very emotions.  
 
I am similarly proposing that the freedom to publicly display the embodied results of 
one’s emotional flux, and by doing so presenting oneself in totality, is, within the 
present western European cultural context, the most socially revolutionary action one 
can engage in. For that reason, emotional freedom is an important aim of my 
developmental sequence for vigilant practice. 
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4.7.2.   Vigilant group improvisation: a experiential model for 
social interaction 
When one discusses music practice as a model for social interaction it is common to 
encounter the notion that music is a metaphor for such interaction. The sonata form, 
with its contrasting themes, is often portrayed as a drama in music, each theme 
taking the role of a different character; Schoenberg’s dodecaphonic pan-tonal system 
is observed in parallel with the raise of representative universal democracies – if all 
citizens are equal, then so are all notes. These approaches to musical forms as 
social metaphors are interesting but they do not reach into the musical act itself. 
  
A second approach is to observe the social model in the act of making music and try 
to expand it to the world beyond. For instance, Bach worked in a protestant and 
relatively equalitarian community and the music making model he asks from his 
musicians is representative of his world order. The social act of singing a Bach mass, 
where all parts have interesting melodies to sing, intricate counterpoint and a parity 
of musical relevance between all parts is very different from the experience of 
performing a Mozart symphony, where some instruments play the nice tunes while 
the basses play pages and pages of tonic and dominant roots. The social model, 
from the point of view of music making, gives some musicians preference over 
others. Mozart grew up and worked under absolutist monarchies, with strict class 
separation and privileges.  
 
Amnon Wolman and James Saunders’ scores require group consensus. The process 
of making music requires consensual decisions, operated through following the rules 
set out in the score. Some of James Saunders’ scores take the form of games. I 
propose that this work is a practical model (not a metaphor) for social interaction, 
democratic and humanising. It demonstrates a concern with present pressing issues 
of individuality and identity, freedom, equality and co-operation. For that reason, it is 
work of our time. 
 
The models of social interaction I am proposing through the development of vigilance 
skills and in Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians are based on ideals of 
freedom, equality, and social responsibility. It is my hope that experiencing those 
ideals in the rehearsal room and on the stage will help sediment those very values in 
the lives of those that choose to work through my proposal, and those around them. 
 
Echo and Narcissus – self and other  
Take Roger Scruton’s perspective that the other is a sacred representation of the self 
(Scruton, 2017); and Merleau-Ponty’s view that the self only truly becomes apparent 
when seen in counterpoint with the other; bring into your mind Damásio’s view that 
the sense of self develops in multiple sequential changes in the organism, changes 
which are operated by objects it encounters; one can perhaps make a reading of the 
myth of Echo and Narcissus as telling the story of a progressive awakening of self 
awareness, brought about by the encounter with the other.  
 
In Narcissus’ story, the encounter of his own reflection (while misunderstood as 
another person with whom Narcissus falls in love) grants him the possibility that the 
other he sees is but a representation of the self (according to Scruton). In Echo’s 
story, she becomes locked in the other, by eternally repeating what she hears from 
others, learning, experiencing, all her experiences conditioned by the primary input of 
the other. As in Damásio’s view, in which the sense of self grows from the interaction 
of the organism with the objects it encounters, Echo grows from observing the other, 
from learning new words, new voices, new selves each time she responds.  
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Narcissus, in this reading, is not self obsessed but aware of self and other, of self as 
other; and Echo is not locked in the automatic, selfless, senseless repetition of the 
other, but acutely aware of how the other deeply forges and feeds her own sense of 
self. Together, both Narcissus and Echo offer a complete reading of selfhood and 
other-hood. It is perhaps tragically meaningful that in the Greek myth both figures’ 
destiny is to mis-encounter each other for eternity.  
 
Perhaps we have lived the past 250 years – since the consciousness transformations 
that started in the enlightenment – perhaps the West has lived in the age of 
Narcissus, the age when we discovered the importance of the self, of the individual, 
of each single person’s experience. The age that preceded it was, in this analogy, 
the Age of Echo, when the self was perpetually locked into the other: the family, the 
tribe, the temple, the nation. Perhaps what I am proposing with my work on vigilance, 
and I am trying to find within myself, is to catch a glimpse of the next age, the next 
step in the development of the consciousness of our sense of freedom, an age where 
Echo and Narcissus finally encounter, see, and acknowledge each other. 
 
This rebalancing of the sense of self (and individual freedom), and other (a group 
responsibility) has consequences for our notion of authorship, which can be 
reframed: vigilance proposes an equilibrium between the concerns of a group of 
people (Echo, pre-enlightenment), and the concerns of the individual (Narcissus, 
post-enlightenment). The author of an event can not be truly said to be this or that 
person, the performers can no longer be said to be this or that group. The authors of 
the event are the performers, which are also its audience. There is no self/other 
schism within the event. Self and other exist as primary colours, ready to be mixed 
into all possible colours. 
 
The practice of vigilance proposes the development of the awareness of the 
encounter – in Moreno’s terms – between self and other. That encounter propitiates 
a disclosure, a bridging of the chiasm, a revelation of good-faith, of Tele, of honesty 
and truthfulness perhaps akin to Heidegger’s elusive aletheia, or Damásio’s and Sue 
Morrison’s transformation. Damásio summarises my point when he writes that: 
The drama of the human condition comes from consciousness 
because its concerns and knowledge are obtained in a bargain that 
none of us stroke: the cost of a better existence is the loss of 
innocence about that very existence. (Damásio, 2000, p. 316) 
 
I conclude by highlighting the social implications of my proposed model of vigilant 
improvisation, suggesting its transformative potential, at an individual and social 
level. Having outlined a generic set of axioms of an aesthetics of vigilant and 
embodied improvisation, I speculate that the practice and experience of vigilance has 
an inherent social and moralizing value.  
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Appendix I – A short description of 
Music Learning Theory 
 
I have made reference to Gordon’s Music Learning Theory at several points in this 
text, as and when appropriate to substantiate my arguments and to justify my 
choices regarding a definition and practice of vigilant music improvisation. It is 
therefore important that I explain the fundamental building blocks of Gordon’s theory. 
Importantly, Music Learning Theory offers me a way of structuring a possible plan of 
action for the development of a vigilant and embodied technique (Spatz, 2015) 
through a sequential pedagogic effort, incarnated in my workbook Games for 
Musicians and Non-Musicians. 
 
Music Learning Theory (MLT) is the creation of Edwin E. Gordon and his research 
team. It was developed over sixty years, since Gordon’s first observations at Iowa 
and Buffalo of how children acquire musical skills. It is an explanation of how humans 
learn music. MLT is a research based explanation of the unique phenomenon of 
music acquisition. MLT is grounded on the phenomenon of audiation. 
 
In MLT, taking Gagné’s learning models as a starting point, Gordon defines two 
distinct stages in music learning: differentiation learning, and inference learning. 
They are sequential, that is, a degree of differentiation learning needs to have taken 
place before a person can engage in inference learning. In differentiation learning, 
we learn mainly by comparison: we observe two objects and notice the differences 
between them. We learn to expect certain values regarding those differences. A 
musical example would be to learn the difference between major and minor. One can 
explain to a student all the reasons why they are different but until a student can 
identify that there is a difference between major and minor, learning anything else is 
of little consequence. Learning at the differentiation stage involves a great deal of 
modelling and mirroring. The student is clearly aware that they are being taught, 
guided, and instructed through copying differentiated actions. In learning the 
differences between objects, the student starts to create a personal catalogue of 
patterns (in the case of music, patterns of meter, rhythm, pitch, harmony, timbre, 
dynamics and how they tend to behave in the context of a particular musical syntax, 
or style). The early stages of education are thus devoted to the creation of a vast 
personal vocabulary of patterns through learning songs, moving with music, and 
through a structured music learning sequence, where individual patterns are taught 
in isolation and contrasted with each other. Improvisation is promoted by combining 
the learnt patterns in many different ways, creating a super-vocabulary of 
combinations. Stylistic differences in rhythm, tonal habits, modes, types of voice 
production, start to become obvious to the student, yet no type of pattern is ignored. 
The more patterns and styles are learnt, the richer the vocabulary of a student is and 
the more elaborate their improvisations are likely to be. 
 
At the inference level, the student makes use of their expanded and often vast 
vocabulary of familiar patterns and is now capable of finding differences on their own, 
of combining different patterns in unfamiliar ways (improvisation). At this stage the 
student is not aware they are being taught, self-learning being more important. A 
clear learning sequence is still used in the structuring of lessons. 
 
Using these two types of learning as scaffolding, different learning sequences were 
designed for each of the musical skills, in the order they are mastered by students, 
one step offering preparation for the next step in the learning sequence.  
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Gordon identifies two main skill domains: rhythm and tonal. Each domain address 
specific musical skills, through learning very short patterns. Rhythm pertains to pulse, 
meter, divisions; Tonal pertains to pitch relationships (through the use of tonal 
solfége and tonal patterns), and harmony (through short harmonic patterns). 
By superimposing a learning sequence for each skill with the two learning domains, 
differentiation and inference, Music Learning Theory provides us with a clear music 
learning sequence upon which a scheme of work can be designed. 
MLT derives a scheme of work from the Whole-Part-Whole structure, where integral 
songs and pieces are learnt, in different modes and meters, prior to its constituting 
patterns being learnt separately. Once each short pattern is learnt, and 
improvisations using those patters are tried out, the whole piece is revisited again, 
but now with a deeper understanding of each constitutive part. 
 
Gordon insists that a strict process of student aptitude differentiation is adhered to at 
all stages in order to shape the teaching process. There is no point teaching very 
difficult patterns to students of low rhythmic or tonal aptitude. It would only lead to 
frustration. Equally, there is no value in repeatedly teaching easier patterns to 
students of higher rhythmic or tonal aptitude. This would only bore them. For the 
purpose of identifying each student’s level of audiation aptitude, Gordon has 
designed a battery of tests that allow the teacher to shape the classroom activities to 
suit both lower and higher aptitude students. No one should be refused a solid music 
education, no matter his or her inherent level of musical aptitude.  Notice that there is 
no attempt to judge a students ‘talent’ but their aptitude to learn. Talent, whatever is 
understood by this slippery word, is irrelevant. This point will become very important 
is my own scores and their attempt to include musicians and non-musicians.  
 
In practice, this means a player performing my scores should be aware of their own 
physical, musical and communication limits and attempt, through the rehearsal and 
performance of my scores, to expand their personal limits to the most of their 
aptitude, on the different vigilance skills I have identified in the body of the text.    
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• GMNM: Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians 
• MITP: Museum In The Park, Stroud, 12,13,15,16/9/2017, workshop week on 
Games for Musicians and Non-Musicians, Neil Arthur; Uta Baldauff; Anne-
Margritte Böhl; Chris Chris; Andy Dunn; Herewood Gabriel; Graeme Owen; 
Sean Roe; Angie Spencer; Vicky Temple. 
• AMOK: Amok, York, 3-6/2/2019, William Barnardo, Gaia Blandina, Felix Hird, 
Oogoo Maia, John McAreavey, James McIllwrath, Lynette Quek 
• OLAD: On Light and Darkness v.2 (GMNM.63), performed at Amok, 6/2/2019 
• Ryoanji – Index Gallery, 6/6/2014, Alun Hart, Cameron Johnson, Oogoo 
Maia 
• NMLQS: New Music for Loud and Quiet Sounds, Index Gallery, Stroud, 
21/3/2014, Gavin McClafferty, Oogoo Maia 
• OSL: Open Scores Lab, Bath Spa University: 
o OSL.1: 11/1/2017, Vassilis Chatzimakris, Cameron Johnson, Robert 
Luzar, James Saunders, Jenniffer Walshe;  
o OSL.2: 5/4/2017, Cathy van Eck, Louis d’Heurdieres, Cameron 
Johnson, Leandro Maia, James Saunders. 
• Ludo2017: Conference, Bath Spa University, 28/2/2017, Louis d’Heurdieres, 
Cameron Johnson, Oogoo Maia, Joe Manghan, Harry Mathew, James 
Saunders.  
 
Table 10 – List of Video and photographs submitted 
Folder File name 
GMNM.01: GMNM.1 - MITP Angie Herry (Discussion Part 1).mov 
 GMNM.1 - MITP Angie Herry (Discussion Part 2a).mov 
 GMNM.1 - MITP Angie Herry (Discussion Part 2).mov 
 GMNM.1 - MITP Neil Uta (Discussion).mov 
GMNM.02: GMNM.2 - MITP Angie Herry Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.2 - Open Scores Lab 1 - 11-01-17.mov 
 GMNM.2 [Tk.1]- MITP Andy Uta Neil Sean Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.2 [Tk.2] - MITP Andy Uta Neil Sean Oogoo.mov 
GMNM.03: GMNM.3 - MITP Neil Oogoo Andy Uta Anne-Margrite Sean.mov 
GMNM.04: GMNM.4 - Jim McIllwrath (a).mov 
 GMNM.4 - Jim McIllwrath (b).mov 
 GMNM.4 - Lansdown - Uta Baldauff.mov 
 GMNM.4 - MITP - Angie unpacks vl.mov 
 GMNM.4 - MITP Herry.mov 
 GMNM.4 - MITP Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.4 [Tk.1] - MITP Angie.mov 
 GMNM.4 [Tk.2] - MITP Angie Tk. 2 Improvising.mov 
 GMNM.4.1 - Index Gallery Alun Hart - Start (a).mov 
 GMNM.4.2 - Index Gallery Alun Hart - Concl. (a).mov 
GMNM.05: GMNM.5 - MITP Angie Herry.mov 
GMNM.06: GMNM.6 - Amok Gaia.mov 
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Folder File name 
 GMNM.6 [Tk.1] - MITP Angie.mov 
 GMNM.6 [Tk.2] - MITP Herry.mov 
 GMNM.6 [Tk.3] - MITP Angie Herry.mov 
 GMNM.6 [Tk.4] - MITP Angie (vl.).mov 
 GMNM.6 [Tk.5] - MITP Herry (fl.).mov 
GMNM.07: GMNM.7 - MITP Andy Sean Vicky.mov 
 GMNM.7 - MITP - Sound to drawing 01 
 GMNM.7 - MITP - Sound to drawing 02 
 GMNM.7 - MITP - Sound to drawing 03 
 GMNM.7 - MITP - Sound to drawing 04 
GMNM.08: GMNM.8 [Tk.1] - MITP Andy Uta Neil Sean Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.8 [Tk.2] - MITP Andy Oogoo manipulation [Var.B].mov 
 GMNM.8 [Tk.3] - MITP Andy Uta Neil Sean Oogoo [Var.B] Andy 
Guiding Group.mov 
 GMNM.8 [Tk.4a Prep. and group discussion] - MITP Andy Uta Neil 
Sean Oogoo [Var.B].mov 
 GMNM.8 [Tk.4b] - MITP Andy Uta Neil Sean Oogoo [Var.B].mov 
 GMNM.8 [Tk.5] - MITP Andy Uta Neil Sean Oogoo [Var.B].mov 
 GMNM.8 [Tk.6] - MITP Sean Conducting  [Var.C].mov 
GMNM.09: GMNM.9 - Lansdown - Uta Baldauff.mov 
 GMNM.9 [Tk.1]- MITP Uta (with discussion on effort scales).mov 
 GMNM.9 [Tk.2]- MITP Uta (Max. effort).mov 
 GMNM.9 [Tk.3]- MITP Sean guiding Uta.mov 
 GMNM.9 [Tk.4]- MITP (Group Devising, Modularity).mov 
 GMNM.9 [Tk.5]- MITP Andy (Baby Love).mov 
 GMNM.9 [Tk.6] - MITP Andy (own gestures).mov 
GMNM.10: GMNM.10 - tk.1-4, discussions - Amok.mp4 
 GMNM.10 [Tk.1]- MITP Andy Chris Sean (Preparation).mov 
 GMNM.10 [Tk.2]- MITP Andy Chris Sean.mov 
 GMNM.10 [Tk.3]- MITP Andy Chris Sean.mov 
 GMNM.10 [Tk.4]- MITP Andy Chris Sean.mov 
 GMNM.10 [Tk.5]- MITP Andy Chris Sean.mov 
GMNM.11: GMNM.11 - Amok.mp4 
 GMNM.11 [Tk.1] - MITP Andy Uta Neil Sean Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.11 [Tk.2]- MITP Andy Vicky Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.11 [Tk.3]- MITP Andy Uta Neil Sean Oogoo.mov 
GMNM.13: GMNM.13 - MITP Uta Herry.mov 
GMNM.14: GMNM.14 - Amok.mov 
 GMNM.14 [Tk.1] - MITP Uta Herry.mov 
 GMNM.14 [Tk.2] - MITP Uta Herry.mov 
 GMNM.14 [Tk.3] - MITP Herry Oogoo.mov 
GMNM.15: GMNM.15 [Tk.1]- MITP Uta Herry.mov 
 GMNM.15 [Tk.2]- MITP Herry Uta Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.15 [Tk.3]- MITP Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.15 [Tk.4]- MITP Oogoo.mov 
 GMNM.15 [Tk.5]- MITP Uta Var. A.mov 
GMNM.16: GMNM.16 - Index Gallery - Alun Oogoo Cameron (a).mov 
 GMNM.16 - Index Gallery - Alun Oogoo Cameron (b) NA.mpeg 
GMNM.18: GMNM.18 - Lile James Saunders.mov 
 GMNM.18 - Ludus Conference.mov 
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Folder File name 
 GMNM.18 - Open Scores Lab 1 - 11-01-17.mov 
GMNM.23: GMNM.23 (Var.C) - Oogoo Jim - Amok.dv 
 GMNM.23 - Jim McIllwrath.mov 
GMNM.25: GMNM.25 - Jim McIllwrath.mov 
 GMNM.25 - Lansdown - Uta Baldauff.mov 
GMNM.27: GMNM.27 - in OLAD – Amok York Show.mov 
GMNM.28: GMNM.28 - Lansdown - Uta Baldauff.mov 
GMNM.31: GMNM.31 - Index Gallery - Cameron (a).mov 
 GMNM.31 - Index Gallery - Cameron (b) NA.mpeg 
 GMNM.31 - Index Gallery - Oogoo (a).mov 
 GMNM.31 - Index Gallery - Oogoo (b) NA.mpeg 
 GMNM.31 - Index Gallery - Oogoo (c).MOV 
 GMNM.31 - Index Gallery - Oogoo (d).MOV 
 GMNM.31- Mariana Marcelino (BSU)- Rehearsals Oogoo.mp4 
GMNM.45: GMNM.45 - ALL TAKES - Amok.mov 
 GMNM.45 - Open Scores Lab 1 - 11-01-17.mov 
 GMNM.45 - Tk.1 - Amok.mov 
 GMNM.45 - Tk.2 - Amok.mov 
 GMNM.45 - Tk.3 - Amok.mov 
GMNM.47: GMNM.47 - Lansdown - Uta Baldauff.mov 
GMNM.50: GMNM.50 - Lansdown - Uta Baldauff.mov 
GMNM.51: GMNM.51 - Open Scores Lab 2 - 05-04-17.mov 
GMNM.63 GMNM.63 - On Light and Dark: 
 OLAD - Counting [ζ] - Amok.dv 
 OLAD - Counting [ζ] - CHURCH - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Harmony 1 - All Takes - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Harmony 1 Tk.1 - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Harmony 1 Tk.2-3 - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Harmony 1 Tk.4 (2 Notes) - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Harmony 1 Tk.5 (Voices) - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Harmony 2 (No eye contact)- Amok.mov 
 OLAD - On light and Dark - AMOK.wav 
 OLAD - Synchronicity [β] - Music Only - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Transformations [V]- Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Transformations [ι] - Chromatic Scales - CHURCH - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - Transformations [ι] - Chromatic Scales - Tom - Amok.dv 
 OLAD - Transformations [μ]- Quartet - Amok.mov 
 OLAD - York Amok SHOW.dv 
Holborne 
Museum, Bath: 
Holborne Museum - Embodied model (painting).JPG 
Holborne Museum - Performance 01.JPG 
 Holborne Museum - Performance 02.JPG 
 Holborne Museum - Performance 05.JPG 
 Holborne Museum - Performance 06.JPG 
 Holborne Museum - Performance 07.JPG 
 Holborne Museum - Performance 08.JPG 
 Holborne Museum - Performance 09.JPG 
 Holborne Museum - Performance 10.JPG 
 Holborne Museum - Mariana Marcelino Dress Rehearsal 1.mp4 
 Holborne Museum - Mariana Marcelino Dress Rehearsal 2.mp4 
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Folder File name 
 Holborne Museum - Mariana Marcelino SHOW.mp4 
Performance 
Photographs: 
Blancmange 01.jpg  
Blancmange 02.jpg 
Blancmange 03.jpg 
The Nine Circles: The Nine Circles.9 (frag.) - Index Gallery NMLQS Oogoo (Long).m4v 
 The Nine Circles.9 - Index Gallery NMLQS Oogoo (Shorter) .mov 
 The Nine Circles. - Index Gallery NMLQS Oogoo .m4v 
Thee Ones: Thee Ones Album Launch - I'm a man (front).mov 
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